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Prosecutorial Misconduct in Closing Argument
Honorable J. Allison DeFoor I1"
Introduction
Prosecutorial misconduct in closing argument1 is increasing in fre-
quency and appears to be perniciously resistant to eradication. Because
of its potentially disastrous effects2 upon a criminal trial, it demands
the attention of prosecutors and the defense bar alike. As stated by Mr.
Justice Drew: "Many a winning touchdown has been called back and
nullified because someone on the offensive team violated a rule by
which the game was to be played. '"'
This article will explore the parameters imposed upon a prosecutor
in Florida4 in arguments to the jury,5 the effects of failure to adhere to
those standards,6 and the procedural rules governing this area of the
law.7
* Judge, Monroe County Court, The Florida Keys, Florida. B.A. University of
South Florida 1976; J.D. Stetson University College of Law 1979, M.A. University of
South Florida 1979. During the research and writing of this article, Judge Defoor was
an Assistant State Attorney in the 16th Judicial Circuit of Florida.
1. The reasoning may also be applied to improper opening statements, as the rule
would be the same. Of course, there should, in theory, be no arguments advanced in
opening. Cf. Juhasz v. Darton, 146 Fla. 484, 1 So. 2d 476, 478 (1941).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
3. Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612, 616 (Fla. 1967).
4. The laws of other jurisdictions will only be considered as they reflect or am-
plify principles of Florida law.
5. Arguments have been referred to by commentators such as Note, Prosecutor
Forensic Misconduct-"Harmless Error?" 6 UTAH L. REV. 108, 108 (1958) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Prosecutor Forensic Misconduct], and have been defined as "any activity
by the prosecutor which tends to divert the jury from making its determination of guilt
or innocence by weighing the legally admitted evidence in the manner prescribed by
law . ." Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prose-
cution of a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 946, 949 (1954) [hereinafter cited as
Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct].
6. See infra text accompanying notes 203-07.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 208-28.
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Recent Trends
The recent case of State v. Gomez8 concluded with the prosecu-
tor's summation:
Don't let that gentleman [the victim] with three children and a
wife walk away without justice in this case, facing possible jail, an
arm that's hideously changed the rest of his life and let these gen-
tlemen [the defendant and codefendant] walk away into our com-
munity and commit further crimes of this nature. These assassins
must be put away. It is your duty to do that. You told me you'll do
that.9
The Third District Court of Appeal expressed its obvious exasperation
with the prosecutor thus: "We add to the growing list of cases requiring
reversal on the basis of prosecutorial misconduct, the case of Jos6
Gomez." 10 The court noted dryly that in this case, the victim for whom
the prosecutor pled for "justice" was an admitted perjurer, as were all
of the State's witnesses, while the "assassin" had no prior criminal
record.1"
In the subsequent case of Jackson v. State, 2 the exasperation of
the district court reached a peak. In the face of the prosecutorial argu-
ment which it termed "utterly and grossly improper,"13 the court in
Jackson chose to react to the "veritable torrent of cases which have
simiarly involved significant prosecutorial improprieties committed by
assistant state attorneys in this district. 1 14 Noting that the volume of
such cases included multiple improprieties by individual prosecutors, 5
the court stated that a pattern seemed to be emerging: "[W]e must
suspect, however reluctantly, that the improprieties may be deliberately
8. 415 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).




12. 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
13. Id.
14. Id. at 16. See infra note 20.
15. 421 So. 2d at 16. The court stressed it was not the prosecutor in the case sub
judice. They appear to have been directing their fire at the Gomez prosecutor. Id. See
infra note 24.
4
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calculated to accomplish just what representatives of the state cannot
be permitted - inducing a jury to convict by unfairly prejudicing it
against the defendant."16 The Jackson court noted that other sanctions,
such as stern judicial admonitions, reversals, discipline by superiors or
self-adherence to the prosecutor's oaths and Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility, had all failed.17 The court went to to "serve notice"' , that
it was prepared to go to the extraordinary measures of analyzing each
instance of misconduct, to refer instances of abuse to the Florida Bar or
to seek discipline directly in circuit court. 19 While the year 1982 has
yielded a great number of cases20 and a large amount of public com-
ment21 as well as strong judicial protest concerning reversal of criminal
cases for improper prosecutorial argument,22 the phenomenon is by no
means a recent one. Each generation of judges seems to supplant the
preceeding one in decrying the occurrence of needless behavior which
too often leads to the squandering of judicial resources. Yet it continues
in the face of the sternest denunciations. 3
16. Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16.
17. Id. at 16-17.
18. Id. at 17.
19. Id.
20. The year 1982 has yielded no less than ten reversals predicated upon im-
proper closing arguments by prosecutors: Wheeler v. State, 1983 Fla. L.W. 124 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Collins v. State, 423 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Simpson v.
State, 418 So. 2d 984 (Fla. 1982); Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Harris v. State, 414 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Ramos v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1302 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Cooper v. State, 413 So. 2d 1244
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Harper v. State, 411 So. 2d 325 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982); McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (a case re-
versed for improper questioning by the prosecutor); Chapman v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); as well as several close calls, Williams v. State, 1983
Fla. L.W. 224 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634 (Fla.
1982); Kindell v. State, 413 So. 2d 1283 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Westley v.
State, 416 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1982). This trend
has continued in 1983. See, e.g., Edwards v. State, - So. 2d ., 8 Fla. L.W. 868
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
21. Fiery Talk Causes Reversal of Conviction, Miami Herald, July 4, 1982, at
1B, col. 1 [hereinafter cited as Fiery Talk].
22. See Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16.
23. "It imposes an added burden on the taxpayers for court expenses and clutters
5
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In reality, such abuses may be regrettable, but they inevitably lurk
at the threshold of every criminal trial. 4 This type of conduct arises
the docket of this court with unnecessary appeals." Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494,
495 (Fla. 1951). Compare Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822 with Grant v. State, 194 So.
2d 612, 615 (Fla. 1967) ("as an increasing number of cases reaching us in recent years,
we must undo all of that which has been done and send this case back for a new trial")
with Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 494 (Fla. 1951) ("so many times condemned...
that the law against it would seem to be so commonplace that any layman would be
familiar with and observe it") with Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 114, 43 So. 312, 317
(Fla. 1907) ("No extended comment upon these utterances of counsel for the prosecu-
tion in their arguments to the jury is necessary."). See also Cain, Sensational Prosecu-
tions and Reversals, 7 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (1931).
24. "[I]solated examples of understandable, if inexcusable, overzealousness in
the heat of trial," Jackson, 421 So. 2d at 16. In analyzing a number of such reversals
which had occurred in her office recently, Eleventh Circuit State Attorney Janet Reno
was quoted as citing a number of reasons which together she saw as producing the
comments. Fiery Talk, supra note 21.
These factors were "greenness" of staff, lack of proper training, pressure of com-
munity concern over crime, the precariousness of the prosecutor's balancing act be-
tween advocate and seeker of justice, frustration over defense tactics, and the difference
between appellate review of a cold record and the heat of trial with its split second
decisions. Id.
Most of the factors cited are the inevitable by-product of the conflicting roles and
duties of public prosecutors, discussed infra notes 28-42.
Ms. Reno may have hit the nail on the head in the discussion of the "greenness" of
staff. This is a factor common to virtually every prosecutor's office, due to rapid turno-
ver. The average tenure of a prosecutor nationwide is less than two years. See C. SIL-
BERMAN, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE 375 (1978).
This inexperience leads to a failure to fully understand and reconcile the conflict-
ing duties of advocate and seeker of justice. In Gomez the prosecutor, a Reno em-
ployee, was receiving his second reversal for such comments. Unchastened, he was
quoted as strongly disagreeing with the appellate court decision (calling it a "travesty
of justice," Fiery Talk, supra note 21), stating further that in his experience the less
evidence against a defendant, the more likely he would be to resort to inflammatory
argument. Contra, State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, 256 P. 793 (1927) and State v. Kirk,
227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
The prosecutor was ultimately quoted as claiming "victory" based upon the two
years incarceration which the defendant served during the pendency of the appeal -
"When you get to the bottom line, I won." Fiery Talk, supra note 21. In discussing the
apparently deliberate pattern of prosecutorial abuse which it saw emerging, the court
in Jackson observed: "This may be - although we are loathe to consider the possibil-
ity - because some prosecutors believe that keeping a convicted defendant in prison
during the sometimes lengthy appellate process is enough to chalk up a 'win' even if the
6
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primarily as a by-product of the heat of combat2 and the conflicting
duties assumed by the public prosecutor.2" As stated by Judge Mann
with predictable eloquence, "[i]f oratory comes can reversal be far
behind?" 21
The Public Prosecutor's Duty
While there are rules governing the conduct of all counsel in argu-
ment,218 the prosecutor is uniquely placed in a position of conflicting
professional obligations. Unlike the defense attorney whose duty, sub-
ject to certain obligations to the court, is to his client,29 the prosecutor
has duties to the State, to the defendant, as well as special obligations
to the court and judicial system."
On one hand he is an advocate of his cause, expected to prevail for
his client, the sovereign.31 At the same time, because of the nature of
conviction is later reversed." 421 So. 2d. at 16 n.4.
Another commentator has asserted that such abuses may be traced to four basic
causes: "a) Sincere, but excessive, zeal of prosecuting attorneys; b) Headline seeking
prosecutors; c) Sheer ignorance of the proper function of a prosecuting attorney and of
criminal law; d) Timidity and indifference of trial court judges." Cain, supra note 23,
at 2.
25. "[L]apsus linguae in the heat of argument," Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d
811, 814 (Fla. 1957). See also Fiery Talk, supra note 21; Jackson, supra note 24.
26. See supra note 24 and text accompanying notes 28-42.
27. Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750, 750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
28. See, e.g., FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106
(1981).
29. For an excellent discussion of defense counsel and closing argument, see
Martin, Closing Argument to the Jury for the Defense in Criminal Cases, 10 CRIM.
L.Q. 3.4 (1967).
30. "The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual advo-
cate; his duty is to seek justice not merely to convict." FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13 (1981). ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
The Prosecution Function, § 1.1 (Approved Draft 1971); Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40,
43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
31. "[T]he prosecutor represents the sovereign..." FLORIDA BAR CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(1), cf. id. at 7-13(2); Washington v. State, 86
Fla. 533, 543, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923) "not to consider himself merely as attorney of
record for the state, struggling for a verdict (emphasis supplied). "[H]e represents the
great authority of the State of Florida." Kirk, 227 So. 2d at 43.
7
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that power, he is expected to exercise it with great discretion.3 2 At odds
with his duty as advocate, he has a specific duty to the defendant which
requires him to negate or mitigate the defendant's guilt.3 3 Beyond those
duties, he has a special obligation to the court which has been termed
"semi-judicial. 3 4 In the early case of Washington v. State,3 5 the Flor-
ida Supreme Court summed up these often conflicting duties:
The prosecuting attorney occupies a semijudicial position. He is a
sworn officer of the government, with no greater duty imposed on
him than to preserve intact all the great sanctions and traditions of
the law. It matters not how guilty a defendant in his opinion may
be, it is his duty under oath to see that no conviction takes place
except in strict conformity to law. His primary considerations
should be to develop the facts and the evidence for the guidance of
the court and jury, and not to consider himself merely as attorney
of record for the state, struggling for a verdict. 8
In short his obligation is to see that "justice is done."137
In argument before the jury these duties restrain the prosecutor
from language which directs the jury to anything but the facts of the
case and the law.38 It has been asserted that the accused has a funda-
32. FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(2); Kirk,
227 So. 2d at 43.
33. In our system of criminal justice the accused is to be given the benefit
of all reasonable doubts. With respect to evidence and witnesses, the prose-
cutor has responsibilities different from those of a lawyer in private prac-
tice: the prosecutor should make timely disclosure to the defense of availa-
ble evidence, known to him that tends to negate the guilt of the accused,
mitigate the degree of the offense, or reduce the punishment. Further, a
prosecutor should not intentionally avoid pursuit of evidence merely be-
cause be believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid the accused.
FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13(3).
34. See, e.g., Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945); Akin v.
State, 86 Fla. 564, 572, 98 So. 609, 612 (1923); Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 542,
98 So. 605, 609 (1923).
35. 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605 (1923).
36. Id. at 573-74, 98 So. at 609.
37. See FLORIDA BAR CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-13.
38. See FLORIDA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIrY DR 7-106; ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function §§ 5.8, 5.9 (Approved
Draft 1971).
8
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mental right to a fair trial free of improper argument.3 9 However, due
to the nature of lawyers and the adversary system the line will often be
difficult to draw. °
The United States Supreme Court summed it up by stating:
"[W]hile he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones."'41 Yet another court said of improper prosecutorial argument,
"[i]f the state has a strong case, it is not necessary, and if it has a close
case, such misconduct is gross injustice to the defendant."' 2
Comment upon the Defendant's Silence
The ultimate and unpardonable 3 sin in a prosecutor's argument is
directing any comment towards the defendant's exercise of his right to
remain silent." Because of the special significance of the rules in this
area, it will be considered first and separately. Rule 3.250 of the Flor-
ida Rules of Criminal Procedure forbids the prosecutor from comment-
ing upon the failure of a criminal defendant to take the stand.'5 The
39. Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 50 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
40. Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 394, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924). See ABA STAN-
DARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution Function § 5.8 commentary at 122
(Approved Draft 1971). "To attempt to spell out in detail what can and cannot be said
in argument is impossible, since it will depend on the facts of the particular case." See
also infra note 123.
41. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
42. State v. Cyty, 50 Nev. 256, ., 256 P. 793, 794 (1927). Accord Kirk v. State,
227 So. 2d 40, 43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1959): "If his case is a sound one, his
evidence is enough. If it is not sound, he should not resort to innuendo to give it a false
appearance of strength. Cases brought on behalf of the State of Florida should be
conducted with a dignity worthy of the client."
43. See infra text accompanying notes 44-61.
44. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976); Brown v. State, 367 So. 2d 616 (Fla.
1979).
45. The text of the rule reads as follows:
Accused as Witness
In all criminal prosecutions the accused may at his option be sworn as a
witness in his own behalf, and shall in such case be subject to examination
as other witnesses, but no accused person shall be compelled to give testi-
mony against himself, nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted
before the jury or court to comment on the failure of the accused to testify
in his own behalf, and a defendant offering no testimony in his own behalf,
except his own, shall be entitled to the concluding argument before the
9
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rule arises from several constitutional roots.
The prohibition against compelling a defendant to testify against
himself has a long history in Florida46 and United States Constitutional
law.4 7 In the later part of the eighteenth century, there was a nation-
wide erosion of the common-law rule which held a defendant incompe-
tent to testify in his own behalf. While this story has been covered in
more depth elsewhere,48 suffice it to say that by 1895, an act of the
legislature of Florida had fully abrogated the common-law rule, and a
criminal defendant had the privilege to become a sworn witness in his
own behalf, subject to the same status as any other witness.4 9 This
jury.
Rule 3.250 FLA. R. CRIM. P. (1972 Rev.).
46. "No person shall be. .. compelled in any criminal matter to be a witness
against himself." FLA. CONST. of 1968, art. 1, § 9. Similar provisions have been a part
of Florida's Constitution since its original constitution in 1838. FLA. CONST. OF 1885,
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § 12; FLA. CONST. OF 1868, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS § 8;
FLA. CONST. OF 1865, art. 1, § 10; FLA. CONST. OF 1861, art 1, § 10; FLA. CONST. of
1838, art. 1, § 10.
47. "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. V. This has been a part of the Constitution
since 1791, though its parameters have been subject to expansion and contraction in
recent years.
48. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 579 (Chadbourn Rev. 1979); Ferguson v.
Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961).
The sequence of this progression in Florida, and the nature of what Florida
progressed from, has never been perfectly clear. See De Foor & Mitchell, Hybrid Rep-
resentation: The Right of Criminal Defendant to Participate in His Trial as Co-Coun-
sel, 10 STETSON L. REV. 191 (1981); De Foor, Lewis & Mitchell, The Right to Dual
Representation, 18 Hous. L. REV. 519 (1981). It is clear that Florida adhered to the
common law rule. See cases cited in this note.
It is equally clear that by the latter part of the 19th century, the legislature had
created the right for a criminal defendant to make a sworn statement to the jury, but
without examination by counsel or the court. This innovation occurred in 1870. See Act
Concerning Testimony, 1870 Fla. Laws, ch. 1816, § I (amended 1898); Hancock v.
State, 79 Fla. 701, 706, 85 So. 142, 143-44 (1920) (Brown, J., dissenting); Millar v.
State, 15 Fla. 577, 584 (1876). This right was broadened by the legislature in 1895 to
make the defendant in a criminal case subject to all of the rules applicable to witnesses.
See text of the Act contained infra at note 49. See also Hart v. State, 38 Fla. 39, 20
So. 805 (1896).
49. Act to Amend Section 2908, 1895 Fla. Laws 4420, § 1 (repealed 1970)
provided:
Accused may Make Himself a Witness. In all criminal prosecutions the
10
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same act also stated "nor shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted
before the court or jury to comment on the failure of the defendant to
testify in his own behalf."50 This provision is still seen as an essential
protection of the right against self-incrimination which became neces-
sary once a defendant had the opportunity to testify in his own
behalf.51
While the United States Supreme Court has fairly recently made
it clear that any such comment is strictly prohibited by the fifth
amendment,52 the Florida courts took a similar position early-on. By
1924 the Florida Supreme Court had taken the then-minority53 view
that such comment was improper and incurable.5 Further, the impro-
accused may at his option be sworn as a witness in his own behalf and
shall in such case be subject to examination as other witnesses, but no
accused person shall be compelled to give testimony against himself, nor
shall any prosecuting attorney be permitted before the court or jury to
comment on the failure of the accused to testify in his own behalf.
This remained the law, essentially unchanged until its repeal in 1970. See Ratiner,
Adverse Comments by a Florida Prosecutor upon a Defendant's Failure to Testify, 15
U. MIAMI L. REv. 293, 295 n.12 (1961) and history of FLA. STAT. 918. 091 (1959).
The provisions of Florida Statutes section 918.09 were adopted into Rule 3.250 of the
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure in 1967 and were unchanged in the 1972 revision,
see Committee Notes Rule 3.250, FLA. R. CRIM. P., and remain the law in Florida.
50. Act to Amend Section 2908, 1895 Fla. Laws 4420, § 1. Florida prosecutors
began to test the limits with the basic "unexplained and uncontradicted" evidence ar-
gument, almost immediately. Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53 (1900). See infra
notes 66-93 and accompanying text.
51. Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524, 540 (Fla. 1958); Burse v. State, 175 So. 2d
586, 587 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See generally Ratiner, supra note 49.
52. Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 U.S. 59 (1968); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965).
53. See Ratiner, supra note 49 and Note, The Nature and Consequences of Fo-
rensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 960 n.68.
54. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 31-32, 98 So. 613, 618 (1924). As early as 1903
the supreme court had indicated in dicta that there "might" be cases where such com-
ment would not be reversible error while not finding it to be likely. Jackson v. State, 45
Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903).
The rule had an interesting evolution in Florida. Simmons v. State, 139 Fla. 645,
190 So. 756 (1939) became the principal case for the proposition that this sort of error
was not subject to the harmless error rule. Simmons was directly repudiated in State v.
Hines, 195 So. 2d 550 (1967), which was itself repudiated and the rule of Simmons
was re-established in Willinsky v. State, 360 So. 2d 760, 762-63 (Fla. 1978).
The recent decision of Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335-36 (Fla. 1978) dis-
11
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
452 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
priety of the comment is not affected by how inadvertant or indirect 55
the comment might be, or by the prosecutor's denial of any intent to
comment on the defendant's right.56 In terms of construction, if the
comment is subject to an interpretation that brings it within the rule, it
is so construed, regardless of susceptibility to a differing construction. 57
Indeed, the cases reversing for prosecutorial comment on this point
have ranged from the egregious58 to the subtle.5" The rule applies
equally to comment by a prosecutor about the failure of a co-defendant
to testify. 0 It does not extend, however, to such comment by a co-
defendant's counsel.61
A failure to contemporaneously object to the comment will be seen
cussed infra at note 207, which places strict technical requirements upon the receipt of
the benefits of this rule, has been seen as another retreat. (Adkins, J., dissenting).
55. Flaherty v. State, 183 So. 2d 607, 609 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1966)(and
cases cited therein). But see Helton v. State, 424 So. 2d 137 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
56. Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 1957); Milton v. State, 127 So. 2d
460 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
57. Rowe v. State, 87 Fla. 17, 31, 98 So. 613, 618 (1924); Jackson v. State, 45
Fla. 38, 34 So. 243 (1903).
The rule may well be such as to be stated thus: if the prosecutor's comment is
"'fairly susceptible of being interpreted by the jury as a statement to the effect that an
innocent man would attempt to explain the circumstances but the defendant offered no
such explanation. . . .'" then the comment thus intepreted or construed violated the
prohibition of the rule. David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943, 944 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1977) (quoting David v. State, 348 So. 2d 420, 421 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(Mager, J., dissenting), which quashed the lower court's decision.
58. As an example of the egregious see David v. State, 369 So. 2d 943 (Fla.
1979). The defense attorney apparently had hypothesized a defense predicated upon a
business failure. The prosecutor argued the permissible line of "Where is the evidence,"
see infra notes 66-77, only to succumb to "If he had a business failure,. . . why didn't
he say anything. . .?" David, 369 So. 2d at 944 (emphasis omitted). The conviction
was reversed.
59. As an example of the subtle, see Hall v. State, 364 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1978) where the prosecutor referred to the defense counsel's attempt to shift
the focus of the case from the defendant whom he characterized as sitting there "qui-
etly." Id. at 867.
60. Clouser v. State, 152 So. 2d 200, 201 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963); Harper
v. State, 151 So. 2d 881, 883 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
61. Jenkins v. State, 317 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Smith v.
State, 238 So. 2d 120, 121 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1970). But see Cruz v. State, 328
So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). See generally, Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 989 (1965).
12
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as waiver of the benefits of this rule. 2 A defendant may also waive the
benefits of the rule by taking the stand 3 or by comment of defense
counsel." Further, by taking the stand he becomes subject to the full
range of cross-examination based on what he did and did not say.65
However, not all comments which seem to brush against this sub-
ject are cause for reversal. Much confusion has resulted from a prose-
cutor's characterization of his case as "uncontroverted" or "unex-
plained" in cases where the defendant did not testify. Prosecutors were
using this double entendre almost as soon as they were prohibited from
commenting upon a defendant's silence.66 For a long while such com-
ments were allowed on the theory that they were comments on the evi-
dence, not the defendant's silence.6 7 The trend then began to run the
other way, to the point that one court held "when the defendant elects
not to testify, it is error to refer to the State's evidence as unexplained
or uncontradicted, or undenied." 8
The supreme court later allowed such a comment in two cases
62. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1978).
63. Hufham v. State, 400 So. 2d 133 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Blackwell v.
State, 271 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43
So. 312 (1903).
64. See Doctrine of Invited Comment or Fair Reply, infra, text accompanying
notes 152-70.
65. [T]he failure of the defendant to testify cannot be taken or considered
as any admission against his interest; but, if a defendant voluntarily takes
the stand and testifies as a witness in his own behalf, then he becomes
subject to cross-examination as any other witness, and the prosecuting of-
ficer has the right to comment on his testimony, his manner and demeanor
on the stand, the reasonableness or unreasonableness of his statements, and
on the discrepancies which may appear in his testimony to the same extent
as would be proper with reference to testimony of any other witness.
Dabney v. State, 119 Fla. 341, 343, 161 So. 380, 381 (1935). Accord Jordan v. State,
334 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 1976); Odom v. State, 109 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1959); Craft v. State,
300 So. 2d 307, 308 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Coney v. State, 258 So. 2d 497
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Peel v. State, 154 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1963).
66. Gray v. State, 42 Fla. 174, 28 So. 53 (1900).
67. Id. See also Clinton v. State, 56 Fla. 57, 47 So. 389 (1908).
68. Singleton v. State, 183 So. 2d 245 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) (citing Way
v. State, 67 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 1953)). Accord Trafficante v. State, 92 So. 2d 811 (Fla.
1957).
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where the defense counsel advanced theories of coerced confession69
and insanity without the defendant's testimony.70 Then, in the case of
White v. State,7 1 the Third District Court held that such a comment
was permitted as a comment on the evidence where the testimony of
several witnesses was heard.7 2 This was approved by the supreme court,
which cited the earlier line of cases allowing such comment.73 Subse-
quently in Smith v. State,7 4 the Fifth District Court of Appeals relying
on White stated: "Indeed, if a prosecutor could not make fair comment
on the fact that the state's evidence of guilt was uncontroverted, what
would be left for him to argue in a case where the defendant declined
to testify? '75 The district court has since reaffirmed its position in the
case of Elam v. State.7 6 The Third District has taken a similar view in
th case of Budman v. State.7 7
Some of the confusion in this area has resulted from the jury in-
struction based on the common-law presumption that a person in unex-
plained possession of recently stolen property is presumed to know it
was stolen.7 8 The question was whether the instruction was an infringe-
69. "Now did you hear one thing about him getting beaten up, or somebody was
pounding on his head, forcing him into this?" State v. Mathis, 278 So. 2d 280, 281
(Fla. 1973).
70. "Now where is the evidence that he says he didn't know what he was do-
ing?" State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515, 516 (Fla. 1967).
71. 348 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
72. "You haven't heard one word of testimony to contradict what she [State's
witness] said, other than the lawyer's argument." Id. at 369.
73. "It is proper for a prosecutor in closing argument to refer to the evidence as
it exists before the jury and to point out that there is an absence of evidence on a
certain issue. It is thus firmly embedded in the jurisprudence of this state that a prose-
cutor may comment on the uncontradicted or uncontroverted nature of the evidence
during argument to the jury." White v. State, 377 So. 2d 1149, 1150 (Fla. 1979) (cita-
tions omitted). Firmly embedded indeed! See cases at note 68.
74. 378 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980), aft'd, Smith v. State, 394 So.
2d 407 (Fla. 1980).
75. Id. at 314.
76. 389 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
77. 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
78. Florida Standard Jury Instruction in Criminal Cases, Theft 148 provides:
Proof of possession of recently stolen property, unless satisfactorily ex-
plained, gives rise to an inference that the person in possession of the prop-
erty knew or should have known that the property had been stolen.
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ment of the defendant's right to remain silent.79 Early cases held that a
prosecutor may not use the instruction in argument, but the instruction
itself was approved.8 0
In light of the positions taken by the courts in White,"' Budman, 2
and Smith,83 this confusion may not be relevant. The exact parameters
placed upon the prosecutor's argument that the evidence is uncontro-
verted, remain unclear from these opinions. May it be advanced at all
times, or only where it may be seen as a comment on the evidence,
rather than on the defendant's silence? The language of the Fifth Dis-
trict in Smith84 and Elam85 suggest the former, while the language of
the Third District in White8 suggests the latter.8 7
There are several directions which the Florida courts might head
on this point. 8 Some jurisdictions allow such comments if they appear
to refer to a witness other than the defendant.8 ' The Florida courts
already allow comment that the defendant did not provide a witness
that he could reasonably be expected to provide.90 Still others would
seem to allow this line of argument 1 even when the defendant would
79. See generally State v. Young, 217 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 1968), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 853 (1969) and Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d 407 (Fla. 1980).
80.. The instruction has been held to be constitutional. See cases cited supra note
79. Ard v. State, 108 So. 2d 38 (Fla. 1959). The case ignores the fact that such an
explanation need not necessarily come from the defendant himself.
81. 348 So. 2d 368.
82. 362 So. 2d 1022.
83. 378 So. 2d 313.
84. Id.
85. 309 So. 2d 221.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
87. "If the evidence presented a situation where the only person who could have
contradicted the witness' testimony was the defendant himself, then this comment
might have been interpreted as the defendant suggests." 348 So. 2d at 369.
88. See generally Annnot., 14 A.L.R.3d 723 (1967).
89. See, e.g., Desmond v. United States, 345 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1965).
90. The witness must be competent and available. Buckrem v. State, 355 So. 2d
111 (Fla. 1978). This is especially true if a witness is a spouse. Jenkins v. State, 317
So. 2d 90 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
91. It can take other forms: see, e.g., "undenied," State v. Hampton, 430 S.W.2d
160 (Mo. 1968); "unrefuted," United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1967);
"uncontroverted," Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1966).
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be the only witness who could reasonably be expected to refute it.92
Clarification will be needed on this point in the future. In a related
matter, Florida courts have allowed prosecutors to argue that guilt
could be inferred from the defendant's flight. 3
Permissible Scope of Argument
Other than the special rules concerning comment upon the defen-
dant's failure to testify, the rules concerning a prosecutor's argument
are fairly broad. As long as his arguments are predicated upon the evi-
dence in the case,9' "wide latitude is permitted in argument to the
jury."9 5 The prosecutor is allowed to advance all legitimate argu-
ments, 96 and is free to make logical inferences based upon the evidence
to support his theory of the case. 7 The Supreme Court of Florida has
stated that these inferences may include "the fanciful play of imagina-
tions,"98 and inferrences are not objectionable merely because they
overcharacterize, 99 or soundness of logic, or relevancy 00 may be lack-
92. See, e.g., People v. Stanbeary, 126 Il1. App. 2d 244, 261 N.E.2d 765 (1970).
93. Cf. Palmer v. State, 323 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975) and cases
cited therein at 615 n.2.
94. Powell v. State, 93 Fla. 756, 112 So. 608 (1927); Johnson v. State, 88 Fla.
461, 464, 102 So. 549, 550 (1924); Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605
(1923); Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, -, 98 So. 609, 618 (1922).
95. Breedlove v. State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 (Fla. 1982); Thomas v. State, 326 So. 2d
413 (Fla. 1975); Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S.
880 (1962), cert. denied 372 U.S. 904 (1963); Smith v. State, 365 So. 2d 405 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1979); Johnson v. State, 348 So. 2d 747 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1977);
Pitts v. State, 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
918 (1975); Wilson v. State, 305 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Frazer v.
State, 294 so. 2d 291 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
96. Spencer, 133 So. 2d at 731.
97. Breedlove, 413 So. 2d at 8; Spencer, 133 So. 2d at 731.
98. Gaston v. Stater, 134 Fla. 538-542, 184 So. 150, 151-52 (1938); Johnson v.
State, 86 Fla. 461, -, 102 So. 549, 550 (1924). "His illustrations may be as various
as are the resources of his genius; his argumentation as full and profound as his learn-
ing can make it; and he may, if he will, give play to his wit or wing to his imagination."
Washington v. State, 82 Fla. 533, -, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923)(citing Mitchum v. State,
11 Ga. 615, 631 (1852)).
99. See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 152 So. 2d 731 (Fla. 1963). In Schneider the
prosecutor's argument dwelt upon the deceased's head having been "blown-off," while,
in fact, he had been shot in the head and neck. Id. at 735.
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ing. Generally speaking, much discretion is vested in the trial court in
keeping counsel's arguments within the scope of the issues and evi-
dence.101 There have been cases where prosecutors made statements so
far from the facts as to constitute deliberate misrepresentation.0 2 Such
cases are, fortunately, rare, and are so obviously reprehensible and re-
versible as to be undeserving of further comment. 103
Prosecutor's Statement of Opinion or Personal Belief
The prosecutor in a case is an advocate, and not a sworn witness
capable of rendering testimony, much less any sort of expert testimony
such as an opinion.'" By rendering an opinion in a factual or ultimate
matter concerning a case, a prosecutor, in effect, renders unsworn testi-
mony not subject to cross-examination. 10 5 The advocacy of a prosecu-
tor's opinion has been prohibited by Florida law at least since 1907,108
and is also in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 107 yet
100. Brown v. State, 80 Fla. 741, 744, 86 So. 574, 575 (1920); Wilson v. State,
47 Fla. 118, 36 So. 580 (1904); Mitchell v. State, 43 Fla. 584, 31 So. 242 (1901). Cf.
Gines v. State, 97 Fla. 908, ., 112 So. 525, 527 (1929); Goshea v. State, 97 Fla. 621,
121 So. 797 (1929).
101. See cases cited supra note 94.
102. See, e.g., Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 85 (1935); Flicker v. State,
296 So. 2d 109, 113 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
103. Cf Berger, 295 U.S. 78. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The
Prosecution Function § 5.8 (Approved Draft 1971). See also ABA STANDARDS, The
Defense Function § 7.8 (Approved Draft 1971), as to a similar obligation upon the
defense. Cf Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564, 574, 98 So. 609, 613 (1924).
104. "It is generally understood that the expression by counsel in argument
before the jury or personal opinion of guilt is not only bad form but highly improper, as
counsel is not a witness, nor under oath to speak the truth, nor called as an expert to
give his opinion." Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 394, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924).
105. Comment (a) to ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosecution
Function § 5.8, 127 (Approved Draft 1971). Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 955 (1954).
106. Adams v. State, 54 Fla. 1, 45 So. 494 (1907).
107. Disciplinary Rule DR 7-106(c)(4) (1981) of the Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility states:
"(C) In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer
shall not:
(4) Assert his personal opinion as to the justness of the cause, as to the
credibility of a witness, as to the culpability of a civil litigant, or as to the
457 1Prosecutorial Misconduct17:1983
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it remains a common source of error.108
The statement by the prosecutor of his belief as to the defendant's
guilt is also impermissible. Prosecutors are human beings who often
believe very strongly in the justness of their cause. 109 As stated truth-
fully though improperly by one prosecutor: "The State doesn't prose-
cute someone because of their religion or race or their nationality. We
prosecute them because we believe they are guilty of crimes."110 Such
comments are prohibited though they do not always constitute revers-
ible error.111 Especially to be avoided are opinions which imply superior
knowledge or investigation beyond the facts in evidence, as the founda-
tion for the opinion.""2 There is a great danger that because of the pres-
guilt or innocence of an accused; but he may argue, on his analysis of the
evidence for any position or conclusion with respect to the matters stated
herein."
108. See cases cited infra notes 110-15.
109. See, e.g., the remarks of the reversed prosecutor contained in Fiery Talk,
supra note 14. See also Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct,
supra note 5, at 948. "He may consider himself engaged in a war against crime in
which no holds are barred in the struggle to overcome powerful, unscrupulous opposi-
tion." The same commentator went on to note more dryly: "Besides, a record of many
convictions is important to the prosecutor who wishes to further his political ambitions.
Even convictions subsequently reversed for misconduct have political utility, especially
where the trial is accompanied by sensational publicity, for the reversal may receive
less attention than the trial and the reputation of the fighting district attorney will be
preserved." Id.
110. Reed v. State, 333 So. 2d 524, 525-26 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). For
virtually identical statements see McGuire v. State, 411 So. 2d 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982); Price v. State, 267 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Another
prosecutor stated the same thoughts, pehaps more mundanely by stating that the state
believed in the defendant's guilt "or we would not be here," Buckhann v. State, 356 So.
2d 1327, 1328 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978). Yet another prosecutor went for the
homerun equivalent in expressing his belief in the defendant's guilt "with all my heart,
mind and soul." Wilson v. State, 371 So. 2d 126, 127 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
111. Grant v. State, 171 So. 2d 361, 365 (Fla. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
1014 (1966); Tyson v. State, 87 Fla. 392, 100 So. 54 (1927); Arline v. State, 303 So.
2d 37 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1924); Roundtree v. State, 229 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1969).
112. In the case of Thompson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1975) the reversed prosecutor flatly asserted that he had numerous other witnesses he
could have called, and this was termed "highly improper." Id. at 552. Cf Richardson
v. State, 335 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976). Similar results have been
obtained where the opinion offered was a collective one, such as is obtained at a prose-
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tige of the office, and the presumably greater fact-finding abilities of
the office, the jury will be led to rely on the prosecutors opinion., 3 This
substitutes the prosecutor for the trier of fact, and is most likely to be
deemed reversible error.11 4 Expressions of personal belief as to the
credibility of witnesses are equally prohibited." 5
Not every comment which begins with "I think" is seen as an im-
proper expression of the prosecutor's opinion regarding the merits of
the case. There is a difference between the prosecutor's statement of his
belief in the defendant's guilt and his belief that the evidence proved
the defendant's guilt, with the latter allowed.118
The use of the words "I think" have been held, in context, to be a
deduction based upon the evidence, 17 or a prefatory statement,1 8
rather than an expression of opinion. Curiously, a prosecutor has been
allowed to state that he felt he was justified in filing an information, 1 "
and expressions of shock over a crime 1 0 have also been allowed. How-
ever, it clearly is the more ethical, professional and prudent practice for
cutor's office conference; Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959); or in the form
of office policy, Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1982); or even the entire State of Florida, Buckhann v. State 356 So. 2d 1327, 1328
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); or of the police, Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d I (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1978), quashed, 330 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980). See also Oglesby v. State,
23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945) (police could tack other offenses on defendant); Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
113. Commentary, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, The Prosection
Function § 5.8 (Approved Draft 1971).
114. Thomson v. State, 318 So. 2d 549, 552 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
115. Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Buckhann v. State, 356 So. 2d 1327 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Hancock v. State,
90 Fla. 178, 195 So. 401 (1925).
116. See Adams v. State, 54 Fla. 1, 5, 45 So. 494, 495 (1907); Washington v.
State, 86 Fla. 533, 536, 98 So. 605, 608 (1925). Cf Coleman v. State, 215 So. 2d 96,
98 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968). See generally, DR 7-106(c)(4) (1981), Budman v.
State, 362 So. 2d 1022 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
117. Coleman, 215 So. 2d at 98 ("If you believe as I do.").
118. Edwards v. State, 288 So. 2d 540, 540 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1974) "the
prosecutor had an unfortunate habit of using these words to introduce each new topic
of discussion."
119. Hancock v. State, 90 Fla. 178, 185, 105 So. 401, 403 (1925). The theory
advanced by the court seemed to be the redundancy and obviousness of the statement.
120. Girtman v. State, 270 So. 2d 380, 381-82 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972).
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a prosecutor to strike the words "I think" from his trial vocabulary.
Inflammatory Argument
Under the guiding principle that argument should be restricted to
the record and to reasonable inferences therefrom, argument which is
inflammatory is objectionable.121 As stated by Mr. Justice Terrell,
"[t]he trial of one charged with crime is the last place to parade preju-
dicial emotions or exhibit punitive or vindictive exhibitions of tempera-
ment." 122 Obviously, given the nature of a criminal trial, and of law-
yers, this will be another difficult line to draw.128 Much discretion is
vested in the trial court,1 24 but here are some general guidelines.
Arguments which ask the jurors to place themselves in the shoes of
the victim, so-called golden-rule arguments, are held to be improper. 2 5
Perhaps the clearest example of such an argument may be found in the
case of Lucas v. State,1 26 where the prosecutor in a rape case asked of
the female jurors, "[t]hink how you ladies would feel it that happened
to you."'1 27 It was held that this comment required reversal because it
tended to deprive the defendant of his right to trial by an impartial
jury. 128
121. "[T]rials should be conducted coolly and fairly, without the indulgence in
abusive or inflammatory statements made in the presence of the jury by the prosecuting
officer." Goddard v. State, 93 Fla. 504, 515, 112 So. 83, - (1927); Landrum v. State,
79 Fla. 189, 84 So. 535 (1920); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43 So. 312 (1907).
122. Stewart v. State, 51 So. 2d 494, 495 (Fla. 1951).
123. "The history of the legal profession is clear also in its love of florid argu-
ments and dramatic perorations. The line between the inflammatory and the dramatic
is not clear." Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1965).
124. Sanchez v. State, 133 Fla. 160, 182 So. 2d 645 (1938).
125. See, e.g., Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762, 763 (Fla. 1966) ("your wife...
your sister . . . your daughter" in a prosecution for murder); Coley v. State, 185 So.
2d 472, 473 (Fla. 1966) ("their little daughter" in a rape prosecution in which the
prosecutrix was 17 years old); Barnes v. State, 88 So. 2d 157, 158 (Fla. 1952) ("what
if it was your wife or your sister or your daughter that this beast was after?").
126. 335 So. 2d 566 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
127. Id. at 567.
128. Id. Accord Lester v. State, 37 Fla. 382, 387, 20 So. 232, 234 (1896). The
rule and rationale are the same in civil cases. See, e.g., Bullock v. Branch, 130 So. 2d
74, 76 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1961).
1460 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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Under the Florida Statutes and case law, the character of the de-
fendant may not be the subject of proof or prosecutorial comment ex-
cept in very limited circumstance. If the defendant offers proof of his
character, the State may offer evidence of other crimes, charges, or
acts as rebuttal12 if they are relevant and the state complies with no-
tice requirements. 30 Despite the clear-nature of this rule, prosecutors
129. FLA. STAT. § 90-404(1) (1981) provides:
90.404 Character evidence; when admissible. -
(1) CHARACTER EVIDENCE GENERALLY -
Evidence of a person's character or a trait of his character is
inadmissible to prove that he acted in conformity with it on a
particular occasion, except:
(a) Character of accused - Evidence of a pertinent trait of
his character offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to
rebut the trait.
(b) Character of victim -
(1) Except as provided in s. 794.022, evidence of a pertinent
trait of character of the victim of the crime offered by an ac-
cused, or by the prosecution to rebut the trait; or
(2) Evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the victim
offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evi-
dence that the victim was the aggressor.
(c) Character of witness - Evidence of the character of a
witness, as provided in ss. 90.608-90.610.
See Young v. State, 142 Fla. 361, 195 So. 569 (1939); Clinton v. State, 53 Fla. 98, 43
So. 312 (1907).
130. FLA. STAT. § 90.404 (2) (1981) provides:
90.404 Character evidence; when admissible. -
(2) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS -
(a) Similar fact evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible when relevant to prove a material fact in issue,
such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident, but is
inadmissible when the evidence is relevant solely to prove bad
character or propensity.
(b) 1. When the state in a criminal action intends to offer evi-
dence of other criminal offenses under paragraph (a), no
fewer than 10 days before trial, the state shall furnish to the
accused a written statement of the acts or offenses it intends
to offer, describing them with the particularity required of an
461 117:1983
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have been stumbling frequently on it for years. The cases generally di-
vide themselves into two categories, 131 past bad acts and future bad
acts.
1 3 2
The fundamental rule as to past acts was stated in the early case
of Simmons v. State:1 33 "It is well settled that statements or intima-
tions by the prosecuting attorney that the accused has committed other
crimes besides that for which he is now on trial constitutes error."13 4
The argument disallowed in Simmons, a rape case, was a classic
example of the type of argument sought to be prevented by the rule:
"And we don't know how many other girls this old Simmons has car-
ried off that way who have never complained. ... 15 This argument
is improper precisely because we don't know.1"'
This rule may be violated in more subtle ways. Cases have found
indictment or information. No notice is required for evidence
of offenses used for impeachment or on rebuttal.
2. When the evidence is admitted, the court shall, if re-
quested, charge the jury on the limited purpose for which the
evidence is received and is to be considered. After the close of
the evidence, the jury shall be instructed on the limited pur-
pose for which the evidence was received and that the defen-
dant cannot be convicted for a charge not included in the in-
dictment or information.
(3) Nothing in this section affects the admissibility of evi-
dence under § 90.610.
This statute embodies the so-called "Williams Rule," allowing the prosecutor to
use similar acts as evidence against a criminal defendant in certain circumstances. See
Williams v. State, I10 So. 2d 654, 663 (Fla. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 847 (1959).
See generally Green v. State, 190 So. 2d 42, 46 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966). For an
excellent discussion in the context of prosecutorial questioning in this area, see Chap-
man v. State, 417 So. 2d 1028 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
131. See infra text accompanying notes 133-41.
132. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45.
133. 139 Fla. 645, 190 So. 756 (1939), overruled on other grounds, 195 So. 2d
550 (1957); State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 551 (Fla. 1967).
134. Id. at 758. Accord, Ailer v. State, 114 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1959); Carlile v. State, 129 Fla. 860, 176 So. 862 (1937).
135. Simmons, 190 So. at 758. Cf. Young v. State, 142 Fla. 351, 195 So. 569
(1939).
136. In Oglesby v. State, 156 Fla. 481, 482, 23 So. 2d 558, 558 (1945), the
prosecutor stated at trial that the only reason the police had arrested the defendant was
because they could pin similar crimes on him.
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the characterization of the defendant in a DUI case as a "drunkard"
improper.137 Any intimation of prior criminal charges is objectionable
whether the reference is made directly'318 or indirectly.13 9 Indeed one of
the most common errors found in the cases comes from the inference
raised by reference to the defendant's photo in a "mug book" or "mug
shots,' 1 40 though it is not necessarily fatal error. 4'
The prohibition against implying future criminal acts may well be
the most commonly violated rule by prosecutors. 42 Case after case
reveals the prosecutor improperly raising before the jury the spectre of
the defendant walking out the door, ready to commit more crimes.
None stated it quite so well as did the prosecutor in Davis v. State,143
who summed up in this fashion: "Gentlemen, if this man is sent out on
the street to do the very same thing, the only question that can never
be resolved, if you will, or put in the same position to ask, 'Am I to be
next?' "'4 Such comments routinely produce reversals."5
137. Young, 195 So. at 569.
138. See, e.g., Gluck v. State, 62 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1952); Noeling v. State, 40 So.
2d 120 (Fla. 1949).
139. In Sherman v. State, 255 So. 2d 263, 265 (Fla. 1971), the prosecutor, refer-
ring to the defendant, stated: "He's seen me lots of times. It's not been under social
circumstances. . ..-
140. See, e.g., State v. Rucker, 330 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976); Loftin v. State, 273
So. 2d 70 (Fla. 1973); Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
141. See State v. Rucker, 330 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976).
142. See infra note 145.
143. 214 So. 2d 41 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
144. Id. at 42.
145. See, E.g., Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612, 613 (Fla. 1967) ("Do you want to
give this man less than first degree murder and the electric chair and have him get out
and come back and kill somebody else, maybe you?"); Williams v. State, 68 So. 2d 583
(Fla. 1953) (acquittal of defendant by reason of insanity would lead to his ultimate
release from asylum to commit another homicide); Young v. State, 195 So. 569, 569
(Fla. 1940) ("the good honest people of the country should not sit down in solitude, in
inaction, and let these whores and drunkards get out here and slay our women and
children"); Gomez v. State, 415 So. 2d 822, 823 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("let
these gentlemen ... walk away into our community and commit further crimes of this
nature"); McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197, 198 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("if
you want to let [defendant] walk out of here, if you want to let this kind of horrible
crime go on in Dade County"); Sims v. State, 371 So. 2d 211, 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1977) ("to [glo get another one" in a case involving firearms); Porter v. State,
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The prosecutor must also be careful of the characterizations, which
he draws from the facts and circumstances of the case, as well as char-
acterizations of the defendant. The easiest to deal with are the most
objectionable. Arguments directed at the defendant's race 4' or reli-
gion, 147 when not in issue, are clearly prohibited, as are arguments di-
rected at geographical prejudices.4 8 Courts have allowed references to
a defendant as a "murderer" ' 49 in a murder case, or a "thief' 150 in a
larceny case, but "assassin"151 has been disapproved, as has the state-
ment that the prosector "'wouldn't want to meet the defendant in a
dark alley.' 1152
From the cases, it would seem that the dividing line is based first
upon relevancy, and second upon whether there is fair factual basis for
the characterization in the record. Strong characterizations such as
"beast," "cruel human vulture," and "vile creature"153 have been al-
streets again" and "to put this man on the street to sell more heroin"); Russell v. State,
233 So. 2d 154, 155 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (if the defendant were acquitted,
there would be "people getting stabbed all over Orange County"). Accord, Johnson v.
State, 408 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750,
750 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) ("let him go back out in your community and handle
more morphine"). In the case of Singer v. State, 109 So. 2d 7, 28-30 (Fla. 1959), the
court held that argument directed at what the defendant would do to the prosecutor's
family if defendant was not executed was reversible error.
146. Cooper v. State, 136 Fla. 23, 186 So. 230 (Fla. 1939); Huggins v. State,
129 Fla. 329, 176 So. 154 (Fla. 1937).
147. Gluck v. State, 62 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 1952).
148. Knight v. State, 316 So. 2d 576, 578 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
149. Washington v. State, 86 Fla. 533, 98 So. 605, 609 (1923). "It is not revers-
ible error for the prosecuting attorney to refer to the defendant as a murderer where
the indictment is for murder and the evidence supports the charge."
150. Sanchez v. State, 133 Fla. 160, 165, 182 So. 645, 648 (1938), termed a
"border line question."
151. Landrum v. State, 79 Fla. 189, 84 So. 535 (1920); Gomez v. State, 415 So.
2d 822, 822 n.1 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
152. Zamot v. State, 375 So. 2d 881 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
153. Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340, 342 (Fla. 1965); See also Breedlove v.
State, 413 So. 2d 1, 8 n.10 (Fla. 1982) ("animalistic attack"); Darden v. State, 329 So.
2d 287, 289 (Fla. 1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 917 (1976), cert. dismissed, 430 U.S.
704 (1977) and cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1036 (1976) (defendant called an "animal");
Goddard v. State, 143 Fla. 28, 31, 196 So. 596, 598 (1940) ("skunks," "low-down
scoundrel"); Gaston v. State, 124 Fla. 538, 539, 184 So. 150, 151 (1938) ("malignant
growth").
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lowed where there is support for them in the record.'" The courts seem
to take the position that some cases are factually so extreme that there
is little a prosecutor might say to make it worse. 155 As stated in Spen-
cer v. State:'58 "In actuality, there is probably very little that the prose-
cutors themselves could have advanced which would have been any
more damning of the conduct of this appellant than the gruesome evi-
dence which was presented from the witness stand."
As a general rule, inflammatory arguments are distasteful and are
considered a sign of incompetence. 5 ' A competent prosecutor will sus-
tain his burden under the law with the facts, not by resort to innuendo
in order to give his case a false appearance of strength. 58
Attacks on Opposing Counsel
It appears that from time to time prosecutors seem unable to re-
strain themselves in their zeal, as they go beyond verbal assaults on the
defendant to attacks on defense counsel. 59 They have said some shock-
ing things about their adversaries. 60 The case of Douglass v. State 61
154. See, e.g., Roundtree v. State, 229 So. 2d 281, 283 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
155. See infra note 156.
156. 133 So. 2d 729, 731-32 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 905 (1963).
Accord Holmes v. State, 228 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1969) ("it would
have been difficult for a prosecutor in this case to overcharacterize the reprehensible
acts shown in the evidence, or to present the facts in a worse light than the bare dis-
closure of them at the trial revealed"). See generally Note, The Nature and Conse-
quences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5, at 969, n. 112.
157. Daugherty v. State, 154 Fla. 308, 310, 17 So. 2d 290, 291 (1944).
158. Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1235 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979);
Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40, 42-43 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
159. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Johnson v.
State, 351 So. 2d 10 (Fla. 1977); Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966); Irvin v.
State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954); Carter v. State,
356 So. 2d 67 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Simpson v. State, 352 So. 2d 125 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Cochran v. State, 280 So. 2d 42 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1973); Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965), and notes 160-
164.
160. E.g., "Would you buy a used car from this guy" and "cheap shot artist."
Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d at 16 n.1.
Let me show you what perverted and distorted things a lawyer can do
465 117:1983
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represents the worst example. In Douglass, the defendant was on trial
for incest, and the prosecutor gratuitously suggested that defense coun-
sel was also guilty of incest. 62 The courts have sternly disapproved of
such arguments, terming them both highly improper and unethical. 63
Such conduct, though, seems to be subject to the harmless error rule'4
and the doctrine of fair reply.1 65
when he wants to do it. How wrong it is, and when they try to do such as
this it is disgusting.
If he thought Mrs. Mayer had one word of testimony, he, himself,
violated his oath as a lawyer and violated his representation of this man
and as a human being. . . . He has no business being a lawyer if he
hadn't talked with her and found out that she knew nothing about it.
Adams, 192 So. 2d at 764. "How defense lawyers operate. . .," Cochran, 280 So. 2d at
43. "One of the favorite tricks of a defense lawyer," Simpson, 352 So. 2d at 126. But
see Westley v. State, 416 So. 2d 18, 19-20 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1982) in which
"smokescreen" was approved.
161. 135 Fla. 199, 184 So. 756 (1929).
162. Id. at 757. It was such a comment which prompted the Third District Court
in Jackson to threaten to take disciplinary action against the Assistant State Attorney.
See note 160 supra.
163. The court in Simpson termed the prosecutor's statement "a gratuitous in-
sult to the adversary system which he serves." 352 So. 2d at 126. See FLORIDA BAR
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-37 (1981):
In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist be-
tween clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct, attitude and
demeanor toward opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make unfair or derogatory
personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and offensive tactics by lawyers
interfere with the orderly administration of justice and have no proper place in our
legal system.
164. E.g., In Irvin, 66 So. 2d 288, and Simpson, 352 So. 2d 125, the error was
found harmless. In Adams, 192 So. 2d 762, Cochran, 280 So. 2d 42, and Carter, 356
So. 2d 67, it was held fatal. In Irvin, the comment was merely that the defense attor-
ney "stopped me from proving it," 66 So. 2d at 295, referring to a defense objection
which had been sustained. See also Johnson, 351 So. 2d 10.
165. See, e.g., Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In
Evans defense counsel sought to discredit law enforcement efforts in the case, asking
why they hadn't been able to find an alibi witness which she had found and produced
at trial. The prosecutor's reply was "[w]e were wondering about that too," implying a
fabricated defense. Id. at 893.
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Duty
At the bottom of every prosecutor's bag of rhetorical tricks is that
personal favorite - the appeal to the jurors to "perform their public
duty," and bring in a verdict of guilty.116 Generally, so long as the
prosecutor stays otherwise within bounds, this line of argument is per-
missible.1 67 The sterner or more coercive the language used, the more
likely to be disapproved. For instance, the appeal "We are going to
continue to have life treated as a scrap of paper in the State of Florida,
until juries with backbones rise up and say we are going to stop it,"
was disallowed.16 8
The prosecutor must not, however, seek to shift or lighten the bur-
den upon the jurors by references to the existence of appellate courts to
correct any mistake they might make, and such references are revers-
ible error. 169 Nor may a prosecutor appeal to the jury to convict be-
cause of economic loss caused to them as taxpayers by the defen-
dant.1 70 However, in a drug case alleging possession of marijuana, the
statement "[t] hat is the reason so many high school students over the
166. Spencer v. State, 133 So. 2d 729 (Fla. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 880
(1961), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 904 (1963).
167. "We realize that the situation in some cases justifies very strong appeals by
the prosection to arouse the patriotism and public duty of the jurors to perform the
duty which the law and the evidence in a case plainly justifies and calls for." Hender-
son v. State, 94 Fla. 318, 345, 113 So. 689, 698 (1927). Accord Thomas v. State, 326
So. 2d 413, 415 (Fla. 1976); Betsy v. State, 368 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1979).
168. Johnson v. State, 140 Fla. 443, 445, 191 So. 847, 848 (1939). The Johnson
court however found the error harmless. Id. Cf. Reed v. State, 333 So. 2d 524, 525
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976). It is noteworthy how contemporary the argument in
Johnson sounds.
169. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 384 (Fla. 1959); Blackwell v. State, 76 Fla.
124, 137, 79 So. 731, 735 (1918). See generally, Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1449 (1965). Cf.
Johnson v. State, 408 So. 2d 813, 816 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (unheard of for a
person to spend more than two years in a hospital if declared insane).
170. Taylor v. State, 123 Fla. 358, 359, 166 So. 825, 826 (1936) (references to
the jurors supporting defendant's children in a criminal non-support case held revers-
ible error). Cf. Cooper v. State, 136 Fla. 23, 186 So. 230 (1939) (reference to taxpay-
ers' dollars spent investigating and prosecuting "Negro" cases, coupled with appeals to
social prejudice held reversible error). A mere casual referrence to the amount of time
and money expended by the jurors and the state, while not commended, does not neces-
sarily require reversal. Ellison v. State, 91 Fla. 502, 107 So. 639 (1926).
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country are using narcotics"171 was held to be not per se prejudicial.
There are a few areas of argument that are more a matter of style
than substance, yet they have cropped up in trials and case law from
time to time. First of these is a reading of law by counsel in closing
argument. Fundamentally, it is the function of the court, not counsel,
to give to the jury the applicable law in the case.17 2 Counsel submit
their requested charges at the charge conference, and the court selects
the theories of law applicable to the case. 17 -3 Once selected, counsel are
clearly permitted to relate the applicable law to the facts of the case in
closing argument, explaining and emphasizing those portions of the
charges relevant to their theory of the case.174
It has been said that it is "difficult for an attorney in the trial of a
case to refrain from expressing his view or opinion as to the law con-
trolling the case"175 but the jury is not bound by counsel's opinion as to
the controlling law.17 There have been cases in which the court, in its
discretion, permitted counsel to read other authorities to the jury. In
Tindall v. State,17 7 the judge's allowance of a prosector's reading of
law to the jury was upheld, absent a showing of prejudice.1 78 The court
stated, however, "correct practice does not permit counsel to read au-thorities to the jury.'' 79 In the case of Wright v. State80 the prosecu-
171. Sims v. State, 64 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1953).
172. In Brownlee v. State, 95 Fla. 755, 116 So. 618 (1928), the defendant ap-
pealed the trial court's refusal to allow defense counsel to read certain statutes to the
jury. The court held: "The rule that the law and statutes applicable to any case are to
be given by the court and not counsel is too elementary and universally recognized to
require any discussion here." Id. at 628. See also FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390; FLA. STAT. §
918.10 (1981).
173. Simmons v. State, 160 Fla. 326, -, 36 So. 2d 207, 208 (1948); Tindall v.
State, 99 Fla. 1132, -, 128 So. 494, 498 (1930); Taylor v. State, 330 So. 2d 91, 93
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
174. Taylor, 330 So. 2d at 93.
175. Overstreet v. State, 143 Fla. 794, 796, 197 So. 516, 518 (1940).
176. Id.
177. 99 Fla. 1132, 128 So. 494 (1930).
178. The Tindall court made it clear that even when allowed by the trial court,
the practice could cause reversal if the law read were inapplicable and prejudicial.
Such a showing, however, was not made in Tindall. Id. at , 128 So. 498.
179. Id.
180. 79 Fla. 831, 84 So. 919 (1920).
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tor's repeated misstatements of law constituted reversible error.181 Tan-
gentially related is the question of whether counsel may read
scripture 82 to the jury. This is held to be a matter of discretion left to
the trial court and is generally not cause for reversal.18 3
The Doctrine of Invited Response or Fair Reply
The normal parameters of a prosecutor's remarks in closing argu-
ment can be significantly broadened by the nature of the defense's ar-
gument. The rule was stated in Pitts v. State: 4 "Defense counsel may
not make statements during summation which reasonably invite re-
sponse and then complain when his opponent's response is such as
would be reasonably expected to be elicited by defense counsel's own
prior remarks."' 85
In the earlier case of Henderson v. State,88 the Court laid down
the rule:
[W]e cannot afford to lay down a rule here which would make it
hereafter possible for an attorney for the defendant in any hard
fought criminal case to deliberately goad the state's attorney, by
unfounded or improper charges and insinuations, into heated, indis-
creet, and improper reply, and to then use such reply to secure a
reversal of the case, regardless of the sufficiency of the evidence,
thus enabling him to take advantage of his own wrong. This would,
indeed, be a dangerous precedent.187
When the door is opened by defense counsel's argument, it swings
wide, and a number of areas barred to prosecutorial comment will sud-
181. Id. at 919.
182. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 861 (Fla. 1969) (Prosecutor's references
to "divine law" and the Bible).
183. Id. at 860-61.
184. 307 So. 2d 473 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1975), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
918 (1975).
185. Pitts, 307 So. 2d at 482 (citing Frazier v. State, 294 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1974)). Accord Howell v. State, 136 Fla. 582, 589, 187 So. 163, 166
(1939); Reyes v. State, 49 Fla. 17, 24, 38 So. 257, 258 (1905); Ricko v. State, 242 So.
2d 763 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
186. 94 Fla. 318, 113 So. 689 (1927).
187. Id. at 697.
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denly be subject to reply. What otherwise would have been improper
comment by the prosecutor will be seen as harmless. Defense counsel
who promises to prove an alibi or other facts in his opening argument
may find those promises thrown back in his face by the prosecutor in
summation.188 In the case of Simpson v. State818 the Court found no
error in the prosecutor's reiteration of the law stating that the defen-
dant's silence could not be held against him after defense counsel had
covered the point earlier.190 The court properly termed the comments
"perilous practice."191 But in one interesting case the defendant attor-
ney's comment that the fact the defendant didn't take the stand didn't
make him guilty was held to invite the response that it didn't make him
innocent either.
1 92
Normally, argument directed at the potential penalty the defen-
dant faces is improper.1 93 Arguments as to the penalty which a defen-
dant would receive upon conviction are fair reply where defense counsel
crosses this line first.194 In Smith v. State 95 defense counsel's comment
188. See, e.g., Mitchell v. State, 304 So. 2d 466, 468 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
189. 352 So. 2d 125 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
190. Id. at 126. The court found the prosecutor's remarks had no "sinister influ-
ence." Id. (citing Gordon v. State, 104 So. 2d 524, 540 (Fla. 1958)).
191. Id.
192. Testasecca v. State, 115 So. 2d-584 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
193. Cf. Waid v. State, 58 So. 2d 146 (Fla. 1952).
It is a curious state of the law in Florida that the judge must instruct the jury on
the penalties in the case, FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.390(a), Tascano v. State, 393 So. 2d 540
(Fla. 1981), and yet the jury is not to consider penalties in any way in reaching its
decision, Florida Standard Jury Instruction 2.15, adopted In re Standard Jury Instruc-
tions in Criminal Cases, 327 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1976). Therefore argument by counsel
concerning penalties would be improper.
These antagonistic themes have been termed "a Lewis Carroll fantasy flight back
and forth through the legal looking glass." Murray v. State, 378 So. 2d 111, 112 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
194. But appellant's position is insecure for the simple reason that his
counsel, while addressing the jury, introduced the subject by remarking
upon the lack of testimony by the appellant, and the reason for it. What
followed was nothing more than a report by the attorney for the state.
A defendant may not reap the benefits of failure to testify, such as the
escape of cross-examination, and then claim the protection the statutes af-
ford, if he plays upon that very failure. When he brings to the attention of
the jury the want of testimony by him, and the reason for the course he
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that a verdict of not guilty by reason of insanity would not put the
defendant back on the street, was held to justify the prosecutor's com-
ments that the defendant could be there in 30-60 days. Where the de-
fendant strained the facts of the case so that they approached a hypo-
thetical circumstance, the court did not view the prosecutor's question,
"where is the proof?" 198 as a comment upon the defendant's silence.
Even sympathetic characterizations of the defendant by defense counsel
must be approached with caution. In Whitney v. State 97 the defense
portrayed the defendant as a mere boy, an irresponsible youth, whose
crime had its roots in his domestic background.' 98 The court held this
to be an invitation to rebuttal and allowed the prosecution to portray
the defendant as a "professional killer" who "lived by the gun," based
upon the evidence of the defendant's methodical manner in killing and
robbing.""9 The invited response doctrine has been used to excuse ver-
bal sparring 2°° in the presence of the jury and other highly improper
statements20 ' which resulted from the heat of the exchange and the
responsive nature of the prosecutor's argument. Even the expression of
a prosecutor's belief in the justness of his cause has been excused by
the defense portrayal of the prosecution as offering "bold lies," "false
testimony," and "buying" evidence. 02
chose, he invites a rebuttal from his adversary, and of that he cannot
complain.
Waid, 58 So. 2d 146, 146.
195. 273 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973). The prosecutor went that
fatal one step too far by saying "because there is no possibility of keeping him there
longer." Id. at 415.
196. Sadler v. State, 222 So. 2d 797, 800 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1969). In Sad-
ler, defense counsel had conjured up a possible affair and love triangle, seemingly out
of the air. Similarly, in State v. Mathis, a defense argument to consider the voluntari-
ness of the confession, unsupported by any evidence of coercion, was held to invite the
rhetorical question if the jury had heard "one thing about [the defendant] getting
beaten up. . .," 278 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 1973).
197. 132 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1961).
198. Id. at 602.
199. Id.
200. See, e.g., Parrish v. State, 97 So. 2d 356 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
201. Evans v. State, 178 So. 2d 892 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (prosecutor
suggested a contrived alibi defense).
202. See, e.g., Broge v. State, 288 So. 2d 280, 281 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1974).
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Effects of Misconduct
When a prosecutor advances an improper argument, the abdica-
tion of his duty imposes certain obligations upon defense counsel and
the court. Even absent any objection, it is the duty of the trial court to
check the improper remarks of counsel, and to apply the appropriate
remedy in order to erase its effect from the mind of the jury.203
Where the defense doesn't object to a remark, it is more likely to
be viewed as nonprejudicial or the objection seen as waived.20 4 Accord-
ingly, it is the duty of defense counsel to call to the attention of the
court the prosecutor's improper argument by objecting to it.20° Further,
the objection must be contemporaneous with the improper conduct.206
It is incumbent upon defense counsel to seek the remedy which he feels
is appropriate in light of the comment. 0 7
Remedies and Technical Requirements
The court may remedy the improper argument by stopping it,
striking it, applying a curative instruction, rebuking the prosecutor
before the jury, or declaring a mistrial. The nature of the prosecutor's
remark, the seriousness of the charge, and the motion made by defense
counsel are the key factors in consideration of the appropriate remedy
for prosecutorial misconduct in argument.
In some cases, upon objection; the prosecutor has withdrawn the
argument and apologized for it, and this has been seen as sufficient
cure.20 8 In other cases merely halting the line of argument by sus-
taining the objection was sufficient.20 9 Many comments may be cured
203. Oglesby v. State, 23 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 1945); Akin v. State, 86 Fla. 564,
572, 98 So. 609, 612 (1923).
204. E.g., Smith v. State, 3 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 1941).
205. E.g., Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 385 (Fla. 1959).
206. Castor v. State, 365 So.2d 701, 703 (Fla. 1978).
207. "The important thing is that the defendant retain primary control over the
course to be followed in the event of such an error." Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331,
335 (Fla. 1978)(citing United States v. Dinitz, 724 U.S. 600 (1976)).
208. North v. State, 65 So. 2d 77, 86-87 (Fla. 1953), af'd, 346 U.S. 932 (1954).
209. See, e.g., Collins v. State, 180 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 1965); Dean v. State, 83 So.
2d 777 (Fla. 1955). Accord, Cumbie v. State, 378 So. 2d 1 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1978), quashed, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980).
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by the court's rebuking the prosecutor before the jury in a manner suf-
ficient to impress the members of the jury that they should not consider
the argument, and further instructing the jury to disregard the com-
ment, and adding any other necessary curative instructions.210
The final option is declaration of a mistrial.21 Generally speaking,
defense counsel should contemporaneously object, seek curative instruc-
tions, and then affirmatively move for a mistrial, 21 2 in order to preserve
his rights on appeal.213 Failure to comply with these procedural re-
quirements may be seen as a bar to raising the issues on appeal.
214
Further, as noted earlier, the doctrine of fair reply or invited comment
may preclude relief for an otherwise objectionable statement.21 5 How-
ever, where the prosecutor's comments are "of such character that
neither rebuke nor retraction may entirely destroy their sinister influ-
ence. . . a new trial should be granted regardless the lack of objection
or exception. ' 216 In such cases the error is seen as going to the heart of
the case, depriving the defendant of the essential fairness of his crimi-
nal trial.217
Certain trends emerge from the cases. On one hand, some argu-
ments almost inevitably cause reversal when objected to by counsel.
These include the previously mentioned categories of comment upon
the defendant's silence,218 appeals to racial prejudice,2x9 or predictions
210. Harper v. State, 411 So. 2d 235, 237 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (citing
Deas v. State, 119 Fla. 893, 161 So. 2d 729 (1939)).
211. Cf. Cumbie v. State, 380 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 1980); Mabery v. State, 303 So.
2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
212. Clark v. State, 363 So. 2d 331, 335 (Fla. 1978).
213. Ferguson v. State, 417 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1982). "Contemporaneously"
means during the offending closing argument, or at the very least at its conclusion.
Cumbie, 380 So. 2d at 1033.
214. Ferguson, 417 So. 2d at 641-42.
215. See supra text accompanying notes 184-201.
216. Ailer v. State, 114 So. 2d 348, 351 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1959). Accord,
Peterson v. State, 376 So. 2d 1230, 1234 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
217. Peterson, 376 So. 2d at 1230. Defense counsel should not rely on this resort,
however, since it is limited to the narrow category where the error is fundamental. Cf.
Clark, 363 So. 2d at 333. Since the Clark case found unobjected-to prosecutorial com-
ment upon the defendant's silence not to be such error, it should be clear that this will
be true only in rare cases.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 43-92.
219. See supra note 146. Cf. Thomas v. State, 419 So. 2d 634 (Fla. 1982).
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of future criminal activity.220 On the other hand, there is no presump-
tion that juries are led astray by the improper arguments of counsel.221
The appellate court must review each case in its own context 222 with
the standard being whether the court can see from the record that the
remarks or conduct of the prosecutor did not prejudice the accused.223
Unless that conclusion is reached, the case must be reversed. The na-
ture224 and frequency 225 of the prosecutor's comments are weighed on
one hand, and the overall strength of the state's case 228 on the other.
Also involved in this balancing process is the nature of the charge;
courts will be less hesitant to find the argument prejudicial in a capital
case.- 27 It remains the duty of defense counsel, however, to show
prejudice. It should be remembered that the defendant is entitled to a
fair trial, not a perfect one.2 28
Future Directions
Of course, reversal is not the only solution to the problem. Indeed
220. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
221. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855, 860 (Fla. 1969). Accord, Tyson v. State,
87 Fla. 392, 393, 100 So. 254, 255 (1924); Johnson v. State, 348 So. 2d 646 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
222. State v. Jones, 204 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 1967).
"Statements that might appear improper when considered in a vacuum, may be
found permissible when examined in context." Nelson v. State, 416 So. 2d 899, 900
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982)(quoting United States v. Forrest, 620 F. 2d 446, 455-56
(5th Cir. 1980)). Accord, McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
223. Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380 (Fla. 1959); McCall v. State, 120 Fla. 707,
163 So. 38 (1938). Accord Coleman v. State, 420 So. 2d 354, 356 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
224. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 89 (1935); Mabery v. State, 303 So.
2d 369, 370 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974).
225. Berger, 295 U.S. at 78.
226. Cummings v. State, 412 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
McMillan v. State, 409 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1982). Cf Coleman v.
State, 420 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
227. See Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1967); Pait v. State, 112 So. 2d
380, 385 (Fla.1959); Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
228. Zide v. State, 212 So. 2d 788, 790 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (citing
Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953)).
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the reversal of a case for this cause may prejudice society more than
the prosecutor. Witnesses disappear, memories fade and it becomes
more difficult to prosecute the defendant several years later at the con-
clusion of the appellate process. It has also been suggested that some
prosecutors, however unethically, may be anticipating ultimate rever-
sal, but view the time served by a defendant in the interim as sufficient
punishment229 - so-called "state attorney time." Some prosecutors
may feel it expedient to "win" today and deal with the reversal later.230
The virtue of the sanction threatened by the court in Jackson v.
State,2 31 disciplinary action against the offending prosecutor, is that it
places the deterrent effect directly where it will do the most good. Dis-
ciplinary action could be applied in the local courts in the form of con-
tempt of court232 or disciplinary proceedings,233 and a punishment
molded to the offense. The Florida Bar could impose penalties ranging
from reprimand to disbarment.234 Other commentators have explored
yet other remedies, including civil liability,235 and removal from of-
fice,238 each with its own drawbacks.237 The reluctance of trial courts to
act in such a fashion, and the fact that no appellate case in Florida
save Jackson has ever proposed a remedy other than reversal, may be
traced to the same point of origin - the courts are reluctant to be so at
odds with the quasi-judicial officers who are viewed as an arm of the
229. See comments of the court in Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15 (1982).
230. Cain, supra note 23, at 41.
231. Jackson v. State, 421 So. 2d 15; Note, The Nature and Consequences of
Forensic Misconduct, supra note 25, at 981. Cf. Kleinfeld v. State, 270 So. 2d 22 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1972) and case cited therein.
232. Shelley v. District Court of Appeal, 350 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1977); see also
Rule 3.840, Fla. R. Crim. P.
233. Fla. Bar Integr. Rule art. XI Rule 11.14; see generally Burns v. Huffstetler,
So. 2d - (Fla. 1983), 13 Fla. L.W. at 164 (May 12, 1983).
234. Fla. Bar Integr. Rule art. XI, Rules 11.01-11.13, see also Jackson, 421 So.
2d 15; Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5.
235. Note, The Nature and Consequences of Forensic Misconduct, supra note 5,
at 979. Prosecutors at common law were absolutely immune from liability for acts in
the scope of their duties. This immunity was not changed by 42 U.S.C. 1983. See
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). This, of course, could be altered by statute.
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court.238 It is natural to expect of prosecutors proper motives and con-
duct. The recriminations inherent in allegations to the contrary are
doubtless not relished by anyone on either side.
It is not the purpose of this article to explore the nontraditional
alternatives available to the courts in deterring prosecutors from such
comments. The court's opinion in Jackson, while not an empty threat,
is intended as a warning shot across the bow, designed to turn prosecu-
tors away from such actions. If the warning is not heeded, the courts
and commentators will be revisiting the subject within a year.
238. Smith v. State, 194 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1957).
36





The property appraiser today plays a central role in the imposition
of ad valorem taxes by Florida's local governmental units. The amount
of ad valorem taxes imposed on a parcel of property is computed by
multiplying the tax rate, expressed in mills," times the tax base, which
is the value of property not exempt or immune from the levy. The tax-
ing authority establishes the rate for levying its tax,2 while the property
appraiser determines the value of property in the tax base. In the pro-
cess of valuation, the property appraiser initially determines whether
the property is exempt or immune from ad valorem taxation, or quali-
fies for special treatment.3 Next, he determines the "just value" of each
item or parcel of taxable property,4 prepares the assessment rolls listing
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.S. Wake Forest University
1968; J.D. Florida State University 1974; LL.M. (Taxation) University of Florida
1975; LL.M. London School of Economics, University of London 1980. The author
would like to thank Daniel C. Turner, a student in the Graduate Tax Program of the
University of Florida, for his invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. A mill is one one-thousandth of a United States dollar, FLA. STAT. §
192.001(10) (Supp. 1982). A rate of 10 mills produces a tax of 1% of the value of the
property in the tax base. Although statutes refer to "millages" and "millage rates," the
tax rates are to be expressed in dollars and cents per every thousand dollars of assessed
property value for purposes of public notice. FLA. STAT. § 200.001(6) (Supp. 1982).
For example, a rate of 10 mills is published as a tax of $10.00 per $1,000.00 of as-
sessed value.
2. Local governmental bodies must observe procedures and limitations in the set-
ting of millages. FLA. STAT. CH. 200 (Supp. 1982).
3. E.g., land properly qualified as agricultural is valued solely on its agricultural
use. FLA. STAT. § 193.461(6)(a) (Supp. 1982).
4. FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 4 (1968) provides in pertinent part: "By general law
regulations shall be prescribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad
valorem taxation. . . ." A similar provision appeared in FLA. CONST. art IX, § 1,
(1885). The term "just valuation" has been defined as "fair market value," the classic
formula being the amount a "purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to
37
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
1 478 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
all real and tangible personal property within his jurisdiction,5 and fur-
nishes these rolls to the appropriate taxing authorities.' After the tax-
ing authorities set millage rates,7 the property appraiser performs the
above described mathematical computation 8 to determine the amount
of ad valorem tax imposed on each item and parcel of taxable property.
Finally, the property appraiser certifies the rolls to the tax collector,'
who collects the taxes due10 and distributes the funds to the proper
taxing entities.""
The role of the property appraiser has remained essentially the
same throughout Florida's history, but at times swirling political cur-
rents and shifts in fiscal policy of state and local governments have
caused the role to undergo change. From the time of Florida's state-
hood until 1974 the property appraiser was referred to as the "tax as-
sessor," 12 but the title was constitutionally changed in that year to
one willing but not obliged to sell." Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 622, 21 So.2d 133,
138 (1945).
5. FLA. STAT. § 193.114 (Supp. 1982).
6. FLA. STAT. § 200.065 (Supp. 1982). The certification provides the taxing au-
thorities a close estimate of the total value of property in the tax base for preparing
budgets and determining the millage rate at which the ad valorem tax will be levied.
The tax rolls must be submitted to the executive director of the Department of Reve-
nue for review to determine if the rolls meet all requirements relating to form and just
value, and for approval or disapproval. Id. § 193.1142 (Supp. 1982).
7. The millage rate levied must be provided for in a resolution or ordinance ap-
proved according to proper statutory procedure by the governing body of the taxing
authority. FLA. STAT. § 200.065(2) (Supp. 1982). A copy of the resolution or ordinance
must be furnished to the property appraiser. Id. § 200.065(4) (Supp. 1982).
8. This computation is referred to as an extension on the tax roll, see FLA. STAT.
§9 192.001(6), 193.122(2) (Supp. 1982), and is purely a ministerial duty. State ex rel.
Neafie v. Board of Comm'rs of Everglades Drainage Dist., 139 Fla. 559, 567, 190 So.
712, 716 (1939).
9. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.116(1) (1981), 193.122(1) (Supp. 1982).
10. FLA. STAT. § 197.012 (Supp. 1982).
11. Id. § 197.0126(2) (Supp. 1982).
12. 1845 Fla. Laws 23, ch. 10, § 9, provided "[tihat there shall be an Assessor of
the Revenue appointed yearly by the General Assembly, and commissioned by the Gov-
ernor of this state for each and every county in this state. . . ." References also were
made variously to "the Assessor of taxes," id. at § 16, and "the County Assessors" id.
at § 18. The most prevalent title, however, was that of "Tax Assessor" e.g., id. at §§
17, 30, and §§ 9, 10, 11 (in marginal notes). The title of "Tax Assessor" quickly be-
came adopted; the other terms falling into disuse. See, e.g., 1846 Fla. Laws 47, ch. 92;
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"property appraiser. ' ' s This article will use the two terms in their
proper chronological context; while the article discusses the history of
the "tax assessor," it should be remembered this character has meta-
morphosed into the "property appraiser."
The thesis of this article is that the changes in the stage setting
upon which the property appraiser plays his role have been of sufficient
magnitude to demote the character from the exalted status of an
elected, constitutional officer to the more appropriate position of a
functionary employee of the Department of Revenue. After more than
a century of experience, it is clear that equality and uniformity in ad
valorem taxation will not be forthcoming so long as the valuation of
property is within the discretionary authority of sixty-seven autono-
mous property appraisers. Recently, the legislature has dramatically in-
creased the Department of Revenue's supervision and control over
property appraisers in a variety of ways, with the laudable objective of
securing the valuation of all property at its full cash value in all sixty-
seven counties. At the same time, the historical reasons for the local
election of property appraisers are no longer timely. It is a sham to
ostensibly maintain the independence of property appraisers, while si-
multaneously prescribing not only the procedures and methods for
them to follow in the valuation of property, but also the minutiae of the
day-to-day operations of their offices. The time has come to transfer the
duties of the property appraiser to the Department of Revenue so that
they may be carried out statewide in a more even-handed, straightfor-
ward manner on a state-wide basis.
II. History of the Property Appraiser in Florida
A. Early Statehood
The tax assessor was a central figure in tax administration when
Florida first became a state. In ad valorem taxation, the term "assess-
ment" refers to the determination of property taxes, and encompasses
the processes of valuing the taxable property, and levying the tax at a
particular rate.14 In the early days of statehood, the most significant ad
1848 Fla. Laws 10, ch. 212, § 1; and 1855 Fla. Laws 8, oh. 715, § 9.
13. H.J. Res. 1907, 1973 Fla. Laws; adopted in the general election of 1974.
14. Jackson Lumber Co. v. McCrimmon, 164 F. 759, 763-64 (M.D. Fla. 1908).
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valorem tax was imposed not by local government, but by the state. 15
The legislature typically would enact a law providing for the imposition
of a state tax at a certain rate. The owner of taxable property (or his
agent) would be required to provide the tax assessor an annual list
(commonly referred to as a "return") of the taxable property, with a
"description of the situation and quality of the same . .. The rate
of state tax imposed on various items of property would already be
known to the tax assessor, who would be required simply to "state in
the last column of his book the total amount of taxes due from such
person."17 The law encouraged the owner to be truthful in valuing his
property by requiring certification under oath that his list was complete
and accurate. 8 If the list was incomplete or inaccurate, the owner be-
came subject to pay a double tax.19 The tax assessor, however, was not
merely a passive actor, for it was his duty "diligently to seek out and
list all the property liable to taxation in his county to the best of his
skill and ability."20
As might be expected, property owners tended to act in their eco-
nomic self-interest, with the value of property listed on a return often
being lower than the price which it might bring in the marketplace. In
1858, the Legislature provided that if the tax assessor should "have any
doubt of the correctness of any return . . . either as to number or
value," he was to bring the matter before the county commissioners
who, in turn, were to appoint "three discreet persons to enquire into the
correctness of said return or returns . . . and the valuation made by
15. See, e.g., 1845 Fla. Laws 21, ch. 10, § 3 (imposing a state tax upon, inter
alia, real property located within any town, ville or city, at a rate of ten cents upon
every hundred dollars value (one mill)). Counties were required to "levy a county tax
. . . upon the same persons and species of property as [were] subject to State tax," id.
at § 32, and municipalities were "authorized to levy and collect a tax . . . upon all the
kinds of property. . . recognised [sic] by [the] act as subjects of State taxation; Pro-
vided, The tax so assessed and collected . . . [did] not exceed fifty per centum upon
the amount of the State Tax," id. at § 33.
16. 1845 Fla. Laws 24, ch. 10, § 13.
17. Id.
18. Id. at § 14.
19. Id.
20. Id. In 1855 a statute was enacted requiring the tax assessor to certify under
oath that all returns submitted to him had been sworn by the taxpayer to be correct.
1855 Fla. Laws _, ch. 715, § 9. i
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said Commission [would] be deemed and taken as the true assessment
in such cases . . 2
During this period, the state ad valorem tax was a general prop-
erty tax, imposed on tangible and intangible personal property as well
as real property. 22 The bulk of the unimproved real property in the
state, however, was within the plantation system, 2  and "the value of
the slave property in the state exceeded the combined value of every
other form of property listed-including land, buildings outside of
towns, [and] household furniture."24 Therefore, in practice, the ad
valorem tax was imposed primarily on agricultural land and slaves.25
With Florida's participation in the Civil War generating an in-
creased need for revenue, legislation was enacted in 1862 to strengthen
the property tax.26 In addition, this legislation shifted the task of valu-
ing property from the tax assessors to the county commissioners.27 This
legislation was repealed the next year, 28 however, "without reviving any
pre-existing law or providing any new method of assessment of valua-
21. 1858 Fla. Laws 11, ch. 859, § 1.
22. 1855 Fla. Laws 7, ch. 715, § 2. Florida derived significant state revenue from
two other types of taxes: the capitation, or poll tax, e.g., id. at § 1 (imposing an annual
tax of fifty cents on "every free white male inhabitant of this State, above the age of
twenty-one years and under the age of fifty years, except paupers and idiotic and in-
sane persons"); and license taxes, e.g., id. at § 6 (imposing a tax of $200 on Hawkers
and Pedlars "for each county in which he or they so hawk and peddle").
23. Edwin L. Williams, Jr., Florida in the Union, 1845-1861, at 109 (unpub-
lished doctoral dissertation, University of North Carolina, 1951), cited in I J. DOVELL,
FLORIDA 333 n.44 (1952).
24. Williams, Negro Slavery in Florida, 28 FLA. HISTORICAL Q. 93, 202 (1950),
cited in I J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 348 n.104 (1952).
25. E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 11, 17 (1925).
26. 1862 Fla. Laws 27, ch. 1,345.
27. [I]t shall be the duty of Tax Assessors and Collectors to make a list of
all the taxable property in their respective counties as provided by law,
with such statistical facts concerning the same as may be requisite in esti-
mating the value of such taxable property and make a return of the same
to the Board of County Commissioners of their respective counties ... ,
and the County Commissioners [shall] thereupon proceed to value and as-
sess the taxes on such property as provided in the first section of this
Act ....
Id. at § 2.
28. 1863 Fla. Laws 25, ch. 1,405, § 3.
4811
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tions, but [thereafter] the assessors [were directed] to assess taxes upon
all taxable property. ' 29 The apparent hiatus in the law 0 was somewhat
bridged because the assessor was required to apportion taxes with ref-
erence to "'equality and uniformity,' and he can do this only by mak-
ing an estimate of the value of property taxed, and apportioning the
taxes accordingly."3 1 The property owner thus continued to have the
initial task of valuing property for ad valorem taxation, subject to the
review and independent judgment of the tax assessor.
B. The Post-Civil War Era
At the conclusion of the Civil War, President Andrew Johnson ap-
pointed William Marvin, formerly a federal judge in Key West, to be
the provisional governor of Florida.3 2 Governor Marvin called a conven-
tion which was held in Tallahassee in October and November of 1865.
The convention annulled the Ordinance of Secession of January 10,
1861, 8 and adopted a new constitution becoming effective on Novem-
ber 7, 1865, without submitting it to the people for ratification. 4 The
constitution made no provision for tax assessors; the General Assembly
was directed to "devise and adopt system of revenue, having regard to
an equal and uniform mode of taxation, throughout the State."35 In
addition, the constitution authorized counties and municipalities to im-
pose taxes, provided that "all property [was to] be taxed upon the prin-
ciples established in regard to State taxation."3
In 1867, the Congress expressed its dissatisfaction with the recon-
struction efforts of President Johnson by placing Florida and other
southern states under martial law and directing the federal military
29. King v. Gwynn, 14 Fla. 32, 34 (1871).
30. The hiatus continued with the enactment of 1866 Fla. Laws 65, ch. 1,501.
31. King, 14 Fla. at 37 (1871).
32. Proclamation of President Andrew Johnson, July 13, 1865, cited in 2 J.
DOVELL, FLORIDA 535 (1952).
33. 1865 Fla. Laws 149 Ordinance No. 1.
34. 3 FLA. STAT. HELPFUL AND USEFUL MATTER 163 (1941). Although the
franchise was extended only to Floridians subscribing to an amnesty oath, liberal en-
forcement resulted in a convention whose membership "included a goodly number of
the Confederate leaders." 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 537 (1952).
35. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (1865).
36. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 4 (1865).
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authorities to oversee a new constitutional convention.3 7 This conven-
tion was a tumultuous affair,38 first having met in January, 1868, with
a constitution ultimately being adopted on February 25, 1868, and rati-
fied by the people at an election held May 4, 1868. This constitution
was modeled after the constitutions of mid-western states in force at
the time,39 with one unusual provision-the product of compro-
mise-which called for virtually all state and local executive offices to
be filled by gubernatorial appointment rather than by election. The
"assessor of taxes" for each county was among the officers to be
appointed."
During the next fifteen years, the political forces which initially
had been swept from power as a consequence of martial law 2 were
able to regroup and regain their influence. In 1884, Brigadier-General
Edward A. Perry, a Democrat and Confederate War hero, was elected
37. Act of March 2, 1867, 14 Stat. 428. Congress was disturbed by steps taken
in Florida and other southern states to keep blacks disenfranchised and treated as sec-
ond-class citizens. The crowning blow was the rejection of the fourteenth amendment
by all of the old Confederate states except Tennessee (Florida's legislature having re-
jected it unanimously). It was necessary for the Congress to override President John-
son's veto in order to enact the reconstruction bill. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 539-40, 548
(1952).
38. See 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 550-57 (1952).
39. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 555 (1952).
40. "The executive appointment compromise had been accepted as a means to-
ward white supremacy in 'black belt' counties during the period of Republican rule."
Id. at 651.
41. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 19 (1868) provided:
The Governor shall appoint, by and with the consent of the Senate, in each
county an assessor of taxes and a collector of revenue, whose duties shall
be prescribed by law, and who shall hold their offices for two years, and be
subject to removal upon the recommendation of the Governor and consent
of the Senate.
42. The ex-Confederates and Democrats who held power under the administra-
tion of Provisional Governor Marvin in the mid-1860's were replaced during the mar-
tial law period by Republicans and "carpetbaggers." The elections held in May, 1868,
produced a Republican Governor, Lieutenant Governor and Representative to Con-
gress. The Florida Legislature was comprised of sixteen Republicans in the senate and
thirty-seven in the house; there were only eight Democrats in the senate and fifteen in
the house. Martial law was lifted on July 4, 1868, and on July 25 of that year the
Congress readmitted Florida into the Union. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 556-64 (1952).
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Governor. 3 At the same election, voters overwhelmingly supported a
proposal for a constitutional convention to overhaul the 1868 constitu-
tion.4 There were many issues involved, but the gubernatorial power to
appoint practically all state and county officials was of paramount con-
cern to the populace.' 5 The constitution, which was adopted by the con-
vention in 1885,46 returned selection of most local officials to the voters
of the jurisdiction.'7
The constitution granted the tax assessor the stature of a "consti-
tutional officer,"'48 but did not change the duties and powers of the of-
fice.49 The preceding thirty years had seen a gradual shift of responsi-
bility from the property owner to the tax assessor in the valuation of
property. As an example, legislation enacted in 1855 required owners
to submit to the tax assessor, under oath, a list of real, or tangible or
intangible personal property subject to taxation.50 The tax assessor had
43. Id. at 647-49.
44. Id. at 594, 650; 1883 Fla. Laws 169, J. Res. No. 1 (resolution calling for
referendum on a constitutional convention).
45. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 651 (1952).
46. The constitution was submitted for ratification in the general election of
1886, and became effective on January 1, 1887. Ordinance No. 1 of the Constitutional
Convention of 1885.
47. FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § 6 (1885) provided: "The Legislature shall provide
for the election by the qualified electors in each county of the following County Of-
ficers: A Clerk of the Circuit Court, a Sheriff, Constables, a County Assessor of Taxes,
a Tax Collector, a County Treasurer, a Superintendent of Public Instruction and a
County Surveyor." Curiously, county commissioners continued to be appointed by the
Governor. Id. § 5. The appointment of the commissioners was a promised compromise
protection to the 'black belt' counties whereby a Democratic governor could select
Democratic officeholders. A further protection was secured in the requirement that
county officeholders were to give surety bond and be commissioned by the governor.
Bonds were made subject to the approval of the county commissioners and the state
comptroller. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 656 (1952). In 1900, the 1885 constitution was
amended to provide for the election of county commissioners. 1899 Fla. Laws S.J.Res.
No. 44.
48. The status is of uncertain importance. Compare District School Bd. of Lee
County v. Askew, 278 So. 2d 272, 275 (Fla. 1973) ("tax assessors are constitutionally
created officers"), with Department of Revenue v. Markham, 396 So. 2d 1120, 1121
(Fla. 1981) (property appraisers, i.e. tax assessors, are governmental officials bound by
statutory duty).
49. See 1887 Fla. Laws 9-11, ch. 3,681, §§ 15-22.
50. 1855 Fla. Laws 8, ch. 715, § 9.
7:19831
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no power to initiate the valuation process. In 1858, the tax assessor was
directed to notify the county commissioners of any perceived instance
of undervaluation, and with respect to all other property on the assess-
ment roll, to give oath that "he verily believe[d] that the said property
ha[d] been returned at its true value."51 The commission would deter-
mine the value of property it found to have been undervalued. 2
In 1874, legislation was passed eliminating the owner's determina-
tion of value of real property, requiring "the assessor [to] visit and
inspect all real estate before he affixe[d] a valuation thereon, unless he
[was] previously personally acquainted with its value."53 The owner
continued to return under oath and specify the value of personalty."
The tax assessor was not authorized to determine the value of person-
alty independently, unless the owner either failed to make a return, or
failed or refused to "make oath before [the tax assessor] that the [re-
turn was] full and correct." 5
Five years later, the legislature again changed the relationship be-
tween the property owner and the tax assessor. This time, the property
owner was required to submit not only a return of personalty, but of
real property, including "a statement of the value of each parcel of
land."5 " The tax assessor's duty was to "call to the attention of the
Board of County Commissioners. . . all cases in which property [was],
in his judgment, . . . assessed below its cash value;' 57 and the Board
was authorized to "raise or lower the valuation of any real or personal
property."58 In 1881, there was another change again obliging the tax
assessor to visit each parcel of real property and determine its value.5'
Personalty was still returned, under oath, by its owner;60 the tax as-
sessor became involved only if no return was filed, or if the return was
51. 1858 Fla. Laws 12, ch. 859, § 2.
52. Id. at § 1.
53. 1874 Fla. Laws 14, ch. 1,976, § 17.
54. Id. at § 24.
55. Id. at §§ 24-26.
56. 1879 Fla. Laws 24, ch. 3,099, § 24.
57. Id. at § 26.
58. Id. at § 29.
59. 1881 Fla. Laws 28, 29, ch. 3,219, §§ 17, 24.
60. Id. at § 24.
485 1Florida's Property Appraisers17:1983
45
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
486 Nova Law Journal 7:198
not properly made under oath."1 This last change in valuation of realty
and personalty was to remain basically the same up to the present.62
C. The First Attempts at State Oversight of Tax Assessors
Over the years, the tax assessor has been accorded a great deal of
discretion in valuing property for taxation;6 3 however, this discretion
has not been unbridled or total. Beginning in 1869, the Board of
County Commissioners was required to meet with the tax assessor on
or before the first Monday of June in each year, in order to review the
assessment rolls." Subsequently,
[t]he county commissioners of each county shall meet at the clerk's
office on the first Monday of June of each year,for the purpose of
equalizing the assessment of the real estate of their respective
counties, and to hear all persons who may be aggrieved, and the
board of county commissioners may alter the valuation of any real
estate.65
The "equalization" process authorized to the county commission-
ers was restricted jurisdictionally to the valuations of property within
the commissioner's county. The board was unconcerned, for example,
that farmland might be valued at $1.00 an acre in its county, and con-
tiguous farmland lying in an adjacent county might be valued at $5.00
an acre--even though both parcels were subject to the same rate of
state ad valorem tax. Instead, the board's primary concern was ensur-
ing that the ad valorem tax imposed by the county was distributed inter
se in a uniform and equal manner. This aim could be accomplished
whether the valuation of property was at full price or some fraction of
the price which it could bring in the marketplace ("cash value").66
With local officials deciding the amount of revenue desired from the ad
valorem tax, and levying the tax at the highest rate (millage) author-
61. Id. at § 25.
62. See FLA. STAT. § 193.052 (Supp. 1982).
63. German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee, 59 Fla. 493, 52 So. 292 (1910).
64. 1869 Fla. Laws 11, ch. 1,713, § 27.
65. Id. at § 28.
66. "Cash value" was defined "to mean the usual selling price at the place where
the property to which the term is applied shall be at the time of assessment." Id. at § 5.
I
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ized, they could adjust downward (equalize?) the valuation of taxable
property without regard to full cash value.17 Indeed, keeping the valua-
tions low worked to the advantage of the property owners and electors
within the board's county, because that correspondingly lowered the
amount of the state imposed ad valorem tax. 8
This antagonism between state and local tax objectives produced a
vicious cycle. The state would increase the state ad valorem tax rate,
while the local officials reduced the local valuations of property which
thereby eroded the tax base available to the state. In 1877, the state ad
valorem tax rate reached twelve and one half mills, 9 and yet revenues
were less than expected. When the legislature rebuffed the governor's
request to reduce the millage, he acted by executive orders to reduce
the 1877 millage to ten, and the 1878 millage to nine.70 In 1879, appar-
ently following the governor's previous examples, the legislature further
reduced the millage to seven and also suspended the levy for the re-
demption of bonded indebtedness.7 1 This reduction caused state ad
valorem tax receipts to fall far short of necessary revenues, even as the
governor was recommending state-wide uniformity of taxation. 2 Subse-
quent decreases (after a brief increase) in the state millage rate during
the early 1880's were accompanied by increases in the assessed valua-
tion of taxable property. 3
By 1913, the state ad valorem tax rate had fallen to a relatively
moderate two mills,"' and yet the vexatious problem of undervaluation
persisted. In that year, the legislature took the first step leading to state
67. Significantly, the board of county commissioners would establish the rate of
the county levy at the same meeting which was required to be held for the purpose of
equalizing assessments. Id. at § 38.
68. It had long been noted that "the utilization for general state purposes of a
locally assessed tax on property inevitably leads to an under-assessment of the prop-
erty." E. SELIGMAN, ESSAYS IN TAXATION 666 (10th ed. 1925).
69. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 590 (1952).
70. Id.
71. 1879 Fla. Laws 39, ch. 3,100, §§ 2, 3.
72. 2 J. DOVELL, FLORIDA 590-91 (1952).
73. Id. at 593. However, it should be noted that a major factor, in both the
increase in total assessed valuations and in the ability to reduce the millage rate, was
the success in finally bringing railroad property into the tax base. Id. at 594.
74. 1913 Fla. Laws 280-81, ch. 6,474, § 1. In addition to the levy for state gov-
ernmental purposes, there was a school tax levied at a state-wide rate of one mill.
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regulation of the ad valorem taxing process by creating a state Tax
Commission, whose primary duty was
[t]o have and exercise general supervision over the administration
of the tax laws of the State, over Assessors, and over Boards of
County Commissioners in the performance of their duties as boards
of tax equalization, to the end that all assessments of property be
made relatively just and equal at the true and substantial value in
compliance with law.7
5
And yet, the Tax Commission was a rather toothless watchdog
posted as sentry over the tax assessors and boards of county commis-
sioners. It had not been empowered to make or force changes in the
valuation of property made by the tax assessors or county commission-
ers, even though such action might have been necessary to fulfill the
mission of the Commission. 6
Because the enabling legislation creating the Tax Commission was
not passed until June of 1913, the Commission was not able to actively
oversee the assessment process for that year. The Commissioners, how-
ever, did spend time traveling throughout the state, observing and
learning about the status of ad valorem taxation in the state.77 The Tax
Commission's first step in corrective action was the call for a conven-
tion of tax assessors for the purposes of having
75. 1913 Fla. Laws. 329-31, ch. 6,500, § 9.
76. The Tax Commission requested that it be given such authority, but the legis-
lature failed to act affirmatively. The Commission also recommended the adoption of
an income tax and an inheritance tax so that the state's reliance on the ad valorem
property tax could be reduced. TAX COMMISSION, FIRST BIENNIAL REPORT 35-36
(1915).
77. Through these investigations we found the conditions to be extremely
bad, everything in the matter of taxation and values being in chaos. We
found no two counties assessing property on the same basis of valuation;
we found great inequalities even among the same classes of property in the
same county; the per centage of values ranged from as low as ten per cent
of true value to full cash value; and great quantities of property were not
even on the tax books. This condition existed in the face of the fact that
the law is plain and emphatic that all property shall be assessed at true
cash value or full cash value.
Id. at 12.
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the assessors confer among themselves and to discuss with the Tax
Commission and one another steps to get the property on an equal
basis in the State and to discuss the necessary steps to be taken to
improve the tax conditions in Florida; it was the desire of the Tax
Commission that the Assessors get together and agree on a definite
percentage of true value upon which all the assessors in the State
would agree to value the property in Florida for the year 1914, so
that a step toward equalization might be taken and something in
that direction begun to be accomplished.78
By the Tax Commission's own admission, the convention was not a
success: "[T]he Assessors adjourned the convention, or rather went
away before the convention had completed its work, without taking any
action in regard to uniform valuation for assessment and the convention
then seemed to be a failure and the efforts of the Commission to have
come to nothing. ' '17
Because the Tax Commission was unable to persuade the tax as-
sessors to agree to value property at some uniform percentage of full
cash value, the Commission believed it was left with no choice but to
instruct the assessors to comply with the law "and assess all property at
its full cash value."80 The tax assessors met again a few months later
and this time adopted a resolution agreeing to value real estate "at fifty
per cent of its true cash value, leaving the true cash value with the
discretion of the Assessor of his county.81 The Tax Commission ac-
cepted this compromise, acknowledging that "[t]his was in violation of
law, but was done by custom and consent among the Assessors. '8 2
Even though fifty per cent and not full cash value was used, valua-
tions rose dramatically. In 1914, real property valuations increased al-
most twenty-five per cent and personal property valuations increased
twenty-one per cent over what they were in 1913.8 As a consequence,
state ad valorem levies were reduced by two mills. 84 It is significant
that this progress was achieved without infringing upon the tax as-
78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 16.
80. Id. at 19.
81. Id. at 21.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 165.
84. Id. at 32.
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sessor's discretion in valuing property.
Instead of accepting the Tax Commission's suggestions for
strengthening its powers and authority to have property assessed at its
full cash value throughout the state,8" the legislature abolished the Tax
Commission in 1918.86 Three years later, however, many of the duties
and functions which the three person Tax Commission had performed
were given to a single individual, the State Equalizer of Taxes.87 The
State Equalizer was authorized to examine the tax assessment rolls
throughout the state, and
[i]f it shall appear to said Equalizer that in any one or more of the
counties of this State the taxable values fixed upon any one or more
classes of property are not uniform with the values fixed upon the
same classes of property in other counties, the said Equalizer shall
investigate and inquire as to the reason therefor, and, after making
such investigation and comparison, shall have authority to point out
to the County Assessor of Taxes such inequalities and direct the
said Assessor to adjust, equalize and assess the same in accordance
with the findings of the said Equalizer as to what would be an equi-
table assessment, either by adding a fixed per centum to the county
valuation of any classe [sic] of property in any county, if he finds
the county valuation is too low, or by deducting a fixed per centum
from the county valuation if he finds the county valuation is too
high, as may appear to be just and right between the counties; or to
raise or lower the valuations and assessments of any or all classes
of property in the State in order to more equally make each class
of property bear its just proportion of taxation. 88
The State Equalizer, however, did not have the final word. If the
Board of County Commissioners was dissatisfied with the changes or-
dered by the State Equalizer, it could appeal to the State Board of
Equalizers, comprised of the Governor, the Treasurer and the Attorney
General. 9 It is unclear how well this scheme worked; 90 it was repealed
85. Id. at 34-35.
86. 1918 Fla. Laws 65, ch. 7,751.
87. 1921 Fla. Laws 403, 406-07, ch. 8,584 §§ 6, 7.
88. Id. at § 3.
89. 1921 Fla. Laws 405-06, ch. 8,584, § 5.
90. There were no reported decisions under this act regarding the duties of the
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in 193191 and for a period thereafter the tax assessors exercised their
discretion in valuing property for taxation without any meaningful re-
view or control from the state.
D. The Tax Assessor's Discretion in Valuation
Throughout this period, the discretion of the tax assessor in valu-
ing property appeared virtually sacrosanct. The Florida Supreme
Court, in first addressing the issue of discretion, held that a circuit
court judge exceeded his authority in reviewing the assessor's discre-
tionary judgment of the value of property determined for purposes of
taxation.92 In German-American Lumber Co. v. Barbee,3 the plaintiff
asserted that the value placed on its property by the tax assessor was
excessive. The court noted that the plaintiff had not complained to the
board of county commissioners, sitting as the board of equalizers,
which had the power to reduce the assessor's valuation if found exces-
sive.94 The parameters of judicial review of the tax assessor's valuation
of property were summarized as follows:
The law contemplates that a wvide discretion be accorded to the tax
assessor in the valuation of property for the purposes of taxation.
In the absence of a clear and positive showing of fraud or of an
illegal act or of an abuse of discretion rendering an assessment au-
thorized by law so arbitrary and discriminating as to amount to a
fraud upon a taxpayer or to a denial of the equal protection of the
laws, the courts will not in general control the discretion of the tax
assessor in making valuations for taxing purposes. The burdens of
State Equalizer of Taxes and his supervision by the Board of Equalizers of the State.
In State v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 84 Fla. 592, 94 So. 681 (1922), the court fended off
an attack on 1921 Fla. Laws 406-07, §§ 6 and 7 which authorized the State Comptrol-
ler, rather than the county tax assessors, to value certain railroad and telegraph prop-
erty, and the Board of Equalizers to review such valuations.
91. 1931 Fla. Laws 940, ch. 15,027.
92. Shear v. County Comm'rs of Columbia County, 14 Fla. 146 (1872). The
valuation subject to review in that case had been made by the board of county commis-
sioners rather than the tax assessor. However, the court's discussion regarding the judi-
cial review of executive discretion is germane.
93. 59 Fla. 493, 52 So. 292 (1910).
94. Id. at 497-98, 52 So. at 294.
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taxation cannot be made exactly equal. 95
In Graham v. City of West Tampa,9 the taxpayer asserted that
the value set for his land by the assessor was not only excessive, but
had been arbitrarily and intentionally made. The Court, holding that
the jurisdiction of the circuit court was proper, noted that
[w]hile the law accords a range of discretion to the officer author-
ized to ascertain and determine valuations of property for purposes
of taxation, when the officer proceeds in accordance with and sub-
stantially complies with the requirements of law designed to ascer-
tain such values, yet, if the steps required to be taken in making
valuations are not in fact and in good faith actually taken, and the
valuations are shown to be essentially unjust or unequal abstractly
or relatively, the assessment is invalid. Valuations of property for
taxation must be ascertained in the manner required by law and
must have relation to the actual value of the property; and there
must be no substantial inequality in valuations.9 8
Again in Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen,99 the taxpayer demon-
strated that the excessive valuation of his property resulted from the
assessor's arbitrary and discriminatory actions, so that the circuit court
properly had jurisdiction to review the assessor's exercise of discretion
in valuation. 100
95. Id. Accord Wadev. Murrhee, 75 Fla. 494, 78 So. 536 (1918); City of Tampa
v. Kaunitz, 39 Fla. 683, 23 So. 416 (1898).
96. 71 Fla. 605, 71 So. 926 (1916).
97. Id. at 607, 71 So. at 926.
98. Id. at 611-12, 71 So. at 927-28.
99. 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503 (1919).
100. The Court noted that the board of county commissioners had approved the
tax assessor's improprieties:
The law does not contemplate that the assessor is infallible nor that
his valuations shall be conclusive, but presumes that he will err, and pro-
vides the means for correcting his errors and equalizing his values by stat-
ute which requires the commissioners to give notice by publication or post-
ing of the time when the board will be in session to have complaints and
receive testimony as to values of any property as fixed by the assessor, and,
after hearing testimony, to raise or lower such values, that the assessment
may be equal and uniform. The board of county commissioners in this
state is an essential part of the taxing system, their duties as such are
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Finally, in City of Tampa v. Palmer,0 1 the court "held mistaken
judgment, and unaffected by any element of illegality in matter of law,
or intentional or other abuse of authority, or fraud, express or implied,
will not suffice as a ground of equitable jurisdiction. 1 °2
Although the tax assessor was accorded wide discretion in valuing
property, he was bound by the constitutional directive, appearing first
in the 1868 constitution, to value property at its "full cash value:" 10 3
"The Legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal rate of taxa-
tion, and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valua-
tion of all property, both real and personal. ... o
E. Just Valuation vs. Equal Valuation
If a property owner could show that he had not been treated
equally-that his property had been determined to have a higher value
than similar property-then the emphasis would be focused on equaliz-
ing the two values, rather than on ensuring each property was valued at
"full cash value." The Board of County Commissioners was empowered
to change the assessor's valuation of a parcel of property in order to
equalize the valuation of the same class of property within the
county.1 0 5 Therefore the Tax Commission did not feel bound by the
"full cash value" requirement when directing tax assessors to value
prescribed by law, and when the members of that board, sitting as a board
of equalizers, deliberately, intentionally, and arbitrarily sustain an assess-
ment which they know is unjust, unequal, and discriminatory, they perpet-
uate a fraud upon the injured taxpayers.
Id. at 363-64, 81 So. at 511.
101. 89 Fla. 514, 105 So. 115 (1925).
102. Id. at 529-30, 105 So. at 120.
103. E.g., 1881 Fla. Laws 28-29, ch. 3,219, § 18. "Cash value" was defined "to
mean the usual selling price at the place where the property to which the term is ap-
plied shall be at the time of assessment." Id. at § 5.
104. FLA. CONsT. art. XII, § 1 (1868). Earlier constitutions had been silent re-
garding the valuation of property for taxation. FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (1861),
merely provided that "[t]he General Assembly shall devise and adopt a system of reve-
nue, having regard to an equal and uniform mode of taxation to be general throughout
the State." Identical language appeared in FLA. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1 (1838). The
"just valuation" provision was retained in FLA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1 (1885), and is
currently contained in FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 4 (1968).
105. E.g., 1881 Fla. Laws 30, ch. 3,219, § 28.
4931
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property at fifty per cent of actual value.1"' Nor were courts bound
when confronted with valuations clearly less than full cash value:
The purpose of the statute in requiring property to be assessed
at its full cash value is to secure uniformity and equality of burden
upon all property in the state, and if all the taxable property of
Citrus county was assessed on a basis of 50 per cent. of its true
cash value, the purpose of the constitutional provision has not been
defeated, nor has the appellant been injured ...
The adoption of full value has no different effect in distribut-
ing the burden than would be gained by adopting 75 per cent., or
50 per cent., or even 10 per cent., as the basis, so long as either was
applied uniformly. The only difference would be that, supposing the
requirements of the treasury remained constant, the rate of taxa-
tion would have to be increased as the percentage of valuation was
reduced. Therefore the principal, if not the sole reason for adopting
"full cash value" as the standard for valuations is as a convenient
means to an end; the end being equal taxation." 7
However, even as the above quoted passage was being penned,
seeds had already been planted which would disrupt the status quo of
allowing property to be valued at something less than full cash value,
so long as all property within a county was valued at the same percent-
age of full value. Those seeds were constitutionally authorized exemp-
tions from ad valorem taxation for certain property---exemptions ex-
pressed in terms of flat dollar amounts. First, the constitution adopted
in 1885 provided that "[t]here shall be exempt from taxation property
to the value of two hundred dollars to every widow that has a family
dependent on her for support, and to every person that has lost a limb
or been disabled in war or by misfortune."108 This exemption appar-
ently did not significantly affect the distributive burden of the ad
106. See supra, discussion of the Tax Commission, text and note 75.
107. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 349, 81 So. 503, 506 (1919).
The Court noted that the valuations had been made at 50 per cent of the full cash
value pursuant to instructions from the Tax Commission. Id. at 347, 81 So. at 505. The
approach of favoring equality and uniformity over full valuation was found in other
jurisdictions as well. See, e.g., Sioux City Bridge Co. v. Dakota County, 260 U.S. 441
(1923).
108. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 9 (1885).
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valorem tax because there are no reported decisions addressing it.
In 1924, the Constitution was amended to provide:
No tax upon inheritances or upon the income of residents or
citizens of this State shall be levied by the State of Florida, or
under its authority, and there shall be exempt from taxation to the
head of a family residing in this State, household goods and per-
sonal effects to the value of Five Hundred ($500.00) Dollars.109
The effect of this exemption, obviously of more widespread utility
than the earlier exemption for widows and certain disabled individuals,
was to exacerbate deviations from valuations at other than full cash
value. The Court, although noting this effect in Hackney v. McPen-
ney,110 concluded:
In this case the taxing unit is the county; and, if all taxable
property in the county is assessed at the same percentage of its true
cash value and such assessment operates to "secure a just valuation
of all property" for taxation, within the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, the court will not adjudge the assessment to be void; there
being no showing by proper parties that the rule of valuation
adopted and applied throughout the county would be illegal if not
uniformly applied in a larger taxing unit which includes the
county."'
The plaintiff in Hackney obviously had not raised the point that
109. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 11 (1885), as amended in the general election of
1924 (emphasis supplied); S.J. Res. 135, 1923 Fla. Laws 483.
110. The court observed:
The organic provision means that, in making assessments of personal
property for taxation, the head of a family residing in this state shall be
allowed an exemption of "household goods and personal effects to the
value of five hundred dollars"; such value of $500 to be deducted from the
total assessable value of the household goods and personal effects of the
head of a family residing in this state. For example, if the head of a family
residing in this state has "household goods and personal effects" of the
value of $1,200 and the assessment value is 50 per cent. thereof, or $600,
the exempt value of $500 is to be deducted from the $600 assessment
value, leaving the remainder of $100 to be assessed for taxation.
113 Fla. 176, 188-89, 151 So. 524, 529 (1933).
111. Id. at 193, 151 So. at 530 (on petition for rehearing).
55
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Nova Law Journal 7:1983496
the state was also levying at a uniform state-wide rate an ad valorem
tax on the assessed value of (inter alia) household goods and personal
effects in excess of five hundred dollars belong to resident heads-of-
household." 2 If valuations in all counties were at a uniform fifty per
cent of full cash value, no unequal treatment would be imposed with
the constitutional school tax of one mill. However, if, for example,
property were valued at fifty per cent in one county, but only twenty-
five per cent in another, identical household goods and personal effects
with a full cash value of $1,200 after application of this exemption
would result in $100 assessed for taxation in the first county, and none
in the second.113 It seems likely that the relatively small dollar amount
of this exemption kept the issue from being brought before the
courts.1 4
In 1934, the constitution was amended, adopting the homestead
tax exemption and thereby ending the era of complacency with valua-
tions at less than full cash value:
There shall be exempted from all taxation, other than special
assessments for benefits, to every head of a family who is a citizen
of and resides in the State of Florida, the homestead as defined in
Article X of the Constitution of the State of Florida up to the valu-
ation of $5,000.00; provided, however, that the title to said home-
112. The tax year before the Court in the Hackney case was 1932. In 1931, the
legislature resolved to reduce the state's reliance on ad valorem taxation of real and
tangible personal property by turning to some alternative tax sources, such as an inher-
itance tax (adopted by ch. 15,746), an excise tax on documents (ch. 15,787), an addi-
tional tax on gasoline (ch. 15,788), and an intangibles tax (ch. 15, 789). In 1929, the
legislature had levied state ad valorem taxes on real and tangible personal property at a
rate of eight mills for general revenue purposes, one-half mill for the state board of
health, one and one-quarter mills for the state prison fund, and one mill for schools, ch.
14,578, § 1, Laws of Fla. 1126-27 (1929). By comparison, in 1931 only the one mill for
school purposes was levied, as was then required by article XII, section 6 of the Florida
Constitution (1885) (repealed in 1940).
113. At the time of the Hackney decision, supra note 110, in 1932, the revenue
derived from the state-wide constitutional school tax of one mill was distributed
"among the several counties of the State in proportion to the average attendance upon
schools in the said counties respectively." FLA. CONST. art. XII, § 7 (1885) (as
amended in 1894).
114. The constitutional school tax of one mill, if imposed on property of a taxa-
ble value of five hundred dollars, would produce a tax liability of only fifty cents.
Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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stead may be vested in such head of a family or in his lawful wife
residing upon such homestead or in both.11 5
The dollar amount of the homestead tax exemption was not de
minimus-in many situations it had the effect of completely re-
moving tax liability from a homestead.116 The unfairness of valua-
tions at less than full cash value became apparent on both a state-
wide and county level. If county valuations were uniform at fifty
per cent of full value, homestead property with a full value of
$10,000 would bear no tax while non-homestead property of equal
value would be taxable. If, on the other hand, the valuations were
at full cash value, both the homestead and non-homestead property
would shoulder some portion of the tax burden. The unfairness re-
sulting from discrepancies in valuations between counties, de-
scribed above in the context of the household goods exemption, was
exacerbated by an exemption 1,000 per cent greater in amount.
The court in Cosen Investment Co. v. Overstreet'" addressed these
issues:
Appellant relies upon our opinion, Camp Phosphate Co. v. Al-
len, 77 Fla. 341, 81 So. 503. This case does not support appellant
because, as was pointed out there, the purpose of the law was to
render the tax burden uniform, equal and just and if all property
was assessed at fifty per cent of its cash value the purpose of the
law was carried out. Such logic is not now tenable because, by the
adoption of Art. X, Sec. 7, to the Florida Constitution, homesteads
to the extent of $5,000 are exempt from taxation.
To perpetuate the practice of assessing all property at a less
percentage than [full cash value] would necessarily result in favor-
ing the homesteads. The logic of the opinion in Camp Phosphate
Co. v. Allen, supra, is no longer applicable because the reduced
115. FLA. CONsT. art. X, § 7 (1885), added in general election 1934; amended
general election 1938 and 1964. The homestead tax exemption is contained today in
FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 6 (1968).
116. See Lersch v. Board of Public Instruction for Orange County, 121 Fla. 621,
164 So. 281 (1935); Schleman v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 9 So. 2d 197 (Fla.
1942); and Note, Assessment Standards and Property Tax Equity in Florida, 17 U.
FLA. L. REV. 83 (1964). The exemption was not applicable to the extent ad valorem
taxes had been pledged for the payment of interest and principal on bonded indebted-
ness incurred prior to the adoption of the homestead tax exemption. State v. Boring,
121 Fla. 781, 164 So. 859 (1935).
117. 17 So. 2d 788 (Fla. 1944).
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value, even though uniformly lower, is no longer just. ..."'
It was no longer possible simply to note that tax assessors had
"wide discretion", or to uphold valuations based on discretion if the
board of county commissioners properly equalized assessments within a
county. Steps were needed to encourage, if not force, the tax assessor to
raise the level of valuations to "full cash value" because political disin-
centives still existed impeding him doing so voluntarily. The tax as-
sessor was an elected official. A voter who understood that the ad
valorem tax imposed on his property was not only a function of the
valuation made by the assessor, but of the millage levied by the taxing
authorities, might nonetheless focus on the clear and direct relationship
between an increase in value placed on his property by the assessor and
the amount of tax he had to pay. The tax assessor thus was placed in a
situation where judicious exercise of his "wide discretion" could im-
prove, if not ensure, the likelihood of his re-election.119
F. The Drive Towards "Full Cash Value" = Restrictions on
Discretion
Recognizing the unfairness resulting from undervaluations, and
taking effective steps producing "full cash value" valuations of property
are two very different things. 120 Nonetheless, one inducement for local
officials to provide low valuations of property"' was removed with the
1940 constitutional amendment prohibiting the state from imposing ad
valorem taxes on real property and tangible personal property. 122 In
118. Id. at 788.
119. In Dickinson v. Geraci, 190 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1966) the
court noted: "We think we can take judicial notice that in the past most Tax Assessors
knew the people of their county looked favorably on low ratios of assessment, and this
would redound favorably in the Tax Assessors' election returns." Id. at 385 (quoting
Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1961)).
120. The Court in Cosen, 17 So. 2d 788 (1944), was willing to assume that prop-
erty was being valued at full cash value: "Subsequent to the adoption of Art. X, Sec. 7,
the practice of assessing property has been in conformity with the statute, that is at one
hundred per cent of its true cash value." Id. at 788.
121. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
122. FLA. CONST. art. IX, § 2 (1885), was amended in the general election of
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addition, the assessor was provided an incentive to value property at
full cash value with enactment of legislation in 1941 requiring local
taxing authorities to reduce, or "roll-back," their millage levies in pro-
portion to the increase in the level of valuations made by the tax as-
sessor.12 3 In theory, property owners no longer should have expected to
find their tax liabilities rise with a rise in the valuation of their prop-
erty because increased valuation accompanied a decrease in the tax
rate. Therefore, a tax assessor could feel free to value property at "full
cash value" because the onus of determining the amount of taxes had
shifted to the proper taxing authorities.124
Also in 1941, the legislature enacted legislation to provide in-
creased state control of ad valorem taxation.125 The state comptroller
was given "general supervision of the assessment and valuation of prop-
erty so that all property [would] be placed on the tax rolls and the
valuation thereof [would] be uniform and equal, as required by the
Constitution .. ."" In furthering this general objective, the legisla-
tion required the comptroller to provide all necessary forms for tax as-
sessors;127 granted the comptroller power to review assessors' budg-
ets;1 28 directed the comptroller to investigate the conduct and
performance of tax officials' duties for recommendation to the governor
the removal of any derelict official for "willful failure to properly per-
form" his duties;129 and authorized the comptroller to approve each as-
sessment roll before being submitted to the local taxing authorities for
A.D. 1940, no levy of ad valorem taxes upon real or personal property except intangible
property, shall be made for any State purpose whatsoever. . . ." The same amendment
repealed the constitutional state-wide school millage required by FLA. CONST. art. XII,
§ 6 (1885), see supra note 112 and accompanying text.
123. 1941 Fla. Laws 1965-66, ch. 20,722, § 54.
124. The defect of this scheme was that it compared the total value of property
on the assessment roll with the millage to be levied. It was later noted, although in a
different context, that "the mere fact that the aggregate total valuation of a tax roll
reflects the full cash value of all property in the county, does not necessarily lead to the
conclusion that the roll is equal and that just valuations have been obtained for each
separate parcel." State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 138 So. 2d 312, 316 (Fla. 1961).
125. 1941 Fla. Laws 1934, ch. 20,722.
126. Id. at 1962-63, § 46.
127. Id. at 1962.
128. Id. at 1966-67, § 56.
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use in levying their respective ad valorem taxes.130
Unfortunately, the comptroller's extended grant of authority to ef-
fectuate full valuation proved to be insufficient because the tax assessor
still had "wide discretion" in valuing property.131 The county board of
equalizers, however, was empowered to disturb the assessor's discretion
in order to equalize the valuations of property within the county.13 2 In
addition, the comptroller had the authority, in proper circumstances
and under the supervision of the State Budget Commission, to direct an
assessor to make "a complete re-evaluation and re-assessment of a tax
roll."1 Yet, assessments at "full cash value" remained the exception,
not the rule.13 4
Since 1941, quickening legislative action has been steadily been
directed toward the fundamental source of the problem of undervalua-
tion-the assessor's discretion in determining just value. In 1957, the
legislature partially limited this discretion by requiring land used for
"agricultural purposes" to be valued on a per acre basis.135 In 1963,
130. Id. at 1937-38, § 5.
131. State ex rel. Kent Corp. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Broward County,
37 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1948). The valuation made by the tax assessor was presumed to be
correct, and would be struck down only if "affirmatively overcome by appropriate and
sufficient allegations and proofs excluding every reasonable hypothesis of a legal assess-
ment." Folsom v. Bank of Greenwood, 97 Fla. 426, 430, 120 So. 317, 318 (1929).
132. Sanders v. Crapps, 45 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 1950). Compare Sanders v. State ex
rel. Shamrock Properties, 46 So. 2d 491 (Fla. 1950) (board of county commissioners,
sitting as a board of equalization, did not have power to reduce valuations placed upon
personal property by tax assessor when return of property owner did not specify such
personal property under oath). Indeed, there was a presumption that the board of
equalization would correct any overvaluation if properly brought before the board. City
of Tampa v. Palmer, 89 Fla. 514, 531, 105 So. 115, 121 (1925).
133. Burns v. Butscher, 187 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 1965).
134. A 1965 survey made by the Railroad Assessment Board, which determined
the value of railroad property throughout the state, noted that in eight counties valua-
tions were 100 per cent of full cash value, but in the other 59 counties, valuations
ranged down to a low of 17.54 per cent. Id. at 595.
In Blumberg v. Petteway, 91 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1956), the tax assessor "testi-
fied point blank that he had not assessed the property on the basis of its full cash value,
but that he had attempted to take 'a happy medium' between the low of 1932 and the
high of 1952. When asked if the City Charter did not provide for assessment of full
cash value, the Assessor answered that, 'the charter did not say what year-present,
past or future.'"
135. FLA. STAT. § 193.11(3) (1957) as enacted by 1957 Fla. Laws 356, ch. 57-
1500 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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after several unsuccessful attempts,"3 6 the legislature required the as-
sessor to consider a series of factors in determining the just value of
property.13 7 The legislation eliminated the assessor's selection of valua-
tion method or procedure by requiring that he now
take into consideration the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can be
expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present use of
the property;
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement
value of any improvements thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property.'"
The Florida Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Walter v.
Schuler, s9 held the statutory and constitutional phrase "just valua-
tion" to be "legally synonymous" with "fair market value," which is
"the amount a 'purchaser willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to
195, § 1. This provision was upheld in Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
The constitution currently in effect contains express authority for special classification
and valuation of agricultural property in FLA. CoNsT. art. VII, § 4(a) (1968).
Earlier legislation, 1943 Fla. Laws 875, ch. 22,079, § 22, had authorized the
Comptroller to promulgate "standard measures of value" to be followed by the tax
assessors in valuing property. Even though this might seem to affect the discretion of
the tax assessor, the court has held "that any standard measure of value promulgated
by the State Comptroller would not destroy the right of the tax assessor to exercise his
discretion or judgment in reaching the ultimate conclusion of just value." Powell v.
Kelly, 223 So. 2d 305, 309 (Fla. 1969).
136. See Note, Assessment Standards and Property Tax Equity in Florida, 17
U. FLA. L. REV. 83, 96-100 (1964).
137. 1963 Fla. Laws § 1, 600 ch. 63-250.
138. FLA. STAT. § 193.021 (1963). An eighth factor was added by 1967 Fla.
Laws 336, ch. 67-167, § 1:
(8) The net proceeds of the sale of the property, as received by the
seller, after deduction of all of the usual and reasonable fees and costs of
the sale, including the costs and expenses of financing.
139. 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965).
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one willing but not obliged to sell.' "140 The Court stated that the new
statute
was not intended to give assessors an almost unbridled discretion in
the performance of their duty to establish just valuation. Rather,
we regard the Act as an attempt by the legislature to pin the asses-
sors more firmly to the Constititional mandate. The result of such a
construction is not to deprive these officers completely of their dis-
cretion for there is bound to be some tolerance in the execution of
their task as they receive, weigh and evaluate varying information
on the subject from different sources they consider reliable, but this
opinion is designed to put at rest the procedure of setting assessable
values at a percentage of "X". It is apodictic that a percentage of
"X" cannot be computed without first establishing "X" and the
assessors upon reaching the first figure are enjoined not to proceed
to the second. 4
This statute's constraint on the assessor's discretion in requiring
consideration of the statutory factors proved somewhat illusory. Cases
held the assessor's valuation invalid when the assessor failed to con-
sider one or more of the factors. 42 Customarily, however, the assessor's
"judgment [was not] disturbed if it [could] be arguably contended that
[the assessor had] abided by the criteria" required by law.1 43 In a re-
cent decision, the Court held the assessor need not give each factor
equal weight, if "EACH FACTOR IS FIRST CAREFULLY CON-
SIDERED AND SUCH WEIGHT IS GIVEN TO A FACTOR AS
THE FACTS JUSTIFY."144
A 1968 constitutional revision granted the legislature authority to
reduce the assessor's discretion in valuing land used for agricultural or
non-commercial recreational purposes, and valuing livestock or tangible
140. Id. at 85-86 (quoting from Root v. Wood, 155 Fla. 613, 21 So. 2d 133
(1945).
141. Id. at 85. Accord Keith Investments, Inc. v. James, 220 So. 2d 695, 696
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
142. Palm Corp. v. Homer, 261 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1972); accord Exchange Realty
Corp. v. Hillsborough County, 272 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 1973).
143. Miller v. Tax Assessor, 31 Fla. Supp. 194, 196 (Cir. Ct. Pinellas County
1968).
144. Lanier v. Walt Disney World Co., 316 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1975) (emphasis original).
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personalty held as inventory.'4 5 Provision remained for the election of a
county tax assessor,146 but the revision provided nothing for enhanced
state supervision of valuations or constraints on the assessor's discre-
tion. The legislature, however, continued to enact legislation increasing
state supervision of tax assessors.
The Governmental Reorganization Act of 1969 created and trans-
ferred to the Department of Revenue all of the powers and duties pre-
viously held by the comptroller with respect to supervision of assessors
and uniformity of valuations. 14 7 In 1969, the legislature also passed an
act representing an important, albeit indirect, step in inducing assessors
to increase their valuations up to the standard of full just valuation.14 8
This act modified the formula for distributing state funds 49 among the
sixty-seven school districts throughout the state. 150 Under the act, each
school district's allotment of state funds was determined, in part, by
reference to the level of assessment of taxable property made by the tax
145. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1968). In 1980, this section was amended to
authorize the total exemption of inventory from taxation, S.J. Res.12-E, 1980 Fla.
Laws 1779. Each of these provisions has been implemented: FLA. STAT. § 193.461
(Supp. 1982) (agricultural lands); id. § 193.501 (1981) (recreational lands); id. §
192.001(11)(c) (Supp. 1982) ("[a]ll livestock shall be considered inventory"); and id. §
196.185 (1981) (exempts all items of inventory from ad valorem taxation after Decem-
ber 31, 1981; prior to that date, inventory was to be assessed "at 10 percent of just
valuation," id. § 193.511) (1981). Earlier statutory authorization for valuation of in-
ventory at 25 percent of cost was held violative of the 1885 constitutional provisions
requiring uniform and equal rates of taxation and just valuation of all property. Franks
v. Davis, 145 So. 2d 223 (Fla. 1962).
146. FLA. CoNsT. art. VIII, § 1(d) (1968). A provision was also added by the
1968 constitutional revision to permit counties to abolish any county office and transfer
all of the duties of that office to another office. A provision in the Dade County charter
abolished the office of property appraiser and transferred the functions to the county
manager. See State ex rel. Glynn v. McNayr, 133 So. 2d 312 (Fla. 1961).
147. 1969 Fla. Laws 527-28, ch. 69-106, § 21. See Department of Revenue v.
Bell, 227 So. 2d 684 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1969).
148. 1969 Fla. Laws § 1, 16, ch. 69-1735. This act was initially passed during
the regular session, but was vetoed by the Governor on June 28, 1969. The veto was
overridden during a special session of the legislature in early December, 1969.
149. In 1969, $43.6 million was appropriated for this purpose. 1969 Fla. Laws,
380-81, ch. 69-100, § 1 (item 347).
150. The school districts are separate governmental entities whose geographical
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assessor. As such, the lower the level of assessment within a county, the
less that county's school district would receive from the state.1 51 The
annual level of assessments for each of the sixty-seven counties was to
be determined by the auditor general.1 52 It was believed that this
scheme would not only produce a more equitable distribution of state
funds,153 but would improve the level of valuations of property through-
out the state.
However, in District School Board of Lee County v. Askew,'" the
Court held this scheme to be unconstitutional. The Court, in finding
the auditor general's independent ascertainment of property values to
be an impermissable usurpation of the duties and powers of the tax
assessor, stated:
[W]e hold that the State has no power to ignore the presumption
of correctness attendant to the official assessments. To rely on the
findings of the Auditor-General . . . ignoring the official assess-
ments, is to negate the discretion granted to the assessors, the dis-
cretion necessary to the job, attendant to all educated estimates,
and uniformly recognized in the opinions of this Court. We con-
clude that a finding by the Auditor-General different from that
reached by a county tax assessor is, therefore, insufficient to over-
ride the official assessment in the absence of a showing that the
official assessment represented a departure from the requirements
of law and not merely the diffeiences of opinion to be expected
when experts approach the subjective business of assessing
property.1 55
151. FLA. STAT. § 236.07(9)(a) (1969).
152. The Auditor General is an employee of the Legislature, appointed by the
legislative auditing committee. FLA. STAT. § 11.42(1) (1969).
153. Under the previous formula, a county whose level of assessment was rela-
tively low received a relatively larger share of state funds, and thus needed to raise a
correspondingly lower amount of revenue locally from its ad valorem tax. Therefore, it
was to the advantage of property owners within a county to have a low level of valua-
tion made by the tax assessor. A similar approach was later employed to determine, in
part, the allocation of state funds to counties and municipalities under state revenue
sharing. FLA. STAT. § 218.245 (1973).
154. 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973).
155. Id. at 277.
64
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
Florida's Property Appraisers7:1983
G. The Past Ten Years
The legislature quickly responded to District School Board of Lee
County by enacting the Property Assessment Administration and Fi-
nance Law, commonly referred to as the "Truth in Taxation Act." '156
This multi-faceted act increased the state's supervision of valuations by
restricting the discretion of the tax assessors. The act required assessors
to break down the assessment rolls into thirteen different classifications
of real property and six classifications of personal property.157 The act
provided for the exchange of information between the Department of
Revenue and the tax assessors. In addition, the assessor's records, in-
cluding worksheets and property record cards, were to be made availa-
ble to the Department and the auditor general.158 The assessors were
required to submit office budgets to the Department for determination
of whether they adequately provided for the performance of the asses-
sors' duties. The Administration Commission, made up of the Governor
and cabinet, was given final authority to resolve disputes and to
"amend the budget if it [found] any aspect of the budget . . . unrea-
sonable in light of the work load of the assessor's office in the
county. ... "159 The Department was authorized to standardize con-
tracts for assessment services and computer systems.160 The act estab-
lished procedures for the audit of assessment rolls by the auditor gen-
eral,161 and increased the Department's authority to approve or
disapprove assessment rolls.1 62 The act establishes an Assessment Re-
156. 1973 Fla. Laws 331, ch. 172. The opinion in the School Board of Lee
County case was handed down on April 4, 1973, and rehearing was denied on June 20;
172 was signed by the Governor on June 13.
157. FLA. STAT. § 195.073 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 335, ch. 172, §
3.
158. FLA. STAT. § 195.084 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 336, ch. 172, §
5.
159. FLA. STAT. § 195.087(1) (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 336-37, ch.
172, § 6.
160. FLA. STAT. § 195.095 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 338-39, ch.
172, § 7.
161. FLA. STAT. § 195.096 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 339-40 ch.
172, § 7.
162. FLA. STAT. § 195.097 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 340-41, ch.
172, § 7; FLA. STAT. §§ 193.114(6), (7) (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 334-45,
ch. 172, § 10.
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view Commission to hear complaints regarding the approval or disap-
proval of rolls, allowing direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court. 3
Finally, the act included a millage roll-back provision preventing taxing
entities reaping a windfall in increased revenues from the anticipated
increase in valuations.16 4 The legislature also proposed a constitutional
amendment changing the name from "tax assessor" to "property
appraiser."16 5
The "Truth by Taxation Act," in improving the assessor's valua-
tion methods and procedures, as well as the state's supervision and con-
trol of property valuation, was striving for valuation of all taxable prop-
erty at "just value."166 In addition to placing the property appraiser's
exercise of discretion under closer scrutiny, the act, by including ele-
ments such as the millage roll-back provision and the name change,
provided property appraisers a less politically sensitive environment
within which to operate. The focus of attention for property owners and
voters was shifted from the property appraiser's valuation of property,
the determination of the tax base, towards the local government's set-
ting of the millage, the determination of the tax rate.
The legislature's action, while achieving progress towards full val-
uation, fell short of resolving the problem. A county's assessment rolls
were to be reviewed in depth only once every three years, 6 7 reduced to
once every four years in 1975.168 Fuxther, the streamlined, centralized
163. FLA. STAT. § 195.098 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 341-43, ch.
172, § 7. Members of the Commission were to be appointed by the Governor, with the
consent of three members of the cabinet and subject to approval by the senate. The
appointees were to be "three persons knowledgable in any of the following three gen-
eral areas: property tax law, determination of property values, or statistics." See infra
note 170 and accompanying discussion.
164. FLA. STAT. § 200.065 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 346-48, ch.
172, § 13.
165. H.R.J. Res. 1907, 1973 Fla. Laws 1305-06, ratified in the general election
held November 4, 1974, amending FLA. CONST. art. VIII, § l(d) (1968).
166. This was later described as a legislative decision "to expand the tools made
available to the Department for it to 'ride herd' on county officials ... " Spooner v.
Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 1976).
167. FLA. STAT. § 195.096(2) (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 339-40, ch.
172, § 7.
168. FLA. STAT. § 195.096 (1975), as amended by 1975 Fla. Laws 488-89, ch.
211, § 2. This effectively reduced the potential for the disapproval of a roll to once
every four years; or, viewing the situation from another perspective, in any one year
506 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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scheme for reviewing the Department's disapproval of an assessment
roll fell apart at the seams with the decision in Slay v. Department of
Revenue.1 69 The Court held that a county's circuit court could hear
issues relating to the disapproval of an assessment roll, thereby circum-
venting the Assessment Administration Review Commission. The Com-
mission had been created in part to expedite and consolidate the review
of the disapproval of an assessment roll by the Department. Although
the Department had long held that power to disapprove an assessment
roll because of undervaluations of property, it was reluctant to exercise
the power because of the financial chaos it would bring to the taxing
entities within the county whose roll had been disapproved. Without a
valid roll, the taxing entities could not levy or collect ad valorem taxes.
To ameliorate this problem, the 1973 legislation created a procedure
which alerted assessors early in the year that rolls of the current year
might be disapproved unless defects in rolls of the prior year were cor-
rected. 170 The disapproval of a roll could be appealed to the Assessment
Administration Review Commission, with subsequent judicial review in
the Florida Supreme Court.17 1 But because the court held that the
county circuit court also had jurisdiction of a disapproved roll, the hope
of rapidly resolving controversies disappeared, and the Department was
again placed in the politically untenable position of being able to em-
ploy its ultimate sanction-disapproving a roll-only with the finesse of
a nuclear warhead.
In 1979, the Governor directed the Department of Revenue to
strictly enforce the full valuation requirement." 2 The legislature re-
only one-fourth of the counties' rolls were at risk for disapproval. Pajic, Weber &
Francis, Truth or Consequences: Florida Opts for Truth in Millage in Response to the
Proposition 8 Fla. St. L.U. Rev. 593, 603 (1980). [hereinafter cited as Truth or Conse-
quences.] In addition, the duty of conducting these reviews was shifted from the Audi-
tor General to the Department of Revenue. FLA. STAT. § 20.21 (1975), as amended by
1975 Fla. Laws 487, ch. 211, § 1.
169. 317 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1975).
170. FLA. STAT. § 195.097(1) (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws 340-41, ch.
172, § 7. See Spooner v. Askew, 345 So. 2d 1055, 1059 n.15 (Fla. 1976).
171. FLA. STAT. § 195.098 (1973), as enacted by 1973 Fla. Laws ch. 172, § 7.
Only one case was ever filed with the Commission, and it was withdrawn before the
hearing commenced. Slay v. Department of Revenue, 317 So. 2d 744, 745 n.3 (Fla.
1975). The Commission was abolished in 1980. 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 272, § 7.
172. St. Petersburg Times, July 31, 1979, at BI, col. -, cited in Truth or Con-
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sponded to the potential problems of disapproved assessment rolls by
enacting the "Truth in Millage," or "TRIM" Act173 (referring to one
of six major elements of the Act). The act aimed to produce a system
for levying ad valorem taxes on property valued at full cash value. The
portion of the act relating to millage was a continuation of the 1973
legislation shifting taxpayers' attention from the valuation process to-
wards the budget setting and millage levying stage. Under the act,
property owners are no longer simply notified by the property appraiser
of an anticipated increase in assessed valuation of property. Owners
now are furnished with a statement reflecting the valuation of their
property, and informing them of their possible tax liability depending
on whether the same millage is levied as the preceeding year or
whether the tax liability will include any amounts for proposed budget
changes. 17 4 Other portions similiarly focus attention on those aspects of
ad valorem taxation relating to budget making and tax rate setting.
The Act makes property appraisers more accountable by providing
improved conditions for a property owner to have the valuation of his
or her property subjected to administrative review by a Property Ap-
praisal Adjustment Board established for each county.1 76 The act also
enhances state-level review of assessment rolls by increasing to once
every two years the frequency of in-depth studies by the Department,
and by requiring the auditor general to conduct a performance audit of
the Department at least once every three years and report his findings
to the legislature.17 7
The Act increases the likelihood that the Department will act to
sequences, supra note 168, at 593 n.1.
173. 1980 Fla. Laws 1143, ch. 274. For an excellent analysis of the Act, see
Truth or Consequences, supra note 168.
174. 1980 Fla. Laws 274, § 20, as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws 1080, ch. 261, §
6. See Truth or Consequences, supra note 168, at 610-14.
175. E.g., the tax collector is now required to send to each property owner a
statement which not only advises the taxpayer of the amount of taxes due, but also
which taxing authorities have imposed increased taxes, and which have not. FLA. STAT.
§ 197.072(5)(b) (Supp. 1982) as enacted by 1980 Fla. Laws 1181-82, ch. 274, § 38.
176. FLA. STAT. §§ 194.011 (Supp. 1982), 194.015 (1981), 194.032 (Supp.
1982), as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws 1174-81, ch. 274, §§ 36, 37. See Truth or
Consequences, supra note 168, at 618-21.
177. FLA. STAT. § 195.096 (Supp. 1982) as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws ch. 274,
§ 18. See Truth or Consequences, supra note 168, at 621-23.
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disapprove an assessment roll because of undervaluation of property.
Procedures were revised for reviewing a roll's disapproval by eliminat-
ing the Assessment Administration Review Commission, providing the
circuit court of Leon County with initial jurisdiction, and providing ap-
pellate jurisdiction in the First District Court of Appeal. 178 To alleviate
the likely financial problems to local entities which a roll disapproval
would bring,. the act provided for imposition and collection of taxes on
an "interim roll" contemporaneous with judicial proceedings regarding
the disapproved roll. 17
The Act affects property appraisers' discretion also by reintroduc-
ing the level of assessed valuations into the formula for distributing
state funds to the sixty-seven school districts.180 This was basically the
same scheme held unconstitutional in District School Board of Lee
County v. Askew,""l because it allowed the determination of property
values by the tax assessor to be overridden by a state official. The con-
stitutional infirmity was remedied, however, by an amendment to the
Constitution:
State funds may be appropriated to the several counties,
school districts, municipalities or special districts upon such condi-
tions as may be provided by general law. These conditions may
include the use of relative ad valorem assessment levels deter-
mined by a state agency designated by general law.
18 2
During the preceding ten years, the legislature has responded to
the inequities of undervaluation by increasing state supervision and
control of property appraisers. The smallest details of the daily func-
178. FLA. STAT. § 195.092(2) (1981), as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws 1154, ch.
274, § 6. See Truth or Consequences, supra note 168, at 625.
179. FLA. STAT. § 193.1145 (Supp. 1982), as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws 1150-
53, ch. 274, § 5. See Truth or Consequences, supra note 168, at 623-25; and infra note
232 and accompanying text.
180. FLA. STAT. § 236.081(4) (1981), as amended by 1980 Fla. Laws 1161-63,
ch. 274, § 21, effective for fiscal year 1983-84 and thereafter, 1980 Fla. Laws, ch. 274,
9, § § 64(2). See Truth or Consequences, supra note 168, at 625-26.
181. 278 So. 2d 272 (Fla. 1973). See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
182. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 8 (1968), as amended in the general election of
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tions of the office are prescribed by statute or administrative rule; but
most importantly, the property appraiser's discretion in valuation has
been brought under close scrutiny. The Department of Revenue has
been provided not only with a well stocked arsenal of carrots and sticks
to use in their supervision of the property appraisers, but also with a
non-cataclysmic procedure for disapproving all or portions of a roll be-
cause of undervaluations. Whether these measures will prove up to the
task of "secur[ing] a just valuation of all property for ad valorem taxa-
tion," 18 3 only time will tell.
III. Duties of the Property Appraiser
The property appraiser's1 84 primary duty is to prepare annual as-
sessment rolls for the county's real property and tangible personal prop-
erty,185 and forward them to the Department of Revenue for approval
by the first Monday in July. 86 The rolls show the taxable value187 of all
property within the county, and are utilized by local governmental enti-
ties for levying ad valorem taxes.1 88 There are four major tasks in-
volved in preparing the assessment rolls: the listing, classification and
valuation of all taxable property, and the determination of whether
property is exempt or immune from taxation.
The property appraiser is required to "assess all property located
within his county, except inventory, whether such property is taxable,
wholly or partially exempt, or subject to classification reflecting a value
less than its just value at its present highest and best use."18" 9 In com-
plying with this requirement, the property appraiser must list on the
assessment roll all real property within the county, 190 and all tangible
183. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4,(1968).
184. Property appraisers are authorized to appoint deputies to act in their behalf
in carrying out the duties of the office. FLA. STAT. § 193.024 (1981).
185. FLA. STAT. § 193.114(1) (Supp. 1982).
186. FLA. STAT. § 193.1142(1) (Supp. 1982).
187. "Taxable value" is defined as "the assessed value of property minus the
amount of any applicable exemption provided under ss. 3 and 6, Art. VII of the State
Constitution and chapter 196." FLA. STAT. § 192.001(16) (Supp. 1982).
188. FLA. STAT. § 200.065 (Supp. 1982).
189. FLA. STAT. § 192.011 (1981).
190. Governmentally owned streets, roads and highways need not be listed. FLA.
STAT. § 193.085(1) (1981).
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personal property with a situs' 11 within the county which has been in-
cluded on a return, 92 or, if omitted from a return, which has been
discovered by the property appraiser."'3 Unless expressly exempted, all
real and personal property located in Florida, and all personal property
belonging to Florida residents, is subject to ad valorem taxation.'9"
Property generally becomes taxable in the jurisdiction in which it is
physically present on January 1 of each year,19 5 and its "just value" is
to be determined as of that date also. 96
The owner of tangible personal property is required to file a return
with the property appraiser of the county in which the property is taxa-
ble, listing the items of personalty and the owner's estimate of their
value.197 Such returns must be filed by April 1 each year,198 and penal-
ties are provided for the failure to file, or late filing of a return, or
omission of property from a return."99 Railroad and railroad terminal
companies which maintain tracks or other fixed assets within Florida
are required to submit a return to the Department of Revenue by April
1; the Department is charged with the duty of valuing such property
and, by June 1, notifying each county of the assessed value of such
property within each county.200 No return is required for real property,
if the ownership is reflected in the public records of the county in which
it is located.20
191. Tangible personal property has a situs in the county in which it is perma-
nently located on January 1. FLA. STAT. § 192.032(2) (Supp. 1982).
192. FLA. STAT. § 193.114(3) (Supp. 1982).
193. FLA. STAT. § 193.073 (1981).
194. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1981). Leasehold interests in property owned by a
governmental entity are also taxable, unless used for an exempt purpose. Id.
195. FLA. STAT. § 192.032 (Supp. 1982).
196. FLA. STAT. § 192.042 (1981). In addition, if property was omitted from an
assessment roll, it may be assessed for the three years preceding the year in which the
omission is discovered at its just value on each of the three preceding first days of
January. FLA. STAT. § 193.092 (1981).
197. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.052(1), (3), (4) (Supp. 1982); 195.027(4) (1981).
198. FLA. STAT. § 193.062(1) (1981).
199. FLA. STAT. § 193.072(1) (1981) (penalty of 25% of tax liability for failure
to file a return), (2) (penalty of 5% of tax liability for each month a return is late, up
to a maximum of 25% penalty), (3) (penalty of 15% of tax attributable to property
omitted from a return).
200. FLA. STAT. §§ 193.062(3), 193.085(4) (1981).
201. FLA. STAT. § 193.052(2) (Supp. 1982). There are a few exceptions, requir-
5111
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All property required to be listed on the assessment rolls mut also
be classified according to its use. 202 Real property is divided into nine
classes;20 3 personal property, into five.20 4 These separate classifications
allow component parts of the assessment rolls to be scrutinized more
carefully, thereby aiding the Department of Revenue in its supervision
of the property appraisers and its review of the rolls. 5 In addition,
certain special classes of property are to be treated differently in the
preparation of the assessment rolls. Agricultural property is to be val-
ued with reference to its agricultural use, even though such value might
be less than its full just value.20 6 Land which is environmentally endan-
gered or utilized for outdoor recreational or park purposes may simi-
larly qualify for valuation at less than full just value.2 0 7 Improvements
ing a return in order to qualify for special treatment. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 193.621(5)
(Supp. 1982), (return required if taxpayer claims the right to have certain pollution
control facilities valued at salvage value). See infra note 204. Such returns are due by
April 1. FLA. STAT. § 193.062(4) (1981). If the owner of real property who also owns
the mineral, oil, gas or other subsurface rights so requests, the property appraiser must
separately assess such subsurface rights; separate assessment is also required if the
subsurface rights are owned by a party other than the party with ownership of the
remainder of the fee. FLA. STAT. § 193.481 (1981).
202. FLA. STAT. § 195.073 (Supp. 1982).
203. The nine classes of real property are: residential, commercial and industrial,
agricultural, nonagricultural acreage, exempt wholly or partially, centrally assessed,
leasehold interests, time-share property, and other. The residential class is further di-
vided into six subclasses: single family, mobile homes, multifamily, condominiums, co-
operatives, and retirement homes. FLA. STAT. § 195.073(1) (Supp. 1982).
204. The five classes of personalty are: residential floating structures, nonresiden-
tial floating structures, mobile homes and attachments, household goods, and other tan-
gible personal property. FLA. STAT. § 195.073(2) (Supp. 1982). Mobile homes are not
subject to ad valorem taxation if they are registered and licensed as motor vehicles
pursuant to FLA. STAT. ch. 320 (Supp. 1982). FLA. CONST. art. VII, § l(b) (1968).
Any mobile home without a current motor vehicle license plate properly affixed is pre-
sumed to be either real property or tangible personal property; however, if it is perma-
nently affixed to land owned by the person who also owns the mobile home, it is pre-
sumed to be real property. FLA. STAT. § 193.075 (1981).
205. See FLA. STAT. § 195.096(3) (Supp. 1982), 195.097(1) (Supp. 1982).
206. FLA. STAT. § 193.461 (Supp.'1982). In order to be entitled to such treat-
ment, a return requesting agricultural classification must be filed by March I each
year.
207. FLA. STAT. § 193.501 (1981). A related provision, id. § 193.507, (1981)
directs the property appraiser, upon petition by a property owner, to reclassify and
72




to certain real property, either in the nature of qualified pollution con-
trol facilities, 0 8 or to permit access by physically handicapped per-
sons,20 9 are deemed to not increase the value of the property so im-
proved by more than the salvage value of the materials utilized.
Finally, within the proper classifications, there is to be separate identifi-
cation of property which qualifies for various corporate income tax
credits,210  or for an economic development ad valorem tax
exemption.
The valuation of property on the assessment rolls has been the
most troublesome aspect of the duties of the property appraiser. The
Constitution provides that "[b]y general law regulations shall be pre-
scribed which shall secure a just valuation of all property for ad
valorem taxation .... ,"212 "Just valuation" has been held to be synon-
ymous with "fair market value," which is "the amount a purchaser
willing but not obliged to buy, would pay to one willing but not obliged
to sell.' ",213 Provisions of general law must be complied with by the
property appraiser in valuing property, their overall objective being to
direct the property appraiser in satisfying the constitutional mandate to
"secure a just valuation of all property." Eight factors are enumerated
which the property appraiser is required to consider in arriving at the
just value of property.21 4 In addition, to ensure that the actual physical
condition of real property is being monitored, the property appraiser is
reassess real property which is located in an area designated as an area of critical state
concern, if that designation affects the highest and best use to which the property
might be expected to be put. The property appraiser is required to separately identify
property assessed as environmentally endangered, and property assessed as outdoor rec-
reational or park land. Id. § 193.301(7) (1981).
208. FLA. STAT. § 193.621 (1981).
209. FLA. STAT. § 193.623 (1981).
210. FLA. STAT. § 195.073(4) (Supp. 1982) (cross-reference to FLA. STAT. §
220.18 (1981) gasohol development tax incentive credit), (5) (cross-reference to FLA.
STAT. § 220.182 (Supp. 1982) economic revitalization tax incentive credit).
211. FLA. STAT. § 195.073(6) (Supp. 1982). The economic development ad
valorem tax exemption is authorized by FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(c) (1968) and may
be implemented pursuant to FLA. STAT. § 196.199 (Supp. 1982).
212. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 4 (1968).
213. Walter v. Schuler, 176 So. 2d 81 (Fla. 1965); see supra note 139 and ac-
companying text.
214. FLA. STAT. § 193.011 (1981); see supra note 138 and accompanying text.
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required to inspect each parcel at least once every three years.215 How-
ever, the most significant provisions of general law which have been
enacted to achieve the constitutional objective of just valuation are con-
tained in Florida Statutes Chapter 195, "Property Assessment Admin-
istration and Finance." The general scheme is to provide the Depart-
ment of Revenue with a great deal of oversight and control over the
methods and procedures used by property appraisers in valuing prop-
erty, culminating with the ultimate authority to disapprove an assess-
ment roll if it does not comply with the just valuation requirement.216
In order to assist specifically with the valuation process, the De-
partment is authorized to establish "standard measures of value,"
which are "guidelines for the valuation of property and methods for
property appraisers to employ in arriving at the just valuation of partic-
ular types of property. 21 7 The standard measures of value are to be
included in a manual of instructions prepared by the Department,
along with other rules and regulations, forms and regulations relating
to the use of forms and maps which have been prepared by the Depart-
ment, and other information considered by the Department to be useful
in the administration of taxes.218
As matters of more general supervision, the Department is author-
ized to have full access to the records of property appraisers;2 9 it is
directed to review the annual budget for the operation of each property
appraiser's office;220 it is to establish a list of approved bidders who
may provide property appraisers with assessment services or systems or
electronic data-processing programs or equipment;221 and the Depart-
215. FLA. STAT. § 193.023(2) (1981).
216. FLA. STAT. §§ 195.0012 (1981), 195.002 (1981); see supra notes 156-63,
177-79 and accompanying text.
217. FLA. STAT. § 195.032 (Supp. 1982). The standard measure of value are
deemed to be prima facie correct. See St. Joe Paper Co. v. Conrad, 333 So. 2d 527,
529 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 344 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1977).
218. FLA. STAT. § 195.062 (1981). The Department is required to make availa-
ble maps and mapping materials sufficient to ensure that all real property within the
state is listed and valued. FLA. STAT. § 193.085(2) (1981).
219. FLA. STAT. § 195.084(2) (1981).
220. FLA. STAT. § 195.087 (Supp. 1982).
221. The Department is also authorized to promulgate standard contracts for the
property appraisers to use in obtaining such services or equipment. FLA. STAT. §
195.095 (1981).
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ment is required to promulgate rules prescribing uniform standards and
procedures for computer programs and operations utilized by property
appraisers so that data will be comparable among counties and so that
a single audit procedure will be practical for all property appraisers'
offices.222 In order to enforce the performance of any of the duties of
the property appraiser, the Department is authorized to bring suit in
the circuit court of the errant property appraiser's county, and such
court is authorized to order, inter alia, "the implementation of a plan
of reappraisal to be completed within a prescribed period of time. '223
Property appraisers are required to submit their assessment rolls to
the Department of Revenue by the first Monday in July of each
year,224 and the executive director of the Department is to disapprove
all or any part of an assessment roll which is not "in substantial com-
pliance with law. ' 225 The determination of a property appraiser's non-
compliance may be based on information discovered by the Depart-
ment, including audits prepared by the Department or the auditor
general.228 While a decision to disapprove a roll may be based upon
data confined solely to the roll being reviewed in that year, a more solid
foundation for disapproval rests upon the authority of the Department
to utilize data from the rolls of the preceding year. Under this proce-
dure, the Department may evaluate a roll after it has been approved,
and then notify the property appraiser of any defects in that roll, and
what he or she must do in order to eliminate those defects from the roll
for the following year." 221 During a period of approximately six weeks
beginning when the Department sends such a notice, the property ap-
praiser must either agree to comply with the suggested corrective ac-
tion, or meet with the executive director of the Department in an at-
tempt to resolve their differences. 28 In any event, the Department is to
issue an administrative order to the property appraiser, either incorpo-
rating his or her agreement to comply with the Department's earlier
222. FLA. STAT. § 195.027(2) (1981).
223. FLA. STAT. § 195.092(4) (1981).
224. FLA. STAT. § 193.1142(1) (Supp. 1982).
225. See FLA. STAT. § 193.1142 (Supp. 1982).
226. Id.
227. FLA. STAT. § 195.097(l) (Supp. 1982). The notice of defects is to be pro-
vided to the property appraiser by November 15.
228. FLA. STAT. § 195.097(2) (Supp. 1982).
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notice, or directing that specified remedial action be taken.2 9
The property appraiser is required to notify the Department of his
or her intention to comply with the administrative order, or the basis
for intended noncompliance. 3 0 If noncompliance is indicated, the De-
partment may seek judicial review at that point.2 31 If compliance is
indicated, the Department is to closely supervise the preparation of the
assessment rolls to ensure that the order is complied with and that
property is valued at its just value.23 2 If it appears by May 1 that the
property appraiser is not in substantial compliance with the administra-
tive order, the Department is to notify the property appraiser and the
governing body of each tax-levying agency in that county of its inten-
tion to disapprove all or a portion of that assessment roll.233 Then, if
the roll which is submitted to the Department is not in compliance with
the administrative order, the Department will disapprove the roll, or
the defective portions thereof.234 When a roll is disapproved, in whole
or in part, local governmental agencies may levy their ad valorem taxes
on the basis of an "interim assessment roll," which, in these circum-
stances, is the roll which was submitted, even though disapproved.23 5
After the deficiences in the disapproved roll have been corrected, or the
judicial review of the disapproval has been concluded, the property ap-
praiser is required to reconcile the differences between the interim roll
and the final roll, and any supplemental bills or refunds, as appropriate,
are to be sent to taxpayers.2 38
The statutes speak broadly of all real and personal property with a
situs in Florida, and all personal property belonging to Florida resi-
dents, being subject to ad valorem taxation "[u]nless expressly ex-
229. Id. The administrative order must be issued no later than January 1.
230. FLA. STAT. § 195.097(3) (Supp. 1982). The notification to the Department
must be made no later than January 15.
231. Id. See FLA. STAT. § 195.092(4) (1981).
232. FLA. STAT. § 195.097(4) (Supp. 1982).
233. Id.
234. FLA. STAT. § 193.1142(2) (Supp. 1982).
235. An interim roll may also be authorized if the current year's roll has not
been timely prepared or approved; the interim roll in this circumstance is the last ap-
proved roll, adjusted to the extent practicable to reflect additions, deletions and
changes in ownership. FLA. STAT. § 193.1145 (Supp. 1982).
236. Id.
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empted from taxation. '3 7 However, property which is immune from
taxation is also nontaxable, even though no specific statutory mention is
made of the concept. Property belonging to the federal government or
one of its instrumentalities is immune from taxation under the United
States Constitution, 38 as are imports.23  Similarly, property belonging
to the State of Florida, one of its instrumentalities or political subdivi-
sions is immune from taxation.2 40 By contrast, municipalities24 1 and
other public corporate bodies24 2 are not political subdivisions of the
state and thus their property does not enjoy immunity from taxa-
tion-property owned by such entities may, however, be exempt from
taxation.43
In preparing the assessment rolls, the property appraiser must de-
termine whether property which is not immune is nonetheless exempt2 44
from taxation, so that taxes will not be levied on such property. 5 Ex-
emptions may be classified into two broad groups: those which are au-
thorized according to clearly stated objective criteria, and those which
fall under the broader, less well defined areas of uses for educational,
237. FLA. STAT. § 196.001 (1981).
238. First National Bank of Homestead v. Dickinson, 291 F. Supp. 855 (D.C.
Fla. 1968), affd, 393 U.S. 409 (1969). FLA. STAT. § 196.199(1)(a) (Supp. 1982)
speaks, confusingly, of such property being "exempt" from taxation.
239. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; see also Michelin Tire Co. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276 (1976).
240. Park-N-Shop, Inc. v. Sparkman, 99 So. 2d 571 (Fla. 1957); Dickinson v.
Tallahassee, 325 So. 2d I (Fla. 1975). See generally 31 FLA. JUR., Taxation § 135
(1974).
241. FLA. CONST. art VII, § 3(a) (1968); State ex rel. Burbridge v. St. John, 143
Fla. 544, 197 So. 131 (1940).
242. Hillsborough County Aviation Authority v. Walden, 210 So. 2d 193 (Fla.
1968).
243. FLA. STAT. § 196.199(1)(c) (Supp. 1982).
244. The exemptions from ad valorem taxation are authorized by FLA. CoNsT.
art. VII, §§ 3, 4, 6 (1968), and implemented by various sections of FLA. STAT. ch. 196
(1981 and Supp. 1982).
245. FLA. STAT. § 196.193, § 196.141 (1981). In addition, for the purposes of
assessment roll recordkeeping and reporting, exemptions authorized by each provision
of the statutes must be reported separately for each category of exemption, both as to
total value exempted and as to the number of exemptions granted. FLA. STAT. §
196.002(2) (1981).
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literary, scientific, religious, charitable or governmental purposes.246
The first category includes: exemptions for property owned and used as
a homestead; 247 the further exemption for property owned and used as
a homestead by qualified veterans who are permanently and totally dis-
abled,248 or by veterans who are confined to wheelchairs,249 or by quali-
fied non-veterans who are afflicted with specified physical conditions or
who are totally and permanently disabled; 250 the exemption of property
to the value of $500 of every Florida resident who is a widow, blind or
totally and permanently disabled;251 the exemption for real property
upon which a renewable energy source device is installed and oper-
ated;252 the total exemptions for household goods and personal effects
of Florida residents253 and items of inventory;254 and economic develop-
ment exemptions for qualifying new businesses and expansions of ex-
isting businesses. 55 Some of the objective criteria for the exemptions in
246. FLA. CONST. art. VII, § 3(a) (1968) provides that "[s]uch portions of prop-
erty as are used predominantly for educational, literary, scientific, religious or charita-
ble purposes may be exempted by general law from taxation." This is implemented by
FLA. STAT. § 196.192 (Supp. 1982):
(1) all property used exclusively for exempt purposes shall be totally
exempt from ad valorem taxation.
(2) All property used predominantly for exempt purposes shall be ex-
empted from ad valorem taxation to the extent of the ratio that such pre-
dominant use bears to the nonexempt use.
"Exempt use of property" is defined, in turn, by FLA. STAT. § 196.012(1) (Supp.
1982) as "predominant or exclusive use of property for educational, literary, scientific,
religious, charitable, or governmental use, as defined in [chapter 1961."
247. The homestead exemption is provided by FLA. CONST. art VII, § 6 (1968)
and is implemented by FLA. STAT. § 196.031 (Supp. 1982).
248. FLA. STAT. § 196.081 (1981).
249. FLA. STAT. § 196.091 (1981).
250. FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1981). The exemption is for real property owned and
used as the homestead by a person who is a quadriplegic, paraplegic, hemiplegic, le-
gally blind, or otherwise totally and permanently disabled if he or she must use a
wheelchair for mobility.
251. FLA. STAT.§ 196.202 (1981).
252. FLA. STAT.§ 196.175 (1981). Renewable energy source devices are defined
in FLA. STAT. § 196.012(13) (Supp. 1982).
253. FLA. STAT. § 196.181 (1981). Household goods and personal effects are de-
fined in F.A.C. § 12D-7.02.
254. FLA. STAT. § 196.185 (1981).
255. FLA. STAT. § 196.1995 (1981). Definitions of a qualifying "new business"
1 518 7:19831
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the first category are to be ascertained by the property appraiser,2 56
but, where appropriate, he may rely on the opinion of others as to the
physical condition of an applicant.25 7
Exemptions in the second category are less well defined and thus
are more difficult to apply, although the property appraiser is given
some legislative guidance in certain areas. For example, property used
by public fairs and expositions chartered by Fla. Stat. ch. 616 is pre-
sumed to be used for educational purposes and is thus entitled to ex-
emption. 58 Similarly,. additional criteria are provided for the determi-
nation of whether a charitable purpose is being served by hospitals,
nursing homes, and homes for special services.2 59 If property is devoted
to an exempt use on less than an exclusive basis, and if the exempt use
is nonetheless the predominant use of the property, exemption is au-
thorized to the extent of the predominant use; 60 there is statutory
guidance for determining the extent of exempt use of property.261 Ex-
and "expansion of an existing business" are provided in FLA. STAT. §§ 196.012(14),
(15) (Supp. 1982), respectively.
256. E.g., FLA. STAT. § 196.181 .(1981) provides exemption for household goods
and personal effects belonging "to every person residing and making his or her perma-
nent home in this state." The property appraiser is provided with nine factors to con-
sider in determining whether an individual has established a permanent residence in
Florida. FLA. STAT. § 196.015 (1981).
257. Exemptions for certain veterans with physical disabilities provided by FLA.
STAT. §§ 196.081 (1981) and 196.091 (1981) may be based upon a letter from the
United States Government or United States Veterans' Administration relating to the
appropriate physical condition. FLA. STAT. § 196.24 (1981). Exemptions provided by
FLA. STAT. § 196.101 (1981) may be based upon a certificate from the Veterans' Ad-
ministration or from two doctors licensed to practice in Florida. See also FLA. STAT. §
196.012(10) (Supp. 1982). The exemption for blind persons provided by FLA. STAT. §
196.202 (1981) may be based on certification from the Florida Bureau of Blind Ser-
vices. F.A.C. § 12D-7.03(1)(c). In addition, applications for the economic development
ad valorem tax exemption authorized by FLA. STAT. § 196.1995 (1981) are to be
granted by the governing body of the county or municipality in which the property is
located.
258. FLA. STAT. § 196.198 (1981). See also FLA. STAT. §§ 196.1985, 196.1986
(1981).
259. FLA. STAT. §§ 196.197 (1981), 196.1975 (Supp. 1982).
260. FLA. STAT. § 196.192(2) (1981). Predominant use of property is defined as
"property used for exempt purposes in excess of 50 percent but less than exclusive."
FLA. STAT. § 196.012(3) (Supp. 1982).
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emptions for the religious, literary, scientific or charitable use of prop-
erty are available only if the owner of such property is a nonprofit or-
ganization, and statutory criteria are supplied for the property
appraiser to follow in making that determination as well.262
The property appraiser is assisted in the task of deciding whether
property is entitled to exemption by the requirement that an applica-
tion for exemption must be filed with the property appraiser by March
1 of each year-the failure to file an application constitutes a waiver of
any exemption privilege for that year.2 3 The same rule applies to the
homestead exemption, 6 4 but because of the political visibility and
widespread use of this exemption, the property appraiser is required to
remind each person who was entitled to the exemption in the previous
year of the need to apply for the exemption in the current year, and to
furnish an application form for that purpose.26 5
IV. Conclusion
The property appraiser today plays a central role in the imposition
of ad valorem taxes by Florida's local governmental units. This is a role
inherent to the fundamental nature of ad valorem taxation, because
such a tax is imposed on property subject to the levy, and it is mea-
sured by the value of such property. Therefore, someone must deter-
mine what property is taxable and ascertain its value. In Florida, the
locally elected property appraiser for each county has traditionally
been the person charged for those tasks. However, the state no longer
imposes a general property tax, and the systems of communication and
transportation have been vastly improved since the mid-1800s.
Over the past several years, the courts have prodded the legisla-
262. FLA. STAT. § 196.195 (1981).
263. FLA. STAT. § 196.011(1) (Supp. 1982). There are exceptions to the annual
application requirement for the exemption of certain property owned by houses of pub-
lic worship, household goods and personal effects of Florida residents, public road
rights-of-way and borrow pits, and property of the state, any county, any municipality,
any school district, or any community college district. FLA. STAT. § 196.011(2), (3)
(Supp. 1982). Applications for exemption are to be filed on forms prepared and distrib-
uted by the Department of Revenue. FLA. STAT. § 196.193(2) (1981).
264. FLA. STAT. § 196.131 (1981).
265. FLA. STAT. 196.111 (1981). The forms are to be provided to the property
appraisers by the Department of Revenue. FLA. STAT. § 196.121 (1981).
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ture to take strong action to ensure full valuation, and the Department
of Revenue has been provided with a plethora of devices to oversee the
property appraisers in the performance of their duties. The ultimate
objective is to achieve full valuation so that ad valorem taxes may be
imposed equally and uniformly throughout the state. The need for
state-wide full valuation has also been accentuated by the homestead
exemption, by multi-county special district levies, and the use of the
assessment rolls as an appropriate measure, in part, for the distribution
of state funds to local governmental entities, including school districts.
The existing scheme of locally elected property appraisers and De-
partment of Revenue supervision is cumbersome and inefficient. Full
valuation would be a more reasonably obtainable objective, and the in-
tegrity of the tax rolls would be improved if the property appraisers
were employees of the Department of Revenue, directly accountable to
the Executive Director. Perhaps, for the purpose of assigning valuation
responsibilities, the state could be divided into geographical divisions
which do not adhere to county lines. However, property owners should
continue to be provided with the opportunity for local relief by author-
izing the board of county commissioners to hear complaints as to the
denial of exemptions and as to valuation, as they do today. The local
circuit court should retain jurisdiction as well, but appellate jurisdiction
should be consolidated, either in the First District Court of Appeals, or
in a separate Appellate Tax Court, with ultimate judicial review in the
Supreme Court. The Department of Revenue would be the sole neces-
sary defendant in such proceedings. There would be no need for the
Department to disapprove a tax roll, thereby disrupting local finances.
Instead, the professional appraiser whose responsibility it was for the
preparation of the defective portion of the roll would be subject to dis-
missal by the Department, rather than being rewarded by re-election as
often is the case today.
The ad valorem tax is a practical, useful source of revenue for
local governmental entities. However, there is no need for the tax base
to be determined by a locally elected official. The ad valorem tax is a
good tax only if it is fairly imposed. The best way to ensure that is to
have the exemption and valuation duties performed by persons who are
subject to uniform, state-wide standards and who are subject to mean-
ingful, immediate review of the performance of their duties. The appro-
priate place for professional property appraisers in the scheme of ad
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valorem taxation is within the Department of Revenue, rather than
merely being subject to the Department's oversight.
82
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
Water Transfer: Shall We Sink or Swim Together?
For all life water is necessary. For many uses it is convenient.
In much of its functioning it is commonplace.
But commonplace things often are the least appreciated and
the hardest to understand . . . . In considering its uses and abun-
dance and properties, however, we must keep in mind this main
fact: Water is needed for life.'
These words are especially meaningful today in light of recurrent
water shortages across the United States. There is an honest realization
that to sustain an ample supply of water, sensible planning, control,
and fairness is required. Recurrent shortages are triggered by various
conditions: supply and demand imbalance; population shifts to the sun-
belt states resulting in locally and regionally concentrated consumptive
increases in areas with scant water resources; pollution of lakes,
streams, and ground water; acid rain pollution; and industrial or agri-
cultural demand.2 It has been said that "[t]he water crisis of the 1980s
and 1990s will rival the oil crisis of the 1970s." 3 The demands for
human survival, for economic stability and growth, and for achieving
the goal of energy self-sufficiency - which overtax the water supply -
have naturally given rise to friction between those who have and those
who do not have.
The United States Supreme Court, in the landmark case of
Sporhase v. Nebraska4 furnishes present-day guidelines whereby con-
frontations may be avoided between those who need water and those
who control its distribution. The opinion specifically addresses the sen-
sitive issue of interstate transfer of ground water.5 The Court declared
1. R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 2.1 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
2. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, WATER ISSUES FACING THE NATION: AN
OVERVIEW (May 6, 1982). See also Canby, Our Most Precious Resource: Water, 158-
2 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 144 (August, 1980).
3. Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A. J. 1066 (1982).
4. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
5. Water is generally categorized as follows: 1) "Lakes and streams on the sur-
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face": bodies of water on beds within well defined boundaries; 2) "Surface water":
water "from rains, springs and melting snow and ice, and which follows the contours of
the land and has not yet reached a well defined water course or basin . . . .Surface
waters have not yet reached a stream or lake."; 3) "Underground or percolating
water": "below surface [water which] seeps, oozes or filters into the earth from the
surface and moves, drips or flows among the interstices of the earth." R. BOYER, SUR-
VEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 276-77 (3d ed. 1981). This note will refer to under-
ground or percolating water as ground water.
The legal aspects of interstate ground water transfer are to be distinguished from
the devices governing interstate surface water transfer and diversion (surface water
used to encompass those waters within or without well defined boundaries). The two
major devices employed in the area of interstate surface water transfer and diversion
are as follows:
1) Equitable Apportionment Doctrine: "Equitable apportionment is the doctrine of
federal common law that governs disputes between states concerning their rights to use
the water of an interstate stream." Colorado v. New Mexico, 102 S. Ct. 539, 545
(1982) (Colorado sought equitable apportionment of the Vermejo River in order to
divert river's waters for future uses; case remanded to Special Master for additional
fact finding to enable Supreme Court to apply equitable apportionment doctrine). The
doctrine attempts to assure an equitable allocation of water among the states appurte-
nant to the interstate body of surface water.
2) Interstate Compacts: U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 is the constitutional basis
authorizing states to negotiate compacts: "No State shall, without the consent of Con-
gress enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign
Power . . " The interstate compact is preceded by negotiations between the states
involved. Frequently, there is a federal representative present to assist in the negotia-
tions. Finally, the negotiation process will generally be followed by Congress' imprima-
tur, known as Congressional consenting legislation, with or without modification. See
generally 2 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS §§ 133.1-133.4 (1967 & Supp.
1978).
Congressional consent, when required, may be inferred from a statute or
pattern of enactments, may take the form of prior authorization as well as
that of subsequent approval, and may be conditioned on state acceptance
of congressionally mandated modifications. Whether or not the United
States chooses to become one of the compacting parties, a valid compact is
binding on the citizens of the signatory states, may be enforced by federal
statute, and itself operates as federal law in the sense that construction of
its terms is a federal question for purposes of Supreme Court review of a
state court decision and in the further sense that signatory states cannot
plead state law, even state constitutional law, as a defense to compliance
with the compact's terms as construed by the Supreme Court.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-31, at 402 (1978 & Supp. 1979)
(footnotes omitted).
For examples of an interstate compact, see Susquehanna River Basin Compact,
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water an article of commerce,' thereby bringing water within the pur-
view of the Constitution's Commerce Clause,7 and furthermore, pro-
scribed as unconstitutional a provision in a Nebraska "embargo" stat-
ute regulating the interstate transfer of ground water.' The Sporhase
decision promulgates new water law and policy, and represents a step
toward moderating the controversy regarding the interstate transfer of
ground water.
This note will examine the history of attempted interstate transfer
of natural resources, culminating in an analysis of the Sporhase deci-
sion and its implications, both present and future. It will also review
selected cases of current litigation and policy in the area of water
transfer, primarily focusing on the interstate transfer of ground water,
considering the state interest weighed against both private need and the
national interest. In order to effectively implement the Sporhase deci-
sion, this note proposes the elimination of all absolute and reciprocal
water embargo statutes as facially discriminatory legislation, and con-
sequently unconstitutional. Moreover, this note supports the employ-
ment of the Pike v. Bruce Church9 Commerce Clause balancing test by
Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat. 1509 (1970) and the Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub.
L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414 (1968).
6. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. 3456.
7. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, provides in part: "The Congress shall have Power...
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."
8. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465, 3467 (invalidating reciprocity provision of NEB.
REV. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978)). The water "embargo" statutes are classified as abso-
lute, reciprocal, or discretionary and seek to prohibit or control the flow of water out-
of-state. The Sporhase Nebraska statute was a discretionary-reciprocal-absolute stat-
ute. It was discretionary in that authorization by the Nebraska Director of Water Re-
sources was required prior to withdrawal of intrastate ground water for transport and
ultimate use interstate. The statute was reciprocal because unless the state to which
water was to be transferred from Nebraska provided for reciprocal transfer rights, no
water was to be removed from Nebraska. The statute was absolute because Colorado,
the state to which appellants Sporhase and Moss needed to transfer water from their
Nebraska property, did not provide for reciprocal transfer rights. Consequently,
Sporhase and Moss were absolutely prohibited from transferring water to Colorado,
regardless of their application to the Nebraska Director of Water Resources. It was the
reciprocity provision, discussed supra text accompanying notes 112-116, of the Ne-
braska statute which was declared unconstitutional.
9. 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
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which to scrutinize state regulation of the interstate transfer of ground
water by a state's use of discretionary water embargo statutes. Lastly,
this note recommends the use of interstate compacts ° to terminate the
interstate rivalries concomitant with interstate ground water transfer.
The application of the interstate compact device and the Commerce
Clause doctrine are necessary tools to govern in an area which requires
and will continue to require the equitable distribution of a precious and
rapidly vanishing natural resource, and as of recent, article of
commerce.
Natural Resources and the Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has been the primary vehicle by which
complainants have challenged a state's attempted sheltering of its natu-
ral resources. The cases employing this approach demonstrate a grad-
ual erosion of the concept of state ownership in natural resources. Al-
though considered natural treasures, these resources were also
recognized as objects of commerce and, ultimately, objects of profit.
The Commerce Clause proscribes state regulation which impedes the
free flow of commerce across state lines. Consequently, regulations that
attempt to hinder divestment of a state's natural resources destined for
interstate commerce repeatedly have been struck down as an unconsti-
tutional interference with interstate commercial undertakings.
Almost a century ago, the case of Geer v. Connecticut" addressed
the issue of whether a Connecticut statute regulating the transportation
of animals ferae naturae2 out-of-state, after being lawfully killed
within this state, violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution.
Edgar M. Geer was charged with and convicted of "unlawfully receiv-
ing and having in his possession . . . with the unlawful intent to pro-
cure the transportation beyond the limits of this state, certain wood-
cock, ruffled grouse and quail killed within this state .... "V13
10. See supra note 5 for a discussion on interstate compacts.
11. 161 U.S. 519 (1896), overruled, Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
12. "Animals which are by nature wild are so designated, by way of distinction
from such as are naturally tame .... . BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 558 (5th ed.
1979).
13. State v. Geer, 61 Conn. 144, 148-49, 22 A. 1012, 1012 (1891).
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Relying primarily on English and French common law14 authoriz-
ing the regulation of hunting animals ferae naturae based upon the
principle of common ownership,15 the right of a state to govern for the
benefit of its people,16 and the concept that the game never entered the
stream of interstate commerce, the Supreme Court affirmed Geer's
conviction. The Court, in referencing Gibbons v. Ogden 7 and The
14. Blackstone, interpreting English common law, wrote: "[I]t follows from the
very end and constitution of society that this natural right [of man to pursue and take
for his own use animalsferae naturae] ... may be restrained by positive laws enacted
for reasons of state or for the supposed benefit of the community." Geer v. Connecticut,
161 U.S. 519, 527 (1896) (quoting 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 410). The
Napoleanic Code, symbolizing French common law, noted the implications of the com-
mon ownership doctrine: "There are things which belong to no one, and the use of
which is common to all. Police regulations direct the manner in which they may be
enjoyed." Geer, 161 U.S. at 526 (quoting NAPOLEANIC CODE arts. 714, 715).
15. The common ownership doctrine stipulates that natural resources:
are the common property of all citizens of the governmental unit and that
the government, as a sort of trustee, exercises this 'ownership' for the ben-
efit of its citizens .... Each government may ... regulate the corpus of
the trust in the way best suited to the interests of the beneficial owners, its
citizens, and may discriminate as it sees fit against persons lacking any
beneficial interest.
Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1948). See also Geer, 161 U.S. 519.
16. The sole consequence of the provision forbidding the transportation of
game, killed within the State, beyond the State, is to confine the use of
such game to those who own it, the people of that State. The proposition
that the State may not forbid carrying it beyond their limits involves,
therefore, the contention that a State cannot allow its own people the en-
joyment of the benefits of the property belonging to them in common,
without at the same time permitting the citizens of other States to partici-
pate in that which they do not own. . . .The common ownership imports
the right to keep the property, if the sovereign so chooses, always within its
jurisdiction for every purpose.
Geer, 161 U.S. at 529-30.
The Court, quoting from Ex parte Maier, reinforced its position:
The wild game within a state belongs to the people in their collective, sov-
ereign capacity; It is not the subject of private ownership, except in so far
as the people may elect to make it so; and they may, if they see fit, abso-
lutely prohibit the taking of it, or any traffic and commerce in it, if deemed
necessary for its protection or preservation, or the public good.
Id. at 529 (quoting Ex parte Maier, 103 Cal. 476, 483, 37 P. 402, 404 (1894).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824) (state grant of authority to operate steamboat
5271Water Transfer17:1983
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Daniel Ball,18 stated that the statute regulated Connecticut's internal
commerce and had no effect on external commerce with other states.
Therefore, there was no violation of the Commerce Clause which regu-
lated commerce "among the several states." 19
An early case which specifically addressed the interstate diversion
of water was Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter.20 Justice
Holmes, writing for the majority, affirmed the state court's issuance of
an injunction against Hudson County Water Company's anticipated di-
version of water from New Jersey to Staten Island, New York. Hudson
County Water Company, a New Jersey corporation, had contracted
with the City of New York to supply the borough of Staten Island with
a minimum 3,000,000 gallons of water a day, which were to be diverted
from the Passiac River in New Jersey through water mains across state
lines to New York. New Jersey sued to enjoin performance of the con-
tract which it saw as a clear violation of state law. 21 Hudson argued the
statute violated the Constitution in that it impaired the obligation of
contracts, took property without due process of law, interfered with
commerce between the states, denied the privileges of New Jersey citi-
zens to citizens of other states, and denied citizens of other states equal
protection of the law.22 Justice Holmes dismissed these contentions
briefly with partial reliance on Geer.23
The state courts had identified Hudson County Water Company as
a "riparian proprietor, '2 4 and as such, had "no right to divert waters
monopoly on New York waters declared unconstitutional as conflicting with Congres-
sional power to regulate navigation).
18. 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871) (ships operating solely on intrastate waters
could be regulated by Congress if those ships were transporting goods interstate).
19. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8.
20. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
21. The challenged New Jersey statute read: "It shall be unlawful for any person
or corporation to transport or carry, through pipes, conduits, ditches or canals, the
waters of any fresh water lake, pond, brook, creek, river or stream of this State into
any other State, for use therein." 1905 N.J. Laws 461. For the current statute on the
subject of water diversion, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-5 (West 1982).
22. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354.
23. 161 U.S. 519.
24. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354. The riparian doctrine is a system of water law
mainly followed in Great Britain and the eastern United States. It permits owners of
land appurtenant to water to make reasonable use of the water and provides for a
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for more than a reasonable distance from the body of the stream or for
other than the well-known ordinary uses, and that for any purpose any-
where he is narrowly limited in amount. 26 Justice Holmes broadened
the justification for the injunction, attributing its employment to the
state's police power: "The limits set to property by other public inter-
ests present themselves as a branch of what is called the police power
of the State. '26 The public interests cited by Justice Holmes included
maintaining an undiminished river flow-to protect the public health and
welfare. "This public interest is omnipresent wherever there is a State,
and grows more pressing as population grows. It is fundamental, and
we are of opinion that the private property of riparian proprietors can-
not be supposed to have deeper roots. 27 In emphasizing the sovereign's
"correlative right protecting against unreasonable use by others that substantially di-
minishes the quantity or quality of water." 7 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS
310 (1967 & Supp. 1978). The "water right is regarded as 'usufructuary,' a right of
use and not an interest in the corpus of the water supply. . . [R]iparian rights origi-
nate from landownership and are dependent upon physical location, i.e., contiguity of
land to a body of water . . . . Riparian rights . . . remain 'vested' though unexer-
cised." 1 R. CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 51.9 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
25. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 354.
26. Id. at 355.
27. Id. at 356. Furthermore, Justice Holmes added that "it is recognized that the
State as quasi-sovereign and representative of the interests of the public has a standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water and the forests within its territory, irre-
spective of the assent or dissent of the private owners of the land most immediately
concerned." Id. at 355, citing three cases:
(1) Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902). This controversy between two states
triggered the original jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court. Kansas sought
injunctive relief to bar Colorado from diverting waters from the Arkansas River which
originated in Colorado but flowed through both Kansas and Colorado. The Supreme
Court recognized the complexity of the issues'and questions raised, overruled a demur-
rer by Colorado, and requested a factual presentation by both parties in order to rule
effectively.
(2) Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). Facts were compiled and presented to
the Supreme Court in this proceeding five years after the litigation was initiated. The
Court dismissed Kansas' complaint in a lengthy opinion which concluded that Kansas
suffered minimally from Colorado's water diversions resulting in diminution of river
flow through Kansas. The Court felt that Colorado diverted water for a reasonable use
- irrigation - and that there was an equitable apportionment of the Arkansas River
waters between the two states.
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independent authority, Justice Holmes claimed that the state need not
justify its protective stance. "[The State] finds itself in possession of
what all admit to be a great public good, and what it has it may keep
and give no one a reason for its will."28
Despite Justice Holmes' views, however, the Court in West v. Kan-
sas Natural Gas Co.29 began to dismantle the state police power theory
of control and ownership of natural resources. Kansas Natural Gas
Company joined forces with three other complainants to attack an
Oklahoma statute30 regulating the interstate transport of natural gas as
violative of the Commerce Clause. The complainants had secured the
rights to construct natural gas wells on Oklahoma land and, in addi-
tion, had purchased the rights of way to lay pipes for the interstate
injunction issued in Georgia's favor against the public nuisance of air pollution from
Tennessee Copper Company's out-of-state plant.
28. Hudson, 209 U.S. at 357. "[T]he constitutional power of the State to insist
that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent
upon any nice estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future needs."
Id. at 356-57. As previously discussed in the introduction and as will later be devel-
oped, population growth is a material factor in the argument for transfer of water to
satisfy justifiable needs. Furthermore, the state, in attempting to enjoin interstate di-
version/transfer of water, must justify its laws regulating such transfer, particularly
under Commerce Clause analysis. See, e.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456
(1982). See supra text accompanying notes 101-119.
29. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
30. The Oklahoma statute, in part, read:
§ 2. No corporation organized for the purpose of, or engaged in the trans-
portation or transmission of natural gas within this State shall be granted
a charter or right of eminent domain, or right to use the highways of this
State unless it shall be expressly stipulated in such charter that it shall
only transport or transmit natural gas through its pipe lines to points
within this State; that it shall not connect with, transport to, or deliver
natural gas to individuals, associations, copartnership companies or corpo-
rations engaged in transporting or furnishing natural gas to points, places
or persons outside of this State.
§ 3. Foreign corporations formed for the purpose of, or engaged in the
business of transporting or transmitting natural gas by means of pipe lines,
shall never be licensed or permitted to conduct such business within this
State.
1907 Okla. Sess. Laws 586-87. See West, 221 U.S. at 239-43 n.1 for text of the statute
in its entirety. For the current statute on the subject, see OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§
1, 3, 4, 5, 7 (West 1969 & Supp. 1982-83).
1530 7:1983 1
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transmission and eventual sale of the natural gas. The Oklahoma stat-
ute prohibited the transportation of natural gas over the state highways
or transmission of the natural gas through pipelines within the state, to
destinations outside the state. The Circuit Court of the United States
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma issued a "perpetual" injunction
against the statute's enforcement, declaring the statute's aims, as scru-
tinized under the authority of the Commerce Clause, "unreasonable,
unconstitutional, invalid and void, "and of no force or effect
whatever . .
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, Oklahoma argued
that "the statute's 'ruling principle is conservation, not commerce; that
the due process clause is the single issue.' And due process, it is urged,
is not violated, because the statute is not a taking of property, but a
regulation of it under the police power of the State. ' 32 Despite the
state's effort, the Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision,
and articulated its rejection of the state's position:
The results of the contention repel its acceptance. Gas, when re-
duced to possession, is a commodity; it belongs to the owner of the
land, and, when reduced to possession, is his individual property
subject to sale by him, and may be a subject of intrastate com-
merce and interstate commerce. The statute . . . recognizes [gas]
to be a subject of intrastate commerce, but seeks to prohibit it from
being the subject of interstate commerce, and this is the purpose of
its conservation. In other words, the purpose of the conservation is
in a sense commercial - the business welfare of the State, as coal
might be, or timber. Both of those products may be limited in
amount, and the same consideration of the public welfare which
would confine gas to the use of the inhabitants of a State would
confine [the coal or timber] to the inhabitants of the State. If the
States have such power a singular situation might result. Penn-
sylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, the mining
states their minerals . . . . To what consequences does such power
31. West, 221 U.S. at 248 (citing Kansas Natural Gas Co. v. Haskell, 172 F.
545 (C.C.E.D. Okla. 1909) (prior to 1912, the judicial system was structured differ-
ently. See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1, at 1-6
(1976)).
32. West, 221 U.S. at 249.
531 11 7:1983
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tend? If one State has it, all States have it; embargo may be retali-
ated by embargo, and commerce will be halted at state lines."3
The objective of the Commerce Clause to foster the free flow of com-
merce among and between the states was clearly frustrated by the
Oklahoma statute. Therefore, the statute was declared unconstitu-
tional, and a permanent injunction issued against its operation.
The West Court highlighted the national concerns implicit in
avoiding the creation of "embargo" legislation. Nonetheless, the con-
troversy continued in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia,34 this time on a
larger scale between three states. Pennsylvania and Ohio sought a pro-
hibitory injunction against the operation and enforcement of a West
Virginia statute.3 5 The statute recognized an anticipated depletion of
natural gas resources within West Virginia and sought to prefer intra-
state consumers as the supply diminished. Again, this attempted re-
straint of "an established current of commerce"361 was challenged as
forbidden by the Commerce Clause. At the time, West Virginia was
the leading producer of natural gas in the United States and had nur-
tured and promoted its position by developing an intrastate, as well as
interstate, market. 7 For years before the suit, the bordering states of
Pennsylvania and Ohio relied heavily on West Virginia gas for private
and public consumption. 8 As its gas fields began to show signs of ex-
33. Id. at 255 (emphasis added).
34. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
35. 1919 W. Va. Acts ch. 71.
36. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 591.
37. Id. at 597-98.
Much of the business is interstate and has grown up through the course of
years. West Virginia encouraged and sanctioned the development of that
part of the business and has profited greatly by it. Her present effort,
rightly understood, is to subordinate that part to the local business within
her borders. In other words, it is in effect an attempt to regulate the inter-
state business to the advantage of the local consumers. But this she may
not do.
Id.
38. "In West Virginia the production of natural gas began as much as thirty
years ago and for the last fourteen years has been greater than in any other State. The
producing fields include thirty-two of her fifty-five counties." Id. at 586. The Court also
noted that the gas was used by 300,000 consumers and ultimately provided for
1,500,000 persons in Pennsylvania and 725,000 consumers, ultimately 3,625,000 per-
532 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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haustion, West Virginia moved to protect local needs. It exhibited a
preference for its inhabitants in the purchase and sale of the resource
by withdrawing "a large volume of the gas from an established inter-
state current whereby it is supplied in other States to consumers
there." 9
The Court recognized the probable ramifications of the statute's
enforcement,'40 but avoided those negative results by relying on the pur-
pose behind the Commerce Clause and prior case law including West.41
The injunction was issued and the Court advised that if interstate regu-
lation of natural gas was necessary, assistance should be sought from
Congress.
Justice Holmes vigorously dissented here, as in West, promoting
his notion of a state's police power to control its resources. "I see noth-
ing in the commerce clause to prevent a State from giving a preference
to its inhabitants in the enjoyment of its natural advantages."' 2 Justice
Holmes, echoing his opinion in Hudson County Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter,'3 emphasized the right of the state to provide for its local
needs.
Although not a "natural resources" case, H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc.
v. DuMond44 offered an analysis of the Commerce Clause, helpful to
the understanding of the "resources" controversy. The seminal case of
its time, Hood, surveyed the field of Commerce Clause litigation and
sons, in Ohio. "To change to other fuel would require an adjustment of heating and
cooking appliances at an average cost of more than $100 for each domestic consumer,
or an aggregate cost exceeding $30,000,000 in Pennsylvania and $72,500,000 in Ohio."
Id. at 590.
39. Id. at 595.
40. Id. at 596.
The question is an important one; for what one State may do others may,
and there are ten States from which natural gas is exported for consump-
tion in other States. Besides, what may be done with one natural product
may be done with others, and there are several States in which the earth
yields products of great value which are carried into other States and there
used.
Id.
41. 221 U.S. 229.
42. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. at 602.
43. 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
44. 336 U.S. 525 (1949).
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emphasized the national economic interest as more imperative than the
state's internal economic preoccupation. The Hood Company, a milk
distributor, was denied a license by the New York Commissioner of
Agriculture and Markets to open and operate an additional distribution
plant at Greenwich, New York. Hood purchased raw milk from farm-
ers, which it then tested, weighed, and cooled for eventual shipment. It
was conceded that Hood's entire business, both present and future, was
interstate.45
In denying the license, the New York Commissioner guided by
state law, concluded: "The issuance of a license to [the] applicant
which would permit it to operate an additional plant, would tend to a
destructive competition in a market already adequately served, and
would not be in the public interest. '46 Justice Cardozo, writing for a
unanimous Court in the earlier case of Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,'7
had struck down a New York statute which attempted to bar the im-
portation of milk from Vermont. The legislation was declared an un-
constitutional burden on interstate commerce. Justice Jackson, writing
for the majority in Hood, compared Baldwin and found the facts there
to be the converse of Hood, but the principles to be identical. Baldwin
involved the attempted curtailment of importation, while Hood in-
volved a similar restraint on the exportation of a commodity. "In
neither case is the measure supported by health or safety considerations
but solely by protection of local economic interests, such as supply for
local consumption and limitation of competition. '48
Justice Jackson, referencing Justice Cardozo's view in Baldwin,
noted the economic mission of the Hood statute, as distinguished from
a legitimate objective of guarding the health, safety, and welfare of a
state's citizens. It was this economic objective, in light of the Com-
merce Clause and its functions, which was precisely at "the root of its
invalidity."'49 In examining the early history of the Commerce Clause,
Justice Jackson found that "[t]he desire of the Forefathers to federal-
ize regulation of foreign and interstate commerce [stood] in sharp con-
trast to their jealous preservation of the state's power over its internal
45. Id. at 526.
46. Id. at 529.
47. 294 U.S. 511 (1935).
48. Hood, 336 U.S. at 531.
49. Id. at 532.
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affairs. No other federal power was so universally assumed to be neces-
sary, no other state power was so readily relinquished. '5
0
Justice Cardozo in Baldwin had marked the parameters limiting
state regulation: "What is ultimate is the principle that one state in its
dealings with another may not place itself in a position of economic
isolation. ' 51 Justice Jackson, in Hood, noted the probable consequences
of "embargo" statutes as the result of the "established interdependence
of the states .... "52 He foresaw states coveting their treasures of
copper, timber, ore, cotton, oil, and gas. "What fantastic rivalries and
dislocations and reprisals would ensue if such practices were begun!" 58
. By the mid 1960's, conservation of our natural resources was a
national concern. Although the country had experienced incidental
water shortages throughout the first half of the century, the first mean-
ingful water related case following the 1908 dispute in Hudson," was
City of Altus v. Carr55 in 1965. The controversy stemmed from a
Texas statute56 limiting the transport of water to other states and an
Oklahoma city's dire need of outside water supplies.
5 7
An engineering firm, hired by the city of Altus, Oklahoma to lo-
cate alternative sources of water, recommended tapping the subsurface
water reserve under six of the 5,663 contiguous acres of Texas land
owned by plaintiffs C.F. and Pauline Mock. The land bordered
Oklahoma and was fourteen miles from the city of Altus. The city of
Vernon, Texas, just south of the Mocks' land, was already drawing
50. Id. at 533-34.
51. Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 527.
52. Hood, 336 U.S. at 538.
53. Id. at 538-39.
54. 209 U.S. 349.
55. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex.), aff'd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
56. The statute stated: "No one shall withdraw water from any underground
source in this State by drilling a well in Texas and transporting the water outside the
boundaries of the State unless the same be specifically authorized by an Act of the
Texas Legislature and thereafter as approved by it." TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b
(Vernon 1965). Statute held void in City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. 828, and therefore
omitted from TEXAS WATER CODE ANN. § 5.096 (Vernon 1972 & Supp. 1982-83).
57. The City of Altus, Oklahoma experienced a rapid population boom from 9,
735 persons in 1959 to approximately 23,500 persons at the time of suit in 1966. City
of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 831 n.3. Available water supplies from the W.C. Austin




et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
536NoaLwJual718
from this "natural subsurface water-bearing formation ' 58 of high qual-
ity percolating ground water. The Mocks and the city of Altus exe-
cuted a lease which granted the city of Altus the land "for the sole and
only purpose of mining and operating for subsurface water and for the
transportation of such water to the city of Altus for its use."5 9 Two
months later, the Texas legislature enacted article 7477be° which effec-
tively barred interstate transfer of water unless the state legislature
first approved the transfer. Thereafter, plaintiffs Mock and the city of
Altus filed suit to permanently enjoin enforcement of the Texas statute
as violative of the Commerce Clause. The Texas state courts had previ-
ously addressed intrastate water rights, l thereby providing some guid-
ance for the federal district court.
The federal district court reiterated the views expressed in Penn-
sylvania v. West Virginia6 2 and West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co. 63 in
finding for the plaintiffs. Water, like gas, when reduced to possession
was considered personal property - a commodity - free for sale in
intrastate or interstate commerce. Regulation restraining transporta-
tion of a commodity was not tolerated under the Commerce Clause and
its theme proscribing burdening and interfering with interstate com-
merce. Texas' argument that the statute's intentions were lawful as an
exercise of the state's police power in the interest of conservation was
discarded." The court eliminated any distinction between a statute
58. Id. at 831.
59. Id. at 832.
60. TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 7477b (Vernon 1965). Statute held void in City of
Altus, and therefore omitted from TEx. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.096 (Vernon 1972 &
Supp. 1982-83).
61. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 832 n.8. See, e.g., City of Corpus Christi v.
City of Pleasanton, 154 Tex. 289, 276 S.W.2d 798 (1955) (declaring that the rule in
Texas permitted a landowner to withdraw as much percolating ground water as neces-
sary for beneficial aims and could thereafter market it as that landowner saw fit).
62. 262 U.S. 553.
63. 221 U.S. 229.
64. City of Altus, 255 F. Supp. at 840.
In the name of conservation, the statute seeks to prohibit interstate ship-
ments of water while indulging in the substantial discrimination of permit-
ting the unrestricted intrastate production and transportation of water be-
tween points within the State, no matter how distant .... Obviously, the










which restrained the movement of an article in interstate commerce
once reduced to personal property and possession and a statute which
prohibited the withdrawal of ground water, for example, with the intent
to transport it interstate.65
Natural Resources and the Privileges and Immunities Clause
In addition to the Commerce Clause, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause of Article IV of the Constitution"6 has been asserted as a
basis from which to contest state laws aimed at coveting natural re-
sources solely for intrastate use. An early case which considered the
Privileges and Immunities Clause as related to state regulation of natu-
ral resources was McCready v. Virginia.67 The common or public own-
ership doctrine discussed in Geer v. Connecticut,"8 was also the topic of
controversy in McCready. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction of
McCready, a Maryland citizen, for his violation of a Virginia statute69
which prohibited out-of-state citizens from planting oysters in or taking
oysters from Virginia waters. The Court upheld the statute stating that
"[t]he right which the people of the State thus acquire comes not from
their citizenship alone, but from their citizenship and property com-
bined. It is, in fact, a property right, and not a mere privilege or immu-
nity of citizenship."70
For further guidance in its interpretation and application of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, the Court turned to
Corfield v. Coryell,71 in which it was established that "those privileges
and immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental. . . belong, of
65. Id.
66. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2, provides in part: "The Citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States."
67. 94 U.S. 391 (1876).
68. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). See also supra note 15 for discussion of the common
ownership doctrine.
69. The Virginia statute read, in part: "If any person other than a citizen of this
State shall take or catch oysters. . . or plant oysters in the waters thereof. . . he shall
forfeit $500, and the vessel, tackle, and appurtenances." 1874 Va. Acts 214.
70. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395. The Court also rejected the notion that the Vir-
ginia statute was an impermissible burden on interstate commerce. Id. at 396-97.
71. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823)(No. 3230) (access to oyster beds
"owned" by New Jersey citizens could be limited solely to New Jersey citizens).
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right, to the citizens of all free governments... "72 and were meant to
be protected by the Clause. The Pennsylvania statute in Corfield, like
the Virginia statute in McCready, established "that it shall not be law-
ful for any person who is not at the time an actual inhabitant and resi-
dent in this state, to rake or gather clams, oysters, or shells, in any of
the rivers, bays, or waters in this state .... ,,73 The Corfield Court
concluded not only that the state could regulate the fisheries within the
state's borders under the common ownership theory, but also that
farming oysters was not considered a "fundamental" privilege of the
citizens of all states.74
The McCready Court, influenced by the Corfield approach, con-
cluded "that the citizens of one State [were] not invested by [the Privi-
leges and Immunities] clause of the Constitution with any interest in
the common property of the citizens of another State. ' 7 5 As in
Corfield, the Court rejected employment of the Commerce Clause to
bolster the challenge against the enforcement of the state statute:
"There is here no question of transportation or exchange of commodi-
ties, but only of cultivation and production. Commerce has nothing to
do with land while producing, but only with the product after it has
become the subject of trade.17 6
72. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 551.
73. Act of June 9, 1820, quoted in Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 548.
74. Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552. The Court said:
[The fishery] is the property of all [citizens or subjects of the state]; to be
enjoyed by them in subordination to the laws which regulate its use. They
may be considered as tenants in common of this property; and they are so
exclusively entitled to the use of it, that it cannot be enjoyed by others
without the tacit consent . . . of the sovereign who has the power to regu-
late its use.
[I]t would. . . be going quite too far to construe the grant of privi-
leges and immunities of citizens, as amounting to a grant of a cotenancy in
the common property of the state, to the citizens of all the other
states. . . .The oyster beds belonging to a state may be abundantly suffi-
cient for the use of the citizens of that state, but might be totally ex-
hausted and destroyed if the legislature could not so regulate the use of
them as to exclude the citizens of the other states from taking them, ex-
cept under such limitations and restrictions as the laws may prescribe.
Id.
75. McCready, 94 U.S. at 395.
76. Id. at 396.
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In addition to McCready and Corfield, the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause was extensively examined in the Slaughterhouse Cases7
where the Louisiana Legislature created a corporation which monopo-
lized the slaughtering of livestock. Approximately 1000 butchers unsuc-
cessfully challenged the statute as an unconstitutional abridgement of
their rights under the privileges or immunities clause of the fourteenth
amendment.7 8 The majority of the Court concluded that the fourteenth
amendment protected only those privileges and immunities inherent in
United States citizenship, as opposed to the privileges or immunities of
state citizenship."' The Court examined the fourteenth amendment and
said:
It is a little remarkable, if this clause [No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States] was intended as a protection to the
citizen of a State against the legislative power of his own State,
that the word citizen of the State should be left out when it is so
carefully used, and used in contradistinction to citizens of the
United States, in the very sentence which precedes it. It is too clear
for argument that the change in phraseology was adopted under-
standingly and with a purpose. 80
77. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). See supra note 66 for the text of the Privileges
and Immunities Clause of Art. IV.
78. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV, § I
provides:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
The statute was also challenged as an unconstitutional creation of an involuntary servi-
tude prohibited by the thirteenth amendment, and a denial of equal protection and
deprivation of property without due process of law contrary to the proscriptions of the
fourteenth amendment. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 66.
79. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 73-74.
80. Id. at 74. Professor Tribe interpreted the Court's analysis:
The fourteenth amendment retained the distinction between the privileges
of state citizenship and those of national citizenship; therefore, the Court
reasoned, the fourteenth amendment left responsibility over the fundamen-
539 1Water TransferI 7:1983
99
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
540 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
The Supreme Court recently discussed the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commission of Montana,81
where a Montana resident and hunting guide for nonresident hunters
joined with several Minnesota residents to challenge the Montana li-
censing scheme applicable to nonresident hunters. Montana residents
were able to purchase hunting licenses for substantially less cost than
nonresident hunters. 82 Consequently, the statute was attacked as a vio-
lation of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV and the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, noted the scant litiga-
tion and judicial analysis involving the Privileges and Immunities
Clause. Nonetheless, Justice Blackmun formulated what was in his
view the modern articulation of the Clause's purpose and protections:
Some distinctions between residents and nonresidents merely reflect
the fact that this is a Nation composed of individual States, and
are permitted; other distinctions are prohibited because they hinder
the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union of
those States. Only with respect to those 'privileges' and 'immuni-
ties' bearing upon the vitality of the nation as a single entity must
the State treat all citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.83
tal rights of state citizenship where it had always rested, in the state gov-
ernments. Since the privilege claimed by the Slaughterhouse plaintiffs
numbered among the rights of state citizenship, they were told to look to
Louisiana for redress: the privileges or immunities clause provided federal
protection only for the rights of national citizenship.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 7-2, at 419 (1978 & Supp. 1979).
The Court suggested some privileges and immunities of national citizenship
"which owe their existence to the Federal Government, its National character, its Con-
stitution, or its laws." For an enumeration, see Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at
79-80.
81. 436 U.S. 371 (1978).
82. In 1975, a Montana resident paid $4 for a license to hunt only elk. A nonres-
ident hunter, on the other hand, paid $151 for a combination license which limited him
to kill only one elk and two deer. In 1976, a Montana resident had the choice between
a combination license for $30 or an elk license for $9, while the nonresident hunter was
required to purchase a combination license only, for $225. Id. at 373-74.
83. Id. at 383.
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Justice Blackmun did not conclude that the Montana elk hunting li-
censing scheme upset the "formation" or "vitality" of the nation, nor
did he consider the issue one of "fundamental," "natural," "basic," or
"essential" rights.8 ' Moreover, Justice Blackmun did not concede the
public ownership theory as defunct despite the weakening effect of ex-
tensive Commerce Clause litigation. Although Justice Blackmun ad-
mitted the theory was "by no means absolute," 85 he found its vitality
evident in Baldwin: "The elk supply, which has been entrusted to the
care of the State by the people of Montana, is finite and must be care-
fully tended in order to be preserved."86
Justice Brennan, joined in his dissent by Justices White and Mar-
shall, was uncomfortable with the majority's emphasis on the "funda-
mental rights" view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause.87 Justice
84. Id. at 387. In Justice Blackmun's words, only "[w]ith respect to such basic
and essential activities, interference with which would frustrate the purposes of the
formation of the Union, the States must treat residents and nonresidents without un-
necessary distinctions." Id.
85. Id. at 385.
86. Id. at 388.
87. The dissenters' discomfort is exemplified through the following comments:
"Corfield's view of the Privileges and Immunities Clause might, and should be, prop-
erly interred as the product of a bygone era .... "Id. at 399 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). Moreover:
The Court concludes that because elk hunting is not a 'basic and essential
activit[y], . . .' the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV, § 2
. . . does not prevent Montana from irrationally, wantonly, and even in-
vidiously discriminating against nonresidents seeking to enjoy natural
treasures it alone possesses. I cannot agree that the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause is so impotent a guarantee that such discrimination remains
wholly beyond the purview of that provision.
Id. at 394.
Furthermore, Justice Blackmun's "fundamental rights" view of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause has been challenged and a modern enunciation of its implications
noted:
Toomer v. Witsell dramatically shifted the focus of review under the privi-
leges and immunities clause from categorizing fundamental rights of state
citizenship to analyzing state justifications for maintaining the challenged
discriminatory burdens. A flexible approach that seeks to allow discrimina-
tion but only where necessary was substituted for the rigidity inherent in a
test that cast down any discrimination once found to diminish a fundamen-
tal right of state citizenship.
5411
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Brennan stressed that the burden was on the state to demonstrate a
"substantial reason for the discrimination beyond the mere fact that
they are citizens of other States." 88
Toomer v. Witsell,89 relied on by the dissent in Baldwin, involved
a South Carolina shrimping statute which, among other requirements,
imposed a license fee on nonresidents 100 times as costly as the fee for
residents.90 Earle J. Toomer and five other Georgia fishermen, renounc-
ing the statute's "purpose and effect," claimed the statute was not
meant "to conserve shrimp, but to exclude non-residents and thereby
create a commercial monopoly for South Carolina residents."91 Despite
South Carolina's conservation position, the Court in Toomer struck
down the South Carolina statute because the state had failed to over-
come the constitutional challenge under the Privileges and Immunities
Clause.9 2 The state had neglected to persuade the Court that: "(1) the
presence or activity of nonresidents [was] the source or cause of the
problem or effect with which the State [sought] to deal, (2) the dis-
crimination practiced against nonresidents [bore] a substantial relation
to the problem they present,"9 s and (3) "the actual impracticality of
apparent and less restrictive alternatives.9 4
Furthermore, Justice Brennan challenged the residual vitality of
the public/common ownership property doctrine as the result of its
qualification in Toomer; that is, "[tihe whole ownership theory, in fact,
[was] . ..generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal short-
hand of the importance to its people that a State have power to pre-
L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6-33, at 410.
88. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 399-400 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Toomer v.
Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). The Privileges and Immunities Clause "was
designed to insure to a citizen of State A who venture[d] into State B the same privi-
leges which the citizens of State B enjoy." Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 399 (quoting Toomer,
334 U.S. at 395). Accordingly, the State first has to justify its attempted discrimina-
tory practice.
89. 334 U.S. 385.
90. 1947 S.C. Acts 281.
91. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 395.
92. Id. at 403. The statute was also declared unconstitutional as a violation of
the Commerce Clause. Id. at 406.
93. Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 402 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See Toomer, 334 U.S. at
396-99.
94. L. TRIBE, supra note 80, § 6-33, at 410. See Toomer, 334 U.S. at 396-99.
1542 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
102
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
7:1983 Water Transfer 543
serve and regulate the exploitation of an important resource."9 5
Immediately following Baldwin, Justice Brennan grasped the op-
portunity to dispose of the common ownership doctrine in Hughes v.
Oklahoma." William Hughes, who operated a commercial minnow
business in Texas, was convicted of violating an Oklahoma statute
which prohibited the commercial exportation of natural minnows from
Oklahoma streams. Hughes challenged the statute as repugnant to the
Commerce Clause.
In his majority opinion, Justice Brennan agreed that the
Oklahoma statute violated the Commerce Clause, and rejected the
state's reliance on the common ownership rationale. This effectively
overturned the decision in Geer v. Connecticut"' almost a century ear-
lier. Justice Brennan, in his step-by-step dismantling of the Geer com-
mon/public/state ownership doctrine, identified the state's "protection-
ist motive,"98 condemned in West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.," as the
basis for the demise of Geer. Justice Brennan saw the Privileges and
Immunities Clause analysis applied in Baldwin,1"0 which had shed
doubt on the vitality of Geer, as analogous to the Hughes Commerce
Clause challenge. 10 1
95. Toomer, 334 U.S. at 402. The erosion of the common ownership doctrine can
be seen in Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) where it was said: "To put
the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender reed." See also Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977) where it was said:
A state does not stand in the same position as the owner of a private game
preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning' wild fish, birds, or ani-
mals. Neither the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a
hopeful fisherman or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are re-
duced to possession by skillful capture. . . . Under modern analysis, the
question is simply whether the State has exercised its police power in con-
formity with the federal laws and Constitution.
Id. at 284-85. In essence, it appears that the common ownership doctrine of natural
resources is no more than a slogan employed by the inhabitants of a state to covet its
treasures despite the real need of others.
96. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
97. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
98. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 329.
99. 221 U.S. 229 (1911).
100. 436 U.S. 371.
101. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 334. See also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32
(1978), where Justice Brennan said there is a "mutually reinforcing relationship be-
103
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Justice Brennan also utilized a functional approach to declare the
Oklahoma statute regulating the interstate transfer of minnows facially
discriminatory, and therefore unconstitutional. This approach had been
utilized before in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.10 2 where the Bruce
Church company grew, harvested, processed, and packed fruits and
vegetables at various plants throughout Arizona and California for ulti-
mate shipment in interstate commerce throughout the nation. The com-
pany employed its California facilities for packing cantaloupes har-
vested in Arizona. Bruce Church, Inc. commenced an action in federal
court to enjoin the operation of the Arizona Fruit and Vegetable
Standardization Act, which in part required that "all cantaloupes
grown in Arizona and offered for sale must 'be packed in regular com-
pact arrangement in closed standard containers approved by the super-
visor . "... , 108 The effect of the Arizona statute was to bar the
Bruce Church company from continued transportation of its canta-
loupes, harvested in Arizona, to its packing facilities in California.
In striking down the Arizona statute as unconstitutional under the
authority of the Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court announced a
more precise rule for purposes of determining the constitutionality of
state statutes in Commerce Clause litigation:
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legiti-
mate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce
are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on
such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local
benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question
becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be
tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the local interest
involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser
impact on interstate activities.Y°"
tween the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, § 2, and the Commerce Clause
.... " Id.
102. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
103. Id. at 138.
104. Id. at 142 (citation omitted). The Court determined, based on this test, that
the Arizona statute burdened interstate commerce:
[T]he State's tenuous interest in having the company's cantaloupes identi-
fied as originating in Arizona cannot constitutionally justify the require-
ment that the company build and operate an unneeded $200,000 packing
1 544 Nova Law Journal
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Justice Brennan, in Hughes, focused on the Pike approach and
noted that the Oklahoma statute banning the interstate transportation
of minnows from Oklahoma streams "overtly block[ed] the flow of in-
terstate commerce at [the] state's borders." 10 5 Futhermore, Justice
Brennan stated that a facially discriminatory statute, like Oklahoma's,
cannot be sanctioned regardless of the state's attempted justification for
its enforcement, because "the evil of protectionism can reside in legisla-
tive means as well as legislative ends."10 6
Sporhase v. Nebraska: Water as an Article of Commerce
Understanding the judicial treatment of the interstate transfer of
natural resources is paramount to recognizing the impact of the United
States Supreme Court decision in Sporhase v. Nebraska.10 7 Until
Sporhase, water was not readily thought of as an article of commerce;
rather, it was widely recognized as a vital natural resource necessary
for economic prosperity and human survival. The Court in Sporhase
classified water as both an article of commerce - thereby bringing it
within the purview of the Commerce Clause - and as a natural
resource.
The Sporhase controversy grew out of a conflict between private
need for water and provisions in the Nebraska statutes which read as
follows:
Any person, firm, city, village, municipal corporation or any other
entity intending to withdraw ground water from any well or pit
located in the State of Nebraska and transport it for use in an
adjoining state shall apply to the Department of Water Resources
plant in [Arizona] .... For the Court has viewed with particular suspi-
cion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the
home State that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even
where the State is pursuing a clearly legitimate local interest, this particu-
lar burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually per se illegal.
Id. at 145.
105. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S.
617, 624 (1978)).
106. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 337 (quoting Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. at
626).
107. 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
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to do so. If the Director of Water Resources finds that the with-
drawal of the ground water requested is reasonable, is not contrary
to the conservation and use of ground water, and is not otherwise
detrimental to the public welfare, he shall grant the permit if the
state in which the water is to be used grants reciprocal rights to
withdraw and transport ground water from that state for use in the
State of Nebraska. 108
In Sporhase, two citizens of Colorado, Joy Sporhase and Delmer
Moss, owned contiguous tracts of land in Nebraska and Colorado.
From a well situated on their Nebraska land, Sporhase and Moss
pumped ground water to irrigate both the Nebraska and Colorado
tracts. They did not seek the required Nebraska permit to transport
water across state lines prior to pumping. Consequently, the State of
Nebraska sued in state court to enjoin Sporhase and Moss from with-
drawing ground water from their well on the Nebraska tract for trans-
port out-of-state. Despite Sporhase's and Moss' defense that the Ne-
braska statute violated the Commerce Clause, the trial court issued an
injunction upon concluding that ground water was not an article of
commerce.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed 0 9 and thereby adopted the
trial court's reasoning that, even if water was an article of commerce,
the statute did not "impose an unreasonable burden [on] interstate
commerce." 110 In its examination of Nebraska law, the court explained
that Nebraska had employed the modified American reasonable use
rule governing the rights of water "ownership." ' In essence, the
108. NEB. Riv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978).
109. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, 208 Neb. 703, 305 N.W.2d 614 (1981),
rev'd sub nom. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
110. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 616.
111. Id. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617 (citing Olson v. City of Wahoo, 124 Neb.
802, 811, 248 N.W. 304, 308 (1933)).
The American [reasonable use] rule is that the owner of land is entitled to
appropriate subterranean waters found under his land, but he cannot ex-
tract and appropriate them in excess of a reasonable and beneficial use
upon the land which he owns, especially if such use is injurious to others
who have substantial rights to the waters, and if the natural underground
supply is insufficient for all owners, each is entitled to a reasonable propor-
tion of the whole, and while a lesser number of states have adopted this









state's highest court advocated public ownership of water. The court
dismissed appellants' reliance on City of Altus v. Carr,112 pointing out
that Texas law, in contrast to Nebraska law, had adopted the English
common law rule of absolute ownership in water.1 " Furthermore, the
court distinguished other "natural resource" cases as dealing with re-
sources which "have historically been market items, reducible to pri-
vate possession and freely exchangeable for value."'1 4
On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the tables turned;
the State of Nebraska was unable to overcome the Court's characteri-
zation of water as an article of commerce. The Court indicated that the
"States' interest [in water] clearly [had] an interstate dimension,"1 15
Id.
Compare other major riparian rights doctrines applicable to ground water such as
the English Rule, which "recognizes absolute ownership of ground water in the overly-
ing land owner." Douglas, 208 Neb. at 705, 305 N.W.2d at 617; and the Prior Appro-
priation Doctrine, which is a system of water law dominant in'most western states. The
basic tenets of the doctrine are priority of right (first in time, first in right) and actual
use of the water appropriated. Appropriative rights are lost by nonuse. See I R.
CLARK, WATERS AND WATER RIGHTs §§ 51.5-51.9 (1967 & Supp. 1978).
In an attempt to further control and enforce the alleged stat6 "conservation"
objectives, the Nebraska Legislature supplemented Nebraska's judicially imposed mod-
ified American reasonable use rule of ground water rights with: (1) the Nebraska stat-
ute in controversy, NEB. REv. STAT. § 46-613.01 (1978), and (2) inclusion of the
state's recognition of its conservation aims in the state constitution. See NEB. CONST.
art. XV, § 4 which reads: "The necessity of water for domestic use and for irrigation
purposes in the State of Nebraska is hereby declared to be a natural want." See Doug-
las, 208 Neb. at 706, 305 N.W.2d at 617. See also Metropolitan Utilities Dist. v.
Merritt Beach Co., 179 Neb. 783, 801, 140 N.W.2d 626, 637 (1966) in which the
Nebraska Supreme Court held it is "the right of the Legislature, unimpaired, to deter-
mine the policy of the state as to underground waters and the rights of persons in their
use."
112. 255 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1966), affd mem., 385 U.S. 35 (1966).
113. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 708-09, 305 N.W.2d at 618. "Ground water use is
not an unlimited private property right in Nebraska law." Id. Cf City of Altus v. Carr,
255 F. Supp. at 840: "[T]he general law of ... Texas ... recognizes water that has
been withdrawn from under ground sources as personal property and subject to sale
and commerce. .... "
114. Douglas, 208 Neb. at 709-10, 305 N.W.2d at 619. The court, with little
elucidation, said "water is the only natural resource absolutely essential to human sur-
vival," and therefore, rules governing the free flow of commerce in "less essential re-
sources" ought not be applied, if at all, to water. Id. at 710, 305 N.W.2d at 619.
115. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456, 3462 (1982).
5471
107
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
I 548 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
despite the State's repeated argument that water was different from
other natural resources. Justice Stevens specifically stressed the "signif-
icant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair allocation of
this diminishing resource."116
The Court was clearly not in harmony with Nebraska's persistence
that water regulation was not to be scrutinized under the auspices of
the Commerce Clause. Although the Court acknowledged and assented
to limited state regulation, particularly in the water-scarce western
states, those states were to achieve their goals of conservation and pres-
ervation within the parameters of the Constitution.117
After establishing the pertinence of the Commerce Clause, the
Court employed the Pikel1 8 test to determine the constitutionality of
the Nebraska statute. The Court agreed that conservation was a legiti-
mate local ambition, identified similar water transport restrictions in-
116. Id. at 3463 (emphasis added). The following are Justice Stevens' remarks in
their entirety:
Although water is indeed essential for human survival, studies indicate
that over 80% of our water supplies is used for agricultural purposes. The
agricultural markets supplied by irrigated farms are worldwide. They pro-
vide the archtypical example of commerce among the several States for
which the Framers of our Constitution intended to authorize federal regu-
lation. The multistate character of the Ogallala aquifer - underlying ap-
pellants' tracts of land in Colorado and Nebraska, as well as parts of
Texas, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Kansas - confirms the view that
there is a significant federal interest in conservation as well as in fair
allocation of this diminishing resource.
Id. at 3462-63 (emphasis added). "An acquifer is a geological formation or structure
that transmits water." 5 R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY 415 (1981 & Supp.
1982).
117. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3463.
But appellee's claim that Nebraska ground water is not an article of com-
merce goes too far: it would not only exempt Nebraska ground water regu-
lation from burden-on-commerce analysis, it would also curtail the affirma-
tive power of Congress to implement its own policies concerning such
regulation . . . . If Congress chooses to legislate in this area under its
commerce power, its regulation need not be more limited in Nebraska than
in Texas and States with similar property laws. Ground water overdraft is
a national problem and Congress has the power to deal with it on that
scale.
Id. (citations omitted, emphasis added).
118. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
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trastate, and yielded to Nebraska's "limited preference for its own citi-
zens in the utilization of the resource."" 9 The Sporhase Court
concluded that the first three conditions of section 46-613.01 of the Re-
vised Statutes of Nebraska - i.e., that the requested withdrawal of
ground water was to be reasonable, not contrary to conservation aims,
and not detrimental to the public welfare - did not "impermissibly
burden interstate commerce. 1 20 However, the fourth statutory require-
ment of reciprocity was declared facially discriminatory and, as such,
subject to the "strictest scrutiny." Recognizing that Colorado did not
permit the exportation of its ground water to other states, the Court
found that "the reciprocity provision operate[ed] as an explicit barrier
to commerce between the two States," and was therefore a violation of
the Commerce Clause. 21
119. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3464.
120. Id. at 3465.
121. Id. "Because of the reciprocity requirement of § 46-613.01, appellants
would not have been granted a permit had they applied for one." Id. at 3458 n.2. The
Court also stated: "We therefore are not persuaded that the reciprocity requirement -
when superimposed on the first three restrictions in the statute - significantly ad-
vances the State's legitimate conservation and preservation interest; it surely is not tai-
lored to serve that purpose." Id. at 3465. The Nebraska Supreme Court decision was
reversed and the case remanded to determine if the reciprocity provision could be sev-
ered from the statute.
Judgment of severance was issued on February 11, 1983 by the Nebraska Su-
preme Court. State ex rel. Douglas v. Sporhase, No. 43206 (Neb. S. Ct. filed Feb. 11,
1983). The court concluded that the unconstitutional reciprocity clause could be sev-
ered after consideration of the following criteria: (1) whether a "workable plan" re-
mained following severance of the unconstitutional reciprocity provision; (2) whether
the invalid reciprocity provision constituted an "inducement" to the enactment of § 46-
613.01 and the overall objectives of Chapter 46 (Irrigation), article 6 (Ground Water);
(3) whether the severance "would frustrate the intent of the [Nebraska] Legislature";
(4) whether a statement of severability was "included in the act, indicating that the
legislature would have enacted the bill absent the invalid portion." Id. at 351-52. The
court announced its decision:
An examination of Chapter 46, article 6, reveals a comprehensive ap-
proach to the conservation and beneficial use of ground water. The striking
of the provision prohibiting transfer of water to nonreciprocating states
does not weaken or otherwise impair the operation of the act. . . . The
remainder of § 46-613.01, after the unconstitutional portion is stricken,
remains a viable statute.
Id. at 352-53.
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The Court also pointed out that the Nebraska statute, particularly
the reciprocity provision, unconditionally prohibited the interstate
transfer of water even if an abundance of available water existed and
even though the most beneficial use of the resource might have existed
out-of-state. With this in mind, the Court found the only way a state
could justify its conservation-preservation program, via an absolute
statutory embargo scheme, would be to prove: (1) the entire state ex-
perienced a water shortage, (2) intrastate transportation of water from
locations of plentiful reserves to locations of scant supplies was feasible,
and (3) importation of water would compensate for the exportation of
water. Nebraska did not furnish such evidence; therefore, the reciproc-
ity provision was struck down as not reflecting a "close fit" with as-
serted state objectives. 22
Although recognizing that past cases, statutes, and interstate
agreements support Congressional deference to state water laws and
policies in some circumstances,23 the Court moreover rejected Ne-
braska's "suggestion that Congress ha[d] authorized the States to im-
pose otherwise impermissible burdens on interstate commerce in
ground water ... 24
Although the 37 statutes and the interstate compacts demonstrate
Congress' deference to state water law, they do not indicate that
Congress wished to remove federal constitutional constraints on
such state laws. The negative implications of the Commerce
Clause, like the mandates of the Fourteenth Amendment, are in-
gredients of the valid state law to which Congress has deferred.
Neither the fact that Congress has chosen not to create a federal
122. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465. Through application of the Commerce
Clause, the Court is able to check unbridled state regulation of state water resources.
123. Nebraska cited 37 statutes, particularly the 1902 Reclamation Act which in
part "mandates that questions of water rights that arise in relation to a federal project
are to be determined in accordance with state law." Id. at 3466 (emphasis ad-
ded)(citing California v. United States, 438 U.S. 645 (1978), considering whether a
state may impose conditions on the United States Department of the Interior's appro-
priation of water for a federal reclamation project). Nebraska also referred the Court
to various interstate compacts "regarding rights to surface water" as evidence of Con-
gressional deference to state water laws. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3466 (emphasis
added).
124. Id. at 3465.
1550 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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water law to govern water rights involved in federal projects, nor
the fact that Congress has been willing to let the States settle their
differences over water rights through mutual agreement, consti-
tutes persuasive evidence that Congress has consented to the unilat-
eral imposition of unreasonable burdens on commerce.125
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice O'Connor in his dissent,
pointed to turn-of-the-century case law in his attempt to bolster the
view that a state has the independent authority to manage its natural
resources.126 "In the exercise of this authority, a State may so regulate
a natural resource so as to preclude that resource from attaining the
status of an 'article of commerce' for the purposes of the negative im-
pact of the Commerce Clause. 1 27 Under the purview of Nebraska's
ground water law128 - which, according to the dissent, recognized only
a "usufructuary right"1 9 to ground water - Justice Rehnquist sug-
gested that "'[c]ommerce' [could not] exist in a natural resource that
[could not] be sold, rented, traded, or transferred, but only used ....
Nebraska so regulates ground water that it cannot be said that the
State permits any 'commerce,' intrastate or interstate, to exist in this
natural resource."130
Current Litigation and Policy
Most of what has been written regarding water transfers and
shortages has primarily concerned the western portion of the United
States.1 31 Because of the continuous attention drawn to the western
water problem, relatively little concern has been shown for the water
crises plaguing the largely populated urban centers of the eastern
states. These areas have suffered critical and alarmingly frequent
shortages which have triggered water use restrictions. 3 2
125. Id. at 3466.
126. Id. at 3468.
127. Id.
128. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
129. Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3468.
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Note, Interstate Transfer of Water: The Western Challenge to the
Commerce Clause, 59 TEx. L. REV. 1249 (1981).
132. See generally N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1982, at BI, col. 1; Canby, Our Most
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The Sporhase controversy is the tip of the iceberg, signalling fu-
ture litigation involving the access rights of arid regions versus the pro-
tectionist measures of the water-rich areas. For example, in City of El
Paso v. Reynolds,1'" the city of El Paso, Texas sued to challenge New
Mexico's absolute water "embargo" statute.134 It challenged the statute
as violative of the Commerce Clause on four grounds: (1) that New
Mexico's minimal intrastate water restrictions and regulations did not
illustrate a concern for conservation, (2) that New Mexico's regulations
Precious Resource: Water, 158-2 NATIONAL GEOGRAPHIC 144 (August 1980). To
many, Florida is seen as a tropical environment, and consequently, one assumes the
existence of an abundance of water. Few people realize Florida's grave concern for a
continued fresh water supply. This was exhibited during the severe droughts of 1980
and 1981 when Floridians witnessed the water level of Lake Okeechobee, a major de-
pository of Florida's fresh water reserves, drop to alarmingly low levels. Victoria
Tschinkel, head of the Florida Department of Environmental Regulation, has said that
the water problem:
will tear the state apart politically .... There is a tension over the reali-
zation that in the long run there will be a struggle between agricultural
and phosphate interests versus the urban areas that are growing very rap-
idly and generally . .. in areas that are running out of water. Coastal
wells are being shut down because of salt water intrusion. They'll have to
go inland, and rural areas are looking down the road when they will be
developing, and their water is already spoken for.
N.Y. Times, July 7, 1982, at A17, col. 1.
133. Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
134. The New Mexico embargo statute is as follows:
Removal of underground waters from state-
No person shall withdraw water from any underground source in New
Mexico for use in any other state by drilling a well in New Mexico and
transporting the water outside the state or by drilling a well outside the
boundaries of New Mexico and pumping water from under lands lying
within the boundaries of New Mexico; provided that nothing in this act
[72-12-18 to 72-12-21 NMSA 1978] prohibits the transportation of water
by tank truck from any underground source in New Mexico to any other
state where the water is used for exploration and drilling for oil or gas.
The owner of the well from which the water is withdrawn shall have a
duty to ascertain that the water exported is used only for the above pur-
poses and such owner shall keep and maintain accurate records of the
amount of water withdrawn and make such records available to the state
engineer of New Mexico upon request. The amount of water withdrawn
from any one well for such exportation shall never exceed three acre-feet.
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 72-12-19 (1978).
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lacked "evenhandedness," i.e., a balance between intrastate and inter-
state regulation as required under the present-day Pike analysis, (3)
that New Mexico allocated its water resources intrastate for all uses,
including so-called low priority uses, while simultaneously depriving
out-of-state users with the highest priority - economic and human
survival, and (4) that New Mexico's "absolute" restrictions were a
more obvious violation of the Constitution than Nebraska's "discretion-
ary" restrictions discussed in Sporhase.13 5
One of the major questions to be pondered in these cases is
whether the state's objectives in attempting to prevent exacerbated
water shortages could be realized through alternative methods, thereby
avoiding the alleged impact on interstate commercial activities. El Paso
suggested some possible alternatives to New Mexico's statutory
scheme: changes in the pattern of uses, improvements in irrigation effi-
ciency, desalinization projects, and importation of water, to name a
few. Furthermore, the focus ought to be when and where the water
may be put to its highest and most beneficial use."'6 In the El Paso
case, as well as in Sporhase, the time is now and the place is across
state lines for the highest and best use of water. Rather than accept
New Mexico's general assertion-that it needs to guard its water pre-
serves to offset future water shortages, El Paso responded: "To say that
at some time in the indefinite future there will be a shortage and that
this justifies the embargo is simply another way of saying that the state
should be free to restrict all water to use in-state, forever. 1 13 7
The New Mexico absolute water embargo statute was struck down
as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause:
The purpose of the embargo is to promote New Mexico's economic
advantage. Even if the purpose were conservation and preservation,
as [New Mexico] maintain[s], the embargo does not significantly
advance the conservation and preservation of water. It certainly is
not narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose and cannot survive
strict scrutiny.138
135. See Plaintiffs' Supplemental Post-Trial Brief, City of El Paso v. Reynolds,
Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
136. Id. at 21-24.
137. Id. at 27.
138. City of El Paso v. Reynolds, Civ. No. 80-730-HB, slip op. at 36 (D.N.M.
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New Mexico's intrastate water laws sustained a policy of "maxi-
mum beneficial use [which meant] putting as much water to beneficial
use as soon as possible."1 9 The court noted that El Paso is the "eco-
nomic hub of an interstate region which includes southern New Mexico
[and consequently,] the most beneficial and economically productive
use of [New Mexico's ground water] is in El Paso for the simple reason
that what is good for El Paso is good for the entire region, including
southern New Mexico."1 40
The. recent movement by the Great Lakes States to control any
diversion of water from the lakes of that region has been manifested in
a resolution1 41 forwarded to The White House. At first glance the reso-
Jan. 17, 1983).
139. Id. at 33.
140. Id. at 34.
141. Mackinac Resolution (prepared at Great Lakes Water Resources Confer-
ence, June 9-11, 1982). From June 9-11, 1982, the 1982 Great Lakes Water Resources
Conference was held at Mackinac Island, Michigan. The participant "Great Lakes
States" included Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Penn-
sylvania, Wisconsin, and the Canadian Provinces of Ontario and Quebec. The resolu-
tion regarding water "diversions" is reprinted here in its entirety. It includes an objec-
tion to any future diversion of Great Lakes water to alleviate the strains of fresh water
shortages that "already are apparent and are expected to reach major proportions in
the next decade . . ." in other parts of the United States. The resolution recognizes
"substantial increases in consumptive uses within the Basin over the next half century
to meet our own growing needs. . . . "The proposal notes the economic interest of the
participants and calls for the "concurrence" of the Great Lakes States, the United
States Federal Government, and the Federal Government of Canada and the provinces
contiguous to the Great Lakes system. Id. (emphasis added).
MACKINAC RESOLUTION
DIVERSIONS
WHEREAS, the States and Provinces in the Great Lakes Basin have been
blessed with an incomparable water resource; and
WHEREAS, increasing evidence points to severe freshwater shortages in
other parts of the United States, shortages that already are apparent
and are expected to reach major proportions in the next decade; and
WHEREAS, the search already has begun for alternative sources of water
for those regions, with support for some of that search coming from the
United States Federal Government; and
WHEREAS, the water of the Great Lakes is needed to meet the current
and future domestic, industrial, navigational, power, agricultural and
recreational needs of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region;
WHEREAS, the findings of the International Joint Commission's Great
1554 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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lution appears reasonable, because the Great Lakes States speak of
Lakes Diversions and Consumptive Uses Study Board indicates that we
will be faced with substantial increases in consumptive uses within the
Basin over the next half century to meet our own growing needs; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of water from the Great Lakes Basin to other
water basins reduces the net supply of water available to the Great
Lakes Basin and lowers lake levels; and
WHEREAS, lowered lake levels and reduction of flows in connecting
channels could result in serious losses in water supply, navigation and
recreational values causing critical economic, social and environmental
problems adverse to the people of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence
States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the wise use and development of the water resources of the
Great Lakes is essential to the economy and prosperity of the Great
Lakes and St. Lawrence States and Provinces; and
WHEREAS, the diversion of Great Lakes waters to other regions of the
United States or Canada could result in severe restrictions in the
growth and development of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence region;
and
WHEREAS, it makes far more sense for development to occur where
abundant supplies of fresh water already exist, rather than moving the
water to other regions; and
WHEREAS, we share in the responsibility for the stewardship of the tre-
mendous natural resources which the Great Lakes provide;
WHEREAS, the Boundary Waters Agreement of 1909 requires that any
change in the flows and levels of any boundary waters is subject to
approval by the federal governments of both the United States and
Canada.
NOW THEREFORE BE IT RESOLVED by the Great Lakes States and
Provinces that based on existing information they object to any new
diversion of Great Lakes water for use outside the Great Lakes States
and Provinces; and
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that no future diversions be considered
until a thorough assessment, involving all jurisdictions contiguous to the
Great Lakes System, of the impacts on navigation, power generation
environment and socio-economic development for all said jurisdictions
takes place.
BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED that any future decision on the diversion
of Great Lakes water for use outside of the Great Lakes States and
Provinces be made only with the concurrence of the Great Lakes
States, the United States Federal Government, and the Federal Gov-
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"shar[ing] in the responsibility for the stewardship of the tremendous
natural resources which the Great Lakes provide . ,," and of a
"concurrence" among the Great Lakes States, the United States Fed-
eral Government, and the Canadian Government. But the motives ac-
companying these written words align themselves with the "protection-
The Canadian Government and its provinces are included, as well as the United
States Federal Government, because of an international treaty between the United
States and Canada regarding the Great Lakes. See Boundary Water Treaty, Jan. 11,
1909, United States-Great Britain, 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548, and Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement, Nov. 22, 1978, United States-Canada 30 U.S.T. 1383,
T.I.A.S. No. 9257.
Apparently, the participants at the Great Lakes Water Resources Conference in-
tended to follow through on their commitments made at the Conference. Former Mich-
igan Governor William Milliken is now the chairman of the board of the Center for the
Great Lakes which was recently established in Chicago, Illinois. The Center, says Mil-
liken, wants to help those involved with plans for the future of the Great Lakes, partic-
ularly water diversion from the lakes, to "make their decisions on an informed basis."
69 A.B.A. J. 152 (1983).
See also H.R. 5278 proposed bill, which, if it had passed, would have prohibited
the interstate transfer or sale of water by any state part of an interstate water system
unless there was prior agreement among all the states affected. Introduced by Repre-
sentative Berkley Bedell (D-Iowa), H.R. 5278 read as follows:
A BILL
To prohibit any State from selling or otherwise transferring
interstate waters located in such State for use outside such
State unless all other States in the drainage basin of such wa-
ters consent to such sale or transfer.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That no State shall sell or oth-
erwise transfer, for use outside of such State, water which is taken from
any river or other body of surface which is located in or which passes
through more than one State or any aquifer or other body of ground water
which underlies more than one State unless-
(1) there is in effect an interstate compact (A) between the States in
the drainage basin of such river or other body of surface water, or (B)
between the affected States, in the case of such an aquifer or other body of
ground water, which governs such sale or transfer, and
(2) all the States which are parties to such compact consent to sucfi
sale or transfer.
H.R. 5278, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
142. Mackinac Resolution supra note 141.
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ist" camp. 143 It is precisely this type of proposed "constituent
legislation" which feeds the controversy, promotes self-regard, and of-
fers little toward easing the tension between those who have and those
who do not have.
In addition to current litigation and policy concerns on the subject
of interstate transfer of water, it is important to note The National
Water Commission's Report to the President."" Its report, upon the
termination of its study of the nation's water policies in 1973, sug-
gested that Congress and the States look at various factors when ap-
proaching the issue of interstate transfer of water necessary to satisfy
the justified needs of those deprived. Among the considerations men-
tioned were local, regional, and national economic development, the
need to put water to its highest and best use, federal aid, environmental
concerns, and an equitable compensation system for the exporting
state.1,45 Unfortunately, balancing these concerns remains a difficult
task.
Conclusion
The Sporhase4 6 case has not entirely settled the issue of interstate
transfer of ground water. The United States Supreme Court, under the
Pike1 47 test, has sustained the constitutionality of the first three condi-
tions of section 46-613.01 of the Revised Statutes of Nebraska 48 _
143. As staff aide to former Michigan Governor William Milliken, William Rus-
tern explained the region's position:
We fully anticipate that one of the Western States will challenge our con-
tention that the Great Lakes belong to the states that surround them and
are not a national resource that can be tapped into by any state.
... Due to the population shift to the West and Southwest, the political
power in Congress is shifting .... When these areas really start hurting
for water, the obvious political solution will be to pipe more water. We
want to be ready for that.
Quade, Water Wars Predicted in a Thirsty Nation, 68 A.B.A. J. 1067 (1982).
144. NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, WATER POLI-
CiES FOR THE FUTURE (1973).
145. Id. at 317-33.
146. Sporhase v. Nebraska, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
147. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). For text of the Pike
test, see supra text accompanying note 104.
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i.e., that the requested withdrawal of ground water be reasonable, not
contrary to Nebraska's conservation aims, and not detrimental to the
public welfare. Joy Sporhase and Delmer Moss must still, therefore,
apply for a permit from Nebraska's Director of Water Resources
before withdrawing ground water from their well, for irrigation of their
Nebraska and Colorado land. In effect, the permit will be issued at the
discretion of the Director of Water Resources dependent upon his eval-
uation of the request guided by the statutory conditions. Consequently,
Sporhase and Moss could conceivably be denied the permit, thus pro-
hibited from withdrawing quantities of ground water for their irrigation
needs. 149
All water embargo statutes classified as either absolute embargoes
or as embargoes triggered by the reciprocity requirement, 15 0 should be
eliminated as facially discriminatory legislation, and therefore uncon-
stitutional. The discretionary water embargo statutes, similar to the
Nebraska statute in Sporhase without the reciprocity provision, should
be scrutinized under the force of the Pike Commerce Clause balancing
test which was employed in Sporhase.'5 ' Although the Pike test fo-
cused on the effect of state legislation on interstate commerce balanced
by "evenhanded" intrastate regulation, it is mandatory to recognize
and incorporate into the balancing formula the individual, economic,
and survival interests at stake.
The Supreme court in Sporhase declared water an article of com-
merce thereby triggering Commerce Clause analysis. However, water
must also be appreciated and dealt with as an essential natural re-
source, and as such, "constituent legislation" which hinders its reasona-
108 for statute in its entirety.
149. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3469 n.3 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For this
very reason, all discretionary water embargo statutes must provide an appellate proce-
dure for those denied a permit.
150. For examples of the various water embargo statutes, see ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 45-153 (Supp. 1982-83); CAL. WATER CODE § 1230 (Deering 1977); COLO.
REV. STAT. §§ 101-103 (Supp. 1982); IDAHO CODE §§ 401-410 (1977); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 82a-726 (1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 85-1-121 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. §§
533.515-533.524 (1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:IA-5 (1982); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 72-
12-18, 72-12-19 (1978); OR. REV. STAT. § 537.810 (1977); UTAH CODE ANN. § 73-2-8
(1981); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 90.03.300, 90.16.110, 90.16.120 (1962); Wyo.
STAT. § 41-3-115 (1977).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 117-22.
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ble use should be eliminated. There exists a fear that without water
"embargo" statutes, unchecked withdrawal and subsequent transfer of
ground water out-of-state will lead to an uncontrolled and rapid deple-
tion of water reserves. In the most recent statement on this issue, the
court in City of El Paso v. Reynolds152 mollified this fear: "The ab-
sence of an embargo statute will not create havoc in New Mexico's
system of ground water regulation. It will not result in unrestricted out-
of-state use or uncontrolled transfers of water. Interstate usage of
water can be restricted and controlled to the same extent as intrastate
usage." 153
Water, as both a natural resource and an article of commerce, is
needed for life. It is needed by individuals to pursue their livelihood.
"[A] State's interest in its resources must yield when . . . it interferes
with a nonresident's right to pursue a livelihood in a State other than
his own, a right protected by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of
the Constitution."' Water is needed by communities throughout the
nation to foster and sustain economic growth. The Sporhase balancing
approach is clearly a step toward mitigating the controversy. Beyond
Sporhase and the declaration that absolute and reciprocal water em-
bargo statutes are unconstitutional, however, interstate compacts 55 to
govern in the area of interstate ground water transfer between states
may become necessary. These agreements will be especially applicable,
for example, to those states which overlie an interstate acquifer.158 Un-
til sporadic water shortages, surface water pollution, acid rain, and
conservation of water resources can be effectively managed, fresh
ground water reserves will continue to be tapped as an alternative
152. Civ. No. 80-730-HB (D.N.M. Jan. 17, 1983).
153. Id. slip op. at 31 (emphasis added).
154. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436 U.S. 371, 386 (1978).
155. See supra note 5 for a discussion of interstate compacts.
156. The Ogallala aquifer, from which Sporhase and Moss were withdrawing
ground water, has a "multistate character" and underlies land in parts of Colorado,
Kansas, Nebraska, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at
3463 (1982) (footnote omitted). It would seem that those states which overlie the same
aquifer or ground water depository would desire the opportunity to design an interstate
compact to govern ground water withdrawal among those states. Six independent
ground water withdrawal policies and prohibitions, particularly in the case of the Ogal-
lala aquifer which underlies six states, accomplishes little toward achieving equitably
balanced withdrawals.
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source of water supply.
This note recommends the employment of interstate compacts to
govern in the area of interstate ground water transfer, similar to the
compacts initiated in the area of surface water diversions. 157 Moreover,
the surface water interstate compacts which currently contain dormant
ground water transfer provisions, 158 ought to be reviewed, amended,
and activated to avoid future conflict. The interstate compact is one
step shy of promoting a uniform federal water policy which would spe-
cifically administer the interstate transfer of ground water. Although a
national policy may seem feasible in order to terminate fifty indepen-
dent state policies which may not be in harmony with the national wel-
fare, the interstate compact enables the states to retain authority and
control in their area of expertise - local water management. The in-
terstate compact incorporates the federal component with the participa-
tion of a federal representative in the negotiation process between
states.10 9 Furthermore, Congressional consenting legislation, with or
without modification, is generally required under the United States
Constitution. l60 A uniform national policy presents the problem of the
extent to which the federal government would carve out the law and
place itself in the area of interstate water transfer, thereby impinging
on the traditional deference to state and local water management.16 1
Moreover, a federal policy would need to accommodate the various re-
gional interests and factors including the disparity in geography, cli-
mate, and consumptive use.16
The fact that two farmers were threatened with a shutdown of
their irrigation system because they were withdrawing ground water
from a neighboring state, is a signal to reevaluate the nation's water
laws and promote the sharing of our natural resources. This note illus-
157. See discussion supra note 5.
158. See, e.g., Susquehanna River Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 91-575, 84 Stat.
1509, § 11.1 at 1523 (1970). This note does not assert that this particular compact's
ground water provision is dormant. Rather, citation is made as an example of a ground
water provision in an interstate compact.
159. See discussion supra note 5.
160. See discussion supra note 5.
161. See Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3465-66.
162. See generally Sporhase, 102 S. Ct. at 3462 n.13 (1982)(citing California v.
United States, 438 U.S. 645, 648 (1978)).
1560 Nova Law Journal
7:19831
120
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
trates precisely the type of "warring" between the states that the Com-
merce Clause and the Constitution sought to prevent:
In [interstate commerce], instead of the states, a new power ap-
pears and a new welfare, a welfare which transcends that of any
State. . . .[L]et us say it is constituted of the welfare of all of the
States, and that of each State is made greater by a division of its
resources, natural and created, with every other State, and those of
every other State with it. This was the purpose, as it is the result,
of the interstate commerce clause of the Constitution of the United
States.163
As Justice Cardozo has said, the Constitution "was framed upon the
theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together,
and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not
division."'
Gary S. Betensky
163. West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255 (1911).
164. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523 (1935).
5611Water Transfer17:1983
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IThe Products Liability Statute of Repose in Florida:
A Trap for the Unwary
Introduction
In the past two decades there has been an explosion of product
liability lawsuits1 brought against manufacturers of defective goods2
1. The number of products liability lawsuits being filed in district courts in-
creased 134% between 1974 and 1976 (from 1,579 to 3,696). UNITED STATES DEPART-
MENT OF COMMERCE, INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON PRODUCT LIABILITY, FINAL RE-
PORT, 11-44 (1977) [hereinafter cited as FINAL REPORT], cited in Donnelly, Date-of-
Sale Statutes of Limitation: An Effective Means of Implementing Change in Products
Liability Law?, 30 CASE W. RES. 123, 123 n.1 (1979).
In April of 1976, the economic Policy Board of the White House established the
Interagency Task Force to investigate widespread claims by the manufacturing indus-
try that products liability insurance had become so unavailable or unaffordable that the
situation had reached "crisis" proportions. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 4B at 1-64, -65 (1980). In January, 1977, the Task Force published a
Briefing Report which concluded that there was no crisis. Id. at 1-65. The Task Force
published its Final Report on November 1, 1977. Id. at 1-65. Three main reasons were
cited as the main causes of higher products liability insurance rates: "[1] the ratemak-
ing procedures of insurers, [2] the production of unsafe products, and [3] uncertainties
as to how [products liability law] is developing." Id. at 1-65.
2. A "product liability claim" includes:
any claim or action brought for harm caused by the manufacture, produc-
tion, making, construction, fabrication, design, formula, preparation, as-
sembly, installation, testing, warnings, or instructions, marketing, packag-
ing, storage, or labelling of the relevant product. It includes, but is not
limited to, any action previously based on: strict liability in tort; negli-
gence; breach of express or implied warranty; breach of, or failure to dis-
charge a duty to warn or instruct, whether negligent or innocent; misrepre-
sentation, concealment or nondisclosure, whether negligent or innocent; or
under any other substantive legal theory.
MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 102(D), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg.
62,714, 62,717 (1979) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]. For a summary of the repose
period proposed by the MODEL ACT, see infra note 18. The function of product liability
law "is to shift the cost of an accident from a claimant to a defendant when the latter
is deemed 'responsible' for the claimant's injuries." MODEL ACT, 44 Fed. Reg. at
62,715 (1979).
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due to increased manufacturers' exposure to liability.' This phenome-
non, referred to as the "product liability revolution," 4 has expanded
manufacturers' liability and facilitated recovery for injured plaintiffs
for product-caused injuries.
The manufacturing industry has responded with attempts to limit
their liability resulting in legislative enactment of statutes of repose.
Statutes of repose are limitations of actions which eliminate the manu-
facturer's liability after a specified time from manufacture or sale of
the product, rather than from the date of discovery of the defect. This
3. The Florida Supreme Court recently adopted the doctrine of strict liability as
stated by the American Law Institute in its RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80, 87 (Fla. 1976). For the text of §
402A, see infra note 8.
Others besides manufacturers have been adversely affected by recent developments
in products liability law. Even non-negligent wholesalers, distributors and retailers of a
defective product can be held strictly liable for injuries caused by a defective product.
West, 336 So. 2d 80; Adobe Bldg. Centers, Inc. v. Reynolds, 403 So. 2d 1033 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See also Futch v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 391 So. 2d 808 (Fla.
5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (where the court held that a lessor of a defective truck could
be held strictly liable for resulting injuries caused by the defect). This so-called "tech-
nical" or "constructive" liability constitutes a cause of action for common law indem-
nity in the amount of any damages, reasonable attorney's fees, costs and expenses
against the manufacturer for breach of its contractual duty to supply the wholesaler,
distributor or retailer with a product reasonably safe for its intended purposes. Insur-
ance Co. of North America v. King, 340 So. 2d 1175 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
See also Pender v. Skillcraft Indus., Inc., 358 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978)
(retailers, and presumably wholesalers and distributors, are likewise entitled to indem-
nity for attorney's fees and costs when they have merely been passively negligent and
successfully defend themselves in the main action); Burbage v. Boiler Eng'g & Supply
Co., 249 A.2d 563 (Pa. 1969) (where manufacturer strictly liable for defective replace-
ment component part was found to be entitled to indemnity from component part man-
ufacturer). There will be a different result if the party claiming the indemnity is him-
self negligent or is vicariously responsible for the negligence of another person which
contributed to causing the injuries. Dura Corp. v. Wallace, 297 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1963); see also Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1979)
("[iJndemnity can only be applied where the liability of the person seeking indemnity is
solely constructive or derivative and only against one who, because of his act, has
caused such constructive liability to be imposed"). Since the liability issue under dis-
cussion is most acute for manufacturers, reference will generally be made to them.
4. Martin, A Statute of Repose For Product Liability Claims, 50 FORDHAM L.
REV. 745, 745 (1982).
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note will consider the provisions, function and practical application of
this type of legislation, and explore the ramifications associated with
their implementation.
Evolution of the Products Liability Statute of Repose
Due to the dramatic increase in products liability litigation in re-
cent years, manufacturer's liability for products released into the
stream of commerce has been expanded on several distinct fronts. First,
the number of persons who may sue has increased because the privity
requirement has been relaxed for causes of action not sounding in neg-
ligence. 5 Florida courts can now recognize liability of a manufacturer
who sells a product in a defective condition which is deemed unreason-
ably dangerous to the user, consumer or innocent bystander.' In 1931,
Judge Cardozo sounded the alarm that "[t]he assault upon the citadel
of privity" was proceeding apace.
Second, the creation of strict liability' and the creative application
of the various warranty theories complementing the traditional com-
5. Matthews v. Lawnlite Co., 88 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 1956). Prior to this decision,
Florida recognized the early common law rule which inhibited recovery where there
was no privity of contract. Id. at 300-01.
6. West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
7. Ultramares Corporation v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 180, 174 N.E. 441, 445
(1931). See also Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REV. 791 (1966) [here-
inafter cited as Prosser, The Fall]; Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel, 69 YALE
L.J. 1099 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser, The Assault].
8. W. PROSSER, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably
dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability
for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to
his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepa-
ration and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
565 1
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mon law negligence theories' have greatly increased the likelihood of
recovery by victims of defective products.10 Astute plaintiffs' attorneys
commonly plead negligence, breach of implied warranty and strict lia-
bility theories alternatively, and overcome previously insurmountable
hurdles to recovery through the use of variations inherent in each of
these theories. The once-popular doctrine of caveat emptor seems to
have little utility in the present age of highly sophisticated products,
when consumers are forced to rely upon the specialized knowledge and
competence of manufacturers."'
In addition, there has been a flood of products liability lawsuits in
recent years following each revelation of another toxic man-made prod-
uct, whch was not previously suspected of having a toxic tendency. 2
Typically, the injury or affliction caused by exposure to this type of
defective product remains latent for many years. The effects of the de-
fective product during this dormant period often lack discernible symp-
toms, even to the medical profession. The peculiarities associated with
9. In Royal v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 205 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968), the court acknowledged the existence of 29 separate recovery theories related to
products liability. Id. at 309 (citing Prosser, The Assault at 1124 (1960)).
10. This is especially true under a theory of strict liability, which has a lesser
burden of proof than negligence or warranty theories. See generally, Parks, Watts-
FitzGerald, & Watts-FitzGerald, Products Liability, 33 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1185
(1979).
11. For a general discussion, see Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without
Fault and the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855 (1963).
12. For example, the quantity of asbestosis, Dalcon Shield (birth control device)
and synthetic estrogen drug diethylstilbestrol (commonly known as DES) products lia-
bility lawsuits is staggering. It is estimated that in February, 1980 there were more
than 3,000 asbestosis cases pending nationally and over 500,000 more individuals "at
risk." Practicing Law Institute seminar in New York City on Toxic Substances Litiga-
tion, reported in 8 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 142 (1980). In a class action
consolidating 1,500 Dalcon Shield cases, a United States District Court noted that
compensatory damages claimed in the action were "well over $500 million and punitive
damages, which combined, far exceeded the net worth of the IUD manufacturer." In re
"Dalcon Shield" I.U.D. Products Liability Litigation (N.D. Cal. June 25, 1981), re-
ported in 9 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 570, 570 (1981). Lastly, it was estimated
in July, 1980, that there were approximately 1,000 lawsuits pending against DES man-
ufacturers for cancerous vaginal abnormalities found in the daughters of the mothers
who ingested this prescription drug to prevent miscarriages between 1947 and 1971.
Rodgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A. J. 827 (1980).
13. This is probably best illustrated in the DES cases, where prenatally exposed
1 566 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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products with latent defects present many problems with the applica-
tion of statutes of limitations for bringing such actions. Most notably is
the often long time-lag between exposure to the defective product and
discovery of the defect. Hence, the duration of the manufacturer's re-
sponsibility to answer for product-related injuries has increased because
persons more remote in the privity chain-and even persons outside of
it-are permitted to sue many years after the delivery of the defective
product.
As a result of the manufacturer's increased exposure to liability
for defective products," insurers impose corresponding increases in pre-
miums for product liability insurance. 15 Manufacturers view this in-
crease as the result of more frequent product liability litigation and
higher damage awards." Consequently; the manufacturing industry na-
tionwide wages a vigorous lobbying campaign to convince legislators
and consumers that there is a need to "reform" current product liabil-
ity laws. Their goal is to reduce the costs associated with insurance
coverage and products liability litigation."7
Possibly the most notable result of the manufacturing industry's
efforts is the enactment of repose legislation by a number of states,"8
daughters of mothers who took the drug often do not develop abnormal symptoms until
sometime after puberty. Researchers wre trying to establish whether sons of mothers
who ingested DES were having infertility problems as late as 1980. The lack of empiri-
cal data may delay such a revelation another ten years or longer. For a well-researched
reference to products with latent defects, especially in the medical field, see Stevenson,
Products Liability and the Virginia Statute of Limitations-A Call for the Legislative
Rescue Squad, 16 U. RICH. L. REV. 323 (1982).
14. See Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1979),
where the Florida Supreme Court rejected the "patent danger" or "open and obvious
hazard" doctrine and held:
the obviousness of the hazard is not an exception to liability on the part of
the manufacturer but rather is a defense by which the manufacturer may
show that the plaintiff did not exercise a reasonable degree of care as re-
quired by the circumstances. We also conclude that the principles of com-
parative negligence apply where this defense is raised.
Id. at 1167.
15. FINAL REPORT, cited in Donnelly, supra note 1, at 124.
16. Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of
Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663, 663 (1978).
17. FINAL REPORT, cited in Donnelly, supra note 1, at 125 n.7.
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including Florida,19 terminating a manufacturer's responsibility after a
specified time elapses after delivery of the product to its original pur-
tured product is first put to use"); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-551 (1982) ("twelve
years after the product was first sold"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-403(3)
(Supp. 1982) ("[t]en years after a product is first sold . . . it shall be rebuttably pre-
sumed that the product was not defective"); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-577a(a)
(West Supp. 1982) ("ten years from the date that such party last parted with posses-
sion or control of the product"); GA. CODE ANN. § 105-106(b)(2) (Supp. 1982) ("10
years from the date of the first sale"); IDAHO CODE § 6-1403 (Michie Supp. 1982)
("ten (10) years after time of delivery, a presumption arises that ... the useful safe
life had expired"); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 83, § 22.2(b) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982-1983)
("12 years from the date of first sale, lease or delivery .. by a seller or 10 years from
the date of first sale, lease or delivery to its initial user"); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-5
(West Supp. 1982) ("ten (10) years after the delivery of the product"); 4A KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-513(b) (1976) ("ten (10) years beyond the time of the act giving rise to the
cause of action"); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.310(1) (Michie Supp. 1982) (non-defec-
tive presumption arises "five (5) years after the date of sale. ..or more than eight (8)
years after the date of manufacture"); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 600.5805(9) (West
Supp. 1982-1983) (after ten years, plaintiff must prove his prima facie case without the
benefit of any presumptions); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.03 (West Supp. 1983) ("expi-
ration of the ordinary useful life of the product"); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-224(2) (Cum.
Supp. 1982) ("ten years after the date when the product. . . was first sold or leased");
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-D:2(II) (Supp. 1979) ("12 years after the manufacturer
• ..parted with its possession and control or sold it, whichever occurred last"); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 1-50(6) (Supp. 1981) ("six -years after the date of initial purchase");
N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-02 (Supp. 1981) ("ten years of the date of initial
purchase . . . or within eleven years of the date of manufacture"); OR. REV. STAT. §
30.905(1) (1979) ("eight years after the date on which the product was first pur-
chased"); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-13(b) (Michie Supp. 1982) ("ten (10) years after the
date the product was first purchased"); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 15-2-12.1 (Supp.
1982) ("six years after the date of delivery"); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-103 (1980)
("ten years from the date on which the product was first purchased . . . or within one
(1) year after the expiration of the anticipated life . . ., whichever is shorter"); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-15-3 (1977) ("six years after the date of initial purchase. . . or ten
years after the date of manufacture"); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.060 (Supp.
1983-84) ("after the product's 'useful safe life' had expired," which is presumed to be
"twelve years after the time of delivery"); see also MODEL ACT, supra note 2, 44 Fed.
Reg. at 62,732 (where a uniform repose period ending at the expiration of a product's
"useful safe life" is proposed, and a rebuttable presumption arises ten years after deliv-
ery that the product's useful safe life had expired).
19. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981) ("within 12 years after the date of delivery").
As of January, 1982, twenty-two states had adopted "statutes of repose", or statutes of
limitations which operate from the act or omission complained of, therefore serving as
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chaser. This type of statute is commonly known as a "statute of
repose".
A statute of repose is distinguishable from a statute of limitation,
which "ordinarily begins to run when there has been a breach of an
obligation."20 A statute of limitation serves to place a time limit on the
plaintiff's right to bring an action for recovery of a loss caused by a
breach.21 On the other hand, a statute of repose limits the duration that
the manufacturer's obligation remains outstanding, and, therefore, the
obligation owed by the manufacturer "exists only during the statutory
period." 22 Thus, injuries which occur after the running of the statute of
repose cannot, theoretically, be the subject of successful lawsuits, since
the manufacturer's obligation to pay for the injury has since expired.
The practical difference between these two distinct types of limita-
tions lies in the fact that the statute of limitation implicitly seeks to
punish those plaintiffs who "sleep on their rights," while the statute of
repose operates to bar some plaintiffs' actions no matter how diligent
they have been in asserting their claims.23 It appears necessary, there-
fore, to analyze the reasoning supporting a statute of repose which
could limit or extinguish the rights of even the most prudent and dili-
gent plaintiffs.
The usefulness and practical need for a statute of repose is difficult
to discern. Through recent developments in products liability litigation
and the "products liability revolution," manufacturers were suddenly
faced with the possibility of perpetual liability for defects in the prod-
ucts they produced many years before. As one commentator put it, the
public "which has been persuaded to buy with enthusiasm is just as
eager to impose liability if the product [causes] harm. '24 In response,
manufacturer's argue that statutes of repose protect both the courts
and the defendants against the possibility of litigating claims from old
product-caused injuries, which necessitate proof by stale or often un-
statutes of repose. Martin, A Statute of Repose for Product Liability Claims, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 745, 749 n.25 (1982).
20. See Martin, supra note 19, at 749.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Comment, Limitation of Action Statutes for Architects and Build-
ers-Blueprints for Non-Action, 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 361, 377-79 (1969).
24. 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, supra note 1, § 1 at 1-6 (1980).
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available evidence.
The expense of litigating older claims is more costly, even when
the defendant-manufacturer prevails. 25 Often, records and witnesses
are difficult to obtain. Manufacturers contend that this cost increase is
ultimately born by consumers, through higher prices. Indeed, the policy
reasons supporting repose and avoiding stale claims are strong. Manu-
facturers also argue that there is a greater likelihood that older prod-
ucts have been misused or subjected to modification. In addition, there
is also a real chance that the jury might wrongly evaluate a product's
"defective" nature by unwittingly comparing today's standards, rather
than the state of the art existing in the industry at the time of
manufacture.26
Statutes of repose also provide the manufacturer with a reasonable
standard from which they can predict potential liability. Thus, a manu-
facturer may plan for future tort liability, or at least designate certain
funds to cover the cost of product liability insurance premiums which
theoretically will be lower due to decreased exposure to liability.27
However, all of the factors supporting statutes of repose tend to
prejudice defendants with the passage of time.
Application of the "Ultimate Repose" in Florida
Sensing a need for reform-the probable consequence of the vari-
ous manufacturing industry lobbying efforts-beginning in 1974, the
Florida Legislature extensively amended chapter 95 of the Florida
25. The cost of investigating and processing claims is obviously greater when
records and witnesses take longer to assemble, such as in proving or defending allega-
tions that an old product is defective.
26. See MODEL AcT, supra note 2, 44 Fed. Reg. at 62,734; Comment, Statutes
of Repose in Products Liability: The Assault Upon the Citadel of Strict Liability, 23
S.D.L. REV. 149, 171 (1978).
27. There is at least one recent decision which indicates that empirical data has
shown that statutes of repose cut down consumer's remedies without reducing insur-
ance costs or increasing the availability of products liability issurance for business. See
Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996 (Ala. 1982). "To say that
barring claims involving products that have been used for more than 10 years will
eradicate and ease the cost increases in consumer prices and product liability insurance
is unreasonable in our opinion." Id. at 1001; see also 25 ATLA L. REP. at 295 (Sept.
1982).
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Statutes, which governs the time limitations for bringing suit. 8 In per-
tinent part, section 95.11 now provides:
[a]ctions other than for recovery for real property shall be com-
menced as follows:
(3) Within four years.-
(a) An action founded on negligence.
(e) An action for injury to a person founded on the design, manu-
facture, distribution, or sale of personal property that is not perma-
nently incorporated in an improvement to real property, including
all fixtures. .... 19
Further, section 95 of the Florida Statutes mandates that actions
for products liability brought under section 95.11(3):
must be begun within the period prescribed in this chapter, with
the period running from the time the facts giving rise to the cause
of action were discovered or should have been discovered with the
exercise of due diligence, instead of running from any date pre-
scribed elsewhere in subsection (3) of s. 95.11, but in any event
within 12 years after the date of delivery of the completed product
to its original purchaser . . ., regardless of the date the defect in
the product . . was or should have been discovered.30
Therefore, the Florida Legislature chose to supplement the tradi-
tional "4 year from the date of injury" limitation by tacking on a maxi-
mum specified time within which products liability actions must be
brought-a "12 year from the date of delivery" limitation. Statutes of
repose for products liability actions, such as this one in Florida, have
thus far been adopted in twenty-three jurisdictions.$1
28. 1975 Fla. Laws 74-382. These revisions became effective on January 1, 1975.
29. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(a), (e) (1981).
30. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981) (emphasis added).
31. For a list of these "date of sale" or "date of delivery" statute of limitation
jurisdictions, see supra notes 18-19. In early 1980, the 22 states that had enacted prod-
uct liability statutes of repose at that time provided the law for 34% of personal injury
and 38% of property damage claims in the product liability area. See, Martin, supra
note 19, at 759 n.80.
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Traditionally, statutes of limitations employed in tort actions do
not begin running uhtil the injury itself is sustained. 2 Section 95.031
of the Florida Statutes states that "[e]xcept as provided in subsection
(2) . .. , the time within which an action shall be begun under any
statute of limitations runs from the time the cause of action accrues. 3
Recent developments in the area of products liability, however, have
generated a "discovery rule," wherein the statutory period begins run-
ning "from the time the facts giving rise to the cause of action were
discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due
diligence. ... 4
Viewing the applicable Florida Statutes together, a person injured
by a defective product in Florida could bring an action against the
manufacturer within four years from the date they discovered (or
should have discovered) that the cause of their injury was the defective
product.3 5 This statutory period of four years would not, therefore, nec-
essarily begin running at the date of injury if discovery of the defect
was not until a later date. If the action involves a product with a latent
defect, the four year period "runs from the date the defect is discovered
or should have been discovered. ' 3s However, the statute of repose states
that no action would be permitted which was filed after 12 years from
32. Note, Developments in the Law: Statutes of Limitations, 63 HARV. L. REV.
1178, 1185 (1949).
33. FLA. STAT. § 95.031 (1981).
34. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981). A statute of limitations begins to run "when
there has been notice of an invasion of the legal right of the plaintiff" or when a person
has first "been put on notice of his right to a cause of action." City of Miami v. Brooks,
70 So. 2d 306, 309 (Fla. 1954). See also Nardone v. Reynolds, 508 F.2d 660 (5th Cir.
1975); Creviston v. General Motors Corp., 225 So. 2d 331 (Fla. 1969); Lund v. Cook,
354 So. 2d 940 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Buck v. Mouradian, 100 So. 2d 70 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1958). For the most part, the time at which a plaintiff's cause of
action accrues is deemed to be the time at which the injury was sustained.
35. FLA. STAT. §§ 95.031 (1981) and 95.11(3) (1981).
36. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 357 So. 2d 401, 402 (Fla. 1978). However,
there has been at least one decision which determined that the "accrual date" of the
statute of limitations began on the date of injury, and was apparently unaffected by the
plaintiff's lack of knowledge at that time of the product's defect which had caused the
injury. Walker v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 320 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975)
(where a Florida two year wrongful death statute of limitations barred an action
brought 35 months after plaintiff's decedent's death).
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the date of delivery of the product.3 As a matter of substantive law,
this statute of repose imposes an outside cut-off date beyond which no
lawsuit may be instituted, irrespective of the accrual date of the cause
of action.38
The arguments against the implementation of such a statute of
repose in products liability cases center on three principal bases: due
process, equal protection and state constitutional provisions which
guarantee access to the courts. The very heart of the due process argu-
ment is that a statute of repose, which cuts off the manufacturer's lia-
bility after a specified time has passed, deprives an injured person of a
cause of action for his injuries.39 However strong this argument may
seem to be, it has enjoyed little or no success. The courts have consist-
ently agreed that the legislature may limit, or in fact, abolish, a right
of access to the courts for redress for a particular injury under certain
circumstances. "The legislature unquestionably has the power to
shorten statutes of limitation, which are part of the remedial law of the
state."' 0 "[W]here mere inchoate rights are concerned, depending for
their original existence on the law itself, they are subject to be abridged
37. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981).
38. By way of illustration, graph (a) depicts no statute of repose (manufacturers'
perpetual liability) and graph (b) depicts a 12 year statute of repose, such as in Florida




Years from Delivery (12) Years from Delivery (12)
39. See, e.g., Hill v. Forrest & Cotton, Inc., 555 S.W.2d 145, 149 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977).
40. Carpenter v. Florida Cent. Credit Union, 369 So. 2d 935, 937 (Fla. 1979).
573[1
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or modified by law.""
However, Florida's statute of repose does not provide for an exten-
tion of the limitation period for someone injured shortly before the ex-
piration period. It follows that the argument for a due process violation
becomes stronger as an individual's limitation period becomes shorter.
This arbitrary aspect of the statute would presumably cause a court to
hold it unconstitutional as applied to an individual who was injured on
the last day of the twelve-year period. The author's proposal is to sup-
plement Florida's statute of repose with a savings clause which provides
for those injuries occurring near the expiration of the twelve-year
period:
but in any event within 12 years after the date of delivery of the
completed product to its original purchaser . . ., regardless of the
date the defect in the product. . . was or should have been discov-
ered, except that, if the cause of action accrues more than 11 years
but not more than 12 years after the initial delivery, the action
may be commenced at any time within one year after the cause of
action accrues.
With respect to equal protection challenges, courts must inquire
whether the statute of repose has established "a classification which
has no rational relation to a proper state objective. '42 "A statute of
limitation does not deny equal protection if it is based on a rational
distinction among classes of persons,' ' 43 and rests on "some difference
that bears a just and reasonable relation to the statute in respect to
which the classification is proposed."' 44 Since the scope of the product
liability statute of repose in Florida theoretically creates a classification
which is congruent with the class of persons whose liability is intended
to be limited-all plaintiffs filing suit after the statutory period has
run-and the statute treats differently persons in different circum-
stances," it has thus far withstood equal protection challenges.' 6
41. Hart v. Bostwick, 14 Fla. 162, 180 (1872); see also Kluger v. White, 281 So.
2d 1 (Fla. 1973) and the text accompanying footnote 55.
42. Purk v. Federal Press Co., 387 So. 2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1980).
43. Id. at 357.
44. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 264 (Fla. 1976).
45. Compare Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons, 369 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1979),
with Bauld, 357 So. 2d 401. See also Purk, 387 So. 2d at 357-58.
1574 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
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The Florida Constitution, however, guarantees that "[tihe courts
shall be open to every person for redress of any injury. . . . "4 Thus,
relying heavily upon this constitutional mandate, the Florida Supreme
Court recently declared unconstitutional a statute of repose which,
when applied, presented an absolute bar to the courts. 8 Section
95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes'9 absolutely barred suits for con-
struction defects brought against contractors more than twelve years
after the construction which produced the injury was completed. The
court in Overland Construction Co. v. Sirmons"° held that the statute
violated the right of access to the courts guaranteed by Article 1, Sec-
tion 21 of the Constitution of the State of Florida, as applied to persons
who are injured after the expiration of the twelve-year statute of repose
period.51
The Overland court reasoned that if such a statute of repose were
given effect to provide absolute immunity to responsible parties after
the statutory period, the injured plaintiff's cause of action would al-
ready be "barred by the twelve year limitation when it first ac-
crued-that is, when his injuries occurred. 52 Consequently, "[n]o judi-
cial forum would ever have been available to [such plaintiffs] if the
46. Purk, 387 So. 2d at 357-58.
47. FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 21. Thirty-seven other state constitutions contain "ac-
cess to the courts" guarantees. 25 ATLA L. REP. 295 (Sept. 1982).
48. Overland, 369 So. 2d 572. The question of interpretation and the constitu-
tionality of a statute is a question of law for the court. City of St. Petersburg v. Austin,
355 So. 2d 486 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1978). When deciding the constitutionality of a
statute which operates to limit the amount of time a claimant has to bring her action,
the court should determine whether that party was afforded a reasonable time in which
to act before being barred under the applicable statute. See Atchafalaya Land Co. v.
F.B. Williams Cypress Co., 258 U.S. 190 (1922); Buck v. Triplett, 159 Fla. 772, 32 So.
2d 753 (1947); Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So. 2d 125 (1941).
49. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(c) (1975). The portion of this statute most germane to
our discussion provided that no action founded on the alleged defective design, planning
or construction of an improvement to real property shall be brought against the profes-
sional engineer, registered architect, or licensed contractor after 12 years from the
completion of the improvements which produced the injury. The present section
95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes provides for a 15 year limitation. FLA. STAT. §
95.11(3)(c) (1981).
50. 369 So. 2d 572.
51. Id. at 575.
52. Id.
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. . . prohibitory portion of the statute were given effect. 53 In reaching
this conclusion, the Overland court quoted the earlier Florida Supreme
Court decision of Kluger v. White,M which held:
[t]he legislature is without power to abolish such a right without
providing a reasonable alternative to protect the rights of the peo-
ple of the State to redress for injuries, unless the Legislature can
show an overpowering public necessity for the abolishment of such
a right, and no alternative method . . . can be shown.55
The Overland court labored to distinguish its earlier decision in
Bauld v. J. A. Jones Construction Co. 56 which appears, at first glance,
to be in direct conflict with the holding in Overland. In Bauld, the
court sustained the very provision that the Overland court deemed un-
constitutional as applied.57 The distinction, however, rests in the fact
that the plaintiff in Bauld was not absolutely denied access to the
courts as was the plaintiff in Overland.58
In Bauld, the plaintiff's injury occurred two and one-half years
prior to the enactment of the applicable statute of repose.59 At the time
of the enactment, the plaintiff's cause of action would have been barred
by the twelve-year statute of repose because the allegedly defective
construction had been completed more than twelve years before."0
However, section 95.022 of the Florida Statutes provides a "savings
clause", which states that any action that would be barred on January
1, 1975, the effective date of the statute of repose, may be brought
53. Id.
54. Kluger, 281 So. 2d 1.
55. Overland, 369 So. 2d at 573 (quoting Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1, 4 (Fla.
1973)). Kluger is regarded as "[t]he polestar decision for the construction of [article 1,
section 21 of the Constitution of the State of Florida]." Overland, 369 So. 2d at 573.
56. 357 So. 2d 401.
57. Id. at 403. See supra note 49 for a summary of the text of section
95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes.
58. Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 403.
59. The plaintiff's injury in Bauld occurred on July 8, 1972. Bauld, 357 So. 2d
at 401. Section 95.11(3)(c) of the Florida Statutes took effect on January 1, 1975. FLA.
STAT. § 95.022 (1981).
60. Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 401-02. The defendant did its last construction work on
the project no later than August 16, 1961. Id. at 401.
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anytime before January 1, 1976.1' Therefore, the plaintiff in Bauld had
a period of approximately three and one-half years in which her action
could have been filed-after the date of her injury and prior to the
extended deadline imposed by the statute of repose and savings clause.
Consequently, the statute of repose as applied to these facts did not
abolish a cause of action, but merely abbreviated the period within
which suit could be commenced from four to three and one-half
years.62
These decisions have had profound effects in the development of
products liability law, particularly with respect to health-related prod-
ucts. For example, the Florida Supreme Court in Diamond v. E. R.
Squibb & Sons, Inc.' s recently invalidated the twelve-year products lia-
bility statute of repose, section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes, as it
applied to a plaintiff who filed suit twenty-one years after the delivery
of the product.6 The plaintiff in Diamond sought to recover damages
resulting from the cancer-producing qualities of the synthetic drug
Stilbetin (also known as diethylstilbestrol or DES), which was pre-
scribed to pregnant mothers to prevent miscarriages between 1947 and
1971. In 1971, however, it was discovered that some, but not all,
prenatally exposed daughters of mothers who had ingested DES were
developing cancerous vaginal abnormalities.65 Because DES does not
61. FLA. STAT. § 95.022 (1981) states:
[t]his act shall become effective on January 1, 1975, but any action that
will be barred when this act becomes effective and that would not have
been barred under prior law may be commenced before January 1, 1976,
and if it is not commenced by that date, the action shall be barred.
Id. Hence, an additional year was given to those plaintiffs whose right to bring an
action was cut off on January 1, 1975. Id. A one year savings period has been deemed
to be reasonable. Campbell v. Home, 147 Fla. 523, 3 So. 2d 125 (1941).
62. Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 403. Four years was the applicable statute of limita-
tions for construction defect actions. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4) (1971).
63. 397 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1981).
64. Id. at 672.
65. See Podgers, DES Ruling Shakes Products Liability Field, 66 A.B.A. J. 827
(1980). It is interesting to note that the California Supreme Court has recently ruled
that DES plaintiffs may proceed to trial against several drug companies that generi-
cally produced DES where it is difficult, if not impossible, to specifically determine
which company produced the injury-causing drug. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 26
Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132 (1980). If found liable to the plaintiffs,
each of the manufacturer-defendants would only be responsible for its approximate per-
5771
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adversely affect all prenatally exposed daughters, the statute of limita-
tion for such an action begins to run from the time the defect (or, in
this case, the injury) was or should have been discovered.66 Determin-
ing precisely when the defect, i.e. injury, should have been discovered
can be very difficult where, as in the DES cases, a latent defect exists
which only affects a portion of those consumers exposed to the product.
Ordinarily, it is a question of fact as to whether one by exercise of
reasonable diligence should have known there was a cause of action
against a defendant, and should be left to the jury to decide.67
In Diamond, the prenatal daughter was exposed to DES on or
before April 1, 1956, and "discovered" the defect in May, 1976.8
Thus, when she instituted an action for negligence and products liabil-
ity on April 1, 1976 (twenty-one years after exposure to the drug), her
action would have long been barred by strict application by the statute
of repose. However, applying the principle laid down in Overland, the
court in Diamond held:
[t]he operation of section 95.031(2) in this case has the same effect
as it had in Overland. . . . The statute of limitations operated
there to bar the cause of action before it ever accrued, so that no
judicial forum was available to the aggrieved plaintiff. . . . We
therefore hold that as applied in this case, section 95.031(2) vio-
lates the Florida Constitution's guaranty of access to courts.69
In another similar situation, the United States District Court for
the Southern District of Florida in Ellison v. Northwest Engineering
Co. 70 held section 95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes to violate the
state's "access to courts" constitutional mandate where the plaintiff
suffered injuries through use of a machine manufactured and delivered
centage market share. Id. at 613-14, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
66. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981).
67. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Wisconsin v. Dade Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n,
403 So. 2d 1097 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Rosen v. Sparber, 369 So. 2d 960 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
68. Diamond, 397 So. 2d at 671.
69. Id. at 672.
70. 521 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1981) (applying Florida law in a diversity
action).
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twenty-three years before the action was begun.7 1 The Ellison court
recognized the two part test announced by the Florida Supreme Court
in Kluger: (1) whether an action for negligence, warranty, and strict
liability existed in 1968 when the "access to courts" provision of the
Florida Constitution was re-adopted, and (2) whether this constitution-
ally protected right would be abolished without providing any reasona-
ble alternative if the statute of repose was strictly applied in the given
case. 7 Answering both questions in the affirmative, the court held the
twelve-year products liability statute of repose, which would have ter-
minated the plaintiff's ability to sue even before the injury occurred, to
be violative of article I, section 21, of the Florida Constitution as ap-
plied to the facts of this case.73 Consequently, as a result of the decision
in Overland, other courts have declared the products liability statute of
repose to be unconstitutional insofar as it provides an absolute bar to
lawsuits brought more than twelve years from the date the product was
delivered. 4
To complete the analysis, we must examine Purk v. Federal Press
Co.,15 a recently decided Florida Supreme Court decision. The Purk
court followed the reasoning in Bauld,76 decided two years before, to
uphold the constitutionality of section 95.031(2) as it applied to the
facts of that case.7 As in Bauld, the plaintiff in Purk was injured
before the statute of repose took effect.7 8 A punch press, delivered no
later than June 2, 1961, injured Mrs. Purk on April 24, 1973.7s Finally,
Mrs. Purk brought a products liability action on April 13, 1976, alleg-
ing that the press was defective and negligently manufactured. 0 View-
ing the effective date of January 1, 1975, for the statute of repose and
the one-year "savings clause" 811 together, the action should have been
71. Id. at 202.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See Ellison, 521 F. Supp. 199; Diamond, 397 So. 2d 671; Battilla v. Allis
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 392 So. 2d 874 (Fla. 1980).
75. 387 So. 2d 354 (Fla. 1980).
76. Bauld v. J.A. Jones Const. Co., 357 So. 2d 401 (Fla. 1978).
77. Purk, 387 So. 2d at 357.
78. Id. at 355-56; see Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 401.
79. Purk, 387 So. 2d at 355-56.
80. Id. at 356.
81. FLA. STAT. § 95.022 (1975). For the full text of this provision, see supra note
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commenced on or before January 1, 1976, to be timely. Since it was
not filed until April of that year, the Florida Supreme Court affirmed
summary judgment for the defendant.8 2 In effect, Mrs. Purk's statute
of limitation was shortened from four years to two years and eight
months from the date she "discovered" the defect-the date of her in-
jury. Hence, Mrs. Purk's cause of action was not abolished, and appli-
cation of the statute in her case was held to be constitutional.83 The
court implicitly held, therefore, that two years and eight months was a
reasonable time in which Mrs. Purk could have commenced her prod-
ucts liability action," after which her action was forever barred.
61.
82. Purk, 387 So. 2d at 357.
83. Id.
84. Id.; see Cates v. Graham, 1982 Fla. L.W. 907 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Apr.
20, 1982), rev'd on rehearing, 1983 Fla. L.W. 621 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. Feb. 22,
1983), where the time within which a medical malpractice action could be brought was
shortened to approximately five months and was deemed to be reasonable. Cates, 1983
Fla. L.W. at 621. The Florida medical malpractice statute of limitation states:
(b) An action for medical malpractice shall be commenced within 2 years
from the time the incident giving rise to the action occurred or within 2
years from the time the incident is discovered, or should have been discov-
ered with the exercise of due diligence; however, in no event shall the ac-
tion be commenced later than 4 years from the date of the incident or
occurrence out of which the cause of action accrued.
FLA. STAT. § 95.11(4)(b) (1981) (emphasis added).
In Cates, the minor plaintiff last received medical treatment by his doctor on July
4, 1975. Cates, 1983 Fla. L.W. at 621. Under section 95.11(4)(b) of the Florida Stat-
utes, the plaintiff would have had until July 4, 1979 to bring his action for malpractice,
at which time his action would become time barred. Notwithstanding the plaintiff's
knowledge on February 6, 1979 that the medical treatment had been wrongful (a fac-
tual finding by the court), he delayed filing his medical malpractice mediation claim
until January 9, 1980. Cates, 1983 Fla. L.W. at 621.
In affirming summary judgment in favor of the defendant doctor, the court held
that the statute, as applied to the facts of this case, did not operate as a complete bar
to the plaintiff's action. Id. Moreover, the court held five months to be a reasonable
limitation period within which plaintiff should have brought his action. Id. In a special
concurrence by Judge Jorgenson of the Third District Court of Appeal, he writes
"[w]ere I free to write upon a clean slate, I would hold that section 95.11(4)(b) is
unconstitutionally applied to this minor plaintiff. Under the principles announced in
Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973), I cannot do so and, therefore, concur in
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There are, however, several interrelated problems inherent in the
Purk and Bauld line of cases. First, it is possible that the plaintiffs in
both cases erroneously believed their statute of limitations to be four
full years from discovery of the defect. This, of course, means four
years from the date of injury. Failure to discover the delivery date of
the machine and ending date of construction in Purk and Bauld, re-
spectively, and failure to file their lawsuits timely proved to be fatal in
both actions.
Second, in the area of products liability litigation, section
95.031(2) of the Florida Statutes imposes a duty on all plaintiffs' attor-
neys to promptly determine the delivery date of the injury-causing
product, conceptually a difficult task. Failing to do so may be grounds
for malpractice. Assuming potential defendants would cooperate in
generating this information, other problems still exist. Records bearing
the date of delivery of the product may not have been kept, or they
may have been lost or destroyed. An alternative is to hastily file suit
the authority to overrule a decision of the Supreme Court of Florida." 280 So. 2d at
440. Judge Jorgenson was apparently .referring to the prior Florida Supreme Court
decision in Bauld, upon which reasoning the majority opinion in Cates was based.
Cates, 1983 Fla. L.W. at 621.
Judge Baskin, the third member of the panel in the Cates decision, succinctly
pinpointed the issue in her dissent: "whether the five months between discovery of
[plaintiff's] injury and the absolute four-year bar to bringing suit under section
95.11(4)(b) constituted a reasonable time under the Florida Constitution [article 1, §
21] for commencement of a medical malpractice claim." Cates, 1983 Fla. L.W. at 621
(Baskin, J., dissenting). She went on to state:
[i]n my opinion, the date of discovery is significant in determining whether
reasonable time remains for the commencement of an action. For these
reasons, I would hold that the five-month period between the date of dis-
covery and the expiration of the final four-year repose provision of section
95.11(4)(b) was insufficient to afford appellant his constitutionally guaran-
teed right of access to court. I would reverse.
Id. This author is aware of a similar situation involving a Broward County (dental)
medical malpractice action which was to be filed the beginning of May, 1983. This case
involves a plaintiff whose action was technically barred eight or nine days after he
discovered that he had a cause of action. Clearly, the medical malpractice statute of
repose is unconstitutional as applied to these facts. Both due process and the Florida
constitutional "access to courts" guarantee are violated by strict application of the re-
pose statute. See also Bauld, 357 So. 2d 401, where the court implicitly held an abbre-
viated period of approximately three and one-half years to bring an action for a con-
struction defect to be reasonable. Bauld, 357 So. 2d at 403.
581 1Products Liability Statute of Repose17:1983
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when there is legitimate concern over the running of the twelve-year
statute of repose.8 5 This does not comport with public policy, which
discourages frivolous and non-meritorious claims.
Third, this principle presents a dichotomy in that the plaintiffs in
Bauld and Purk are barred from presenting their claims which arose
less than twelve years from the acts or occurrences complained of,
while plaintiffs in the Overland and Diamond line of cases are permit-
ted to bring their actions (after fourteen and twenty-one years,
respectively).
Through the benefit of a hypothetical which is analogous to the
situation in Purk, we can develop this dilemma more fully. Suppose, for
example, a product (assumed to be defective) was delivered on June 2,
1963, and the plaintiff was injured by it on April 24, 1975. Since the
plaintiff was injured after the effective date of the statute of repose 6
(January 1, 1975), the cause of action was not extinguished by the im-
plementation of the statute on that date. Therefore, the one-year "sav-
ings clause" is of no benefit to her.
Plaintiff's cause of action, however, would terminate twelve years
after the delivery date of the product (June 2, 1975), according to the
tenor of the repose statute. Therefore, the plaintiff would only have
forty days from her injury in which to file suit. If the plaintiff attempts
to file suit after that time, the court could, of course, deem the statute
of repose to be unconstitutional as applied to her, since it failed to af-
ford her a reasonable time in which to bring her action.88 Strict appli-
cation of the statute, however, would create a Purk trap89 for the un-
85. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1975).
86. Id.
87. See FLA. STAT. § 95.022 (1981). For the text of the "savings clause," which
only provides for an additional year (until January 1, 1976) if an existing action is
terminated by the statute of repose on its effective date (January 1, 1975), see supra
note 61.
88. However, see Cates, supra note 84, where the medical malpractice statute of
repose operated to limit the claimant's period within which he could bring suit to five
months, which was deemed to be reasonable. This author agrees with the lengthy dis-
sent in the Cates decision, and feels that the plaintiff in Cates suffered such a disadvan-
tage that the statute of repose should have been declared unconstitutional as applied to
the facts in that case.
89. This clever phrase has been used on numerous occasions to describe this ar-
rant situation by Joel D. Eaton, Esq., of the law firm of Podhurst, Orseck, Parks, Josef-
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wary, who may suddenly find themselves in this uncomfortable
position.90
Although the principles supporting statutes of repose have evolved
over many years, this is a relatively new concept to Florida. Manufac-
turers and potential plaintiffs necessarily have adopted polarized posi-
tions in arguments for and against the implementation of these "ulti-
mate repose" statutes. "At issue is the appropriate balance between
[the Florida constitutonal guarantee of access to courts] and the fed-
eral Constitution, the role of the legislature to represent the popular
will, and the duty of the courts to preserve [individual's] rights without
encroaching upon legislative prerogatives."9 1
sberg, Eaton, Meadow & Olin, P.A., Miami, Florida. It was Joel Eaton's suggestion
that this author "sound the alarm" in this area of law which provided the incentive to
complete the required research.
90. Under the Florida statute of repose, it is significant to note that only the
legal rights of those individuals injured by defective products between eight and twelve
years old are affected by operation of the statute. If a plaintiff is injured by a defective
product between years one and eight, or after twelve, he will theoretically have four
years in which to bring his cause of action. Plaintiff's injured by products between eight
and twelve years old will, as the courts currently apply the statute, be limited by one
more day for each day the product has aged over eight years.
This time-line shows how plaintiffs A and C have the traditional four-year period
in which to file suit. Plaintiff C's action is permissible because, under the Overland line
of cases, the statute of repose is unconstitutional as an absolute bar (his action was
barred before it ever accrued). Plaintiff B's cause of action is extinguished by operation
of the statute of repose at year 12, irrespective of the actual time in which B had to
bring his action or when the defect was or should have been discovered.
(4 years)
A/
B/ C (4 years)
(8) (12)
(Years from delivery of the product)
91. McGovern, Symposium Products Liability: The Variety, Policy and Consti-
tutionality of Product Liability Statutes of Repose, 30 AM. U. L. REv. 579, 581
(1981).
17:1983 583[Products Liability Statute of Repose
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From the manufacturer's point of view, statutes of repose would
affect few people adversely but would permit rather substantial savings;
i.e., lower consumer costs due to lower products liability insurance pre-
miums. From the perspective of potential plaintiffs, there is still con-
cern for the few individuals who would receive no compensation from
the manufacturer for injuries caused by older defective products. Re-
cently discovered latent defects arising long after use of the product
complicate this position. Where, as in Florida, there is a constitutional
guarantee of "access to the courts," this position becomes even more
salient. In addition, recently available empirical data suggests that the
results desired by the manufacturing industry are not being achieved
through enactment of these statutes of repose.92 Thus, if insurance pre-
miums are not significantly affected by the enactment of repose legisla-
tion, serious questions arise as to the validity of these statutes when
they operate to bar an individual's right to redress for injury.
Conclusion
The Florida Legislature, persuaded by the aftermath of the "prod-
ucts liability revolution" witnessed in the last two decades, erred in
1975 by annexing "ultimate repose" limitations to existing products lia-
bility statutes of limitations. As it now stands, section 95.031 (2) 93 af-
fords disparate application, as examined in recent decisions, 94 with no
significant benefit to the manufacturing industry.95 Repeal or modifica-
92. See Lankford, supra note 27. "Although a statute of repose certainly would
reduce recoveries by persons injured by products, there may not be a corresponding
reduction in insurance premium rates. An eight-to-ten year statute of repose, for exam-
ple, would be too long to improve the predictability of insurance claims." FINAL RE-
PORT, cited in McGovern, supra note 91, at 595. See generally Martin, supra note 19,
at 752; Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products Liability Statutes of
Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REV. 663 (1978). One study estimates that over 97 percent of
product-related accidents occur within six years of the time the product was purchased
and, in the capital goods area, 83.5 percent of all bodily injury accidents occur within
ten years of manufacture. MODEL ACT, supra note 2, at 62,733 (citing Insurance Ser-
vices Office, Product Liability Closed Claim Survey: A Technical Analysis of Survey
Results, at 105-08 (1977)).
93. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(2) (1981).
94. See Overland, 369 So. 2d 572; Purk, 387 So. 2d 354.
95. McGovern, supra note 91.
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tion of this provision is recommended, because it presently imposes
upon the guaranteed "access to courts" provision of the Florida Consti-
tution.98 In the meantime, the full ramifications of the Bauld and Purk
decisions are yet to be seen.
William M. Tuttle
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Will the Real Party in Interest Please Stand Up?
Florida Statutes Section 627.7262 as Amended
In 1978 Florida Statutes section 627.72621 was declared unconsti-
tutional in Markert v. Johnston2 as an invasion of the Florida Supreme
Court's rulemaking authority. The statute prohibited joinder of motor
vehicle liability insurance companies at the commencement of lawsuits
against insured persons, but also provided for possible joinder of the
insurer at a later stage in the proceedings.$ Therefore the court deter-
mined that the statute involved procedural aspects of trial and was in
1. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977) read:
Nonjoinder of Insurers.
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant
in an action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer
which does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a por-
tion of any judgment which might be entered in the action shall file a
statement, under oath, of a corporate officer setting forth the following
information with regard to each known policy of insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer.
(b) The name of each insured.
(c) The limits of liability coverage.
(d) A statement of any policy or coverage which said insurer
reasonably believes is available to said insurer filing the state-
ment at the time of filing said statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immedi-
ately upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or
coverage defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be
joined as a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the
case is tried without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judg-
ment may be entered by the court based upon the statement or statements
herein required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and
policy provisions of liability insurance coverage.
2. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
3. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262(3) (1977).
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violation of Article II, Section 3, of the Florida Constitution.4
Prior to this 1976 statute, joinder of liability insurers in actions
against the insured tortfeasor was permitted as a result of the
landmark Florida Supreme Court decision in Shingleton v. Bussey.5
This case established that a direct cause of action' against insurers in
motor vehicle liability insurance coverage cases inures to injured per-
sons as third party beneficiaries of the insurance contract. The court
declared this to be the result of the prevailing public policy of Florida.'
The legislature's first attempt to reverse this direction of the court was
struck down by the Markert decision. Apparently determined not to be
thwarted, the legislature re-enacted Florida Statute Section 627.7262,8
albeit revised,9 in an attempt to cure the prior constitutional defects.
4. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 provides: "The powers of the state government shall
be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one
branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless
expressly provided herein."
5. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
6. The court relied upon rule 1.210(a), of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides for joinder of parties. See Russell v. Orange County, Florida, 237 So.
2d 192 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Kephart v. Pickens, 271 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1972)(holding that the insured is an indispensable party in such
actions).
7. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 715.
8. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262, (Supp. 1982) (effective October 1, 1982). On Apr. 7,
1982, during the fourth special session of the 1982 Legislature, the Revised Insurance
Code was passed by unanimous vote in both Houses. HousE COMMITTEE ON INSUR-
ANCE, STAFF REPORT, 1982 Ins. Code Sunset Revision (HB4F; As Amended by HB
10G), at 4 (1982) [hereinafter cited as STAFF REPORT].
9. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (Supp. 1982) now provides:
Nonjoinder of insurers.
(1) It shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of a
cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an insured under
the terms of the liability insurance contract, that such person shall first
obtain a judgment against a person who is an insured under the terms of
such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such policy.
(2) No person who is not an insured under the terms of a liability insur-
ance policy shall have any interest in such policy, either as a third party
beneficiary or otherwise, prior to first obtaining a judgment against a per-
son who is an insured under the terms of such policy for a cause of action
which is covered by such policy.
(3) Insurers are affirmatively granted the substantive right to insert in lia-
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Joinder of liability insurers as codefendants has been the subject of
debate for well over a decade in this state. On the one hand, insurance
and defense counsel vigorously oppose joinder of the liability insurer
(the company) in actions against their insureds (the tortfeasors), and
therefore support the amended statute. Their principal objection to
joinder of the insurer centers on the supposedly negative impact on the
jury of knowledge of the defendant's insurance coverage. On the other
hand, plaintiffs' counsel just as vigorously favor joinder of the liability
insurer, and therefore oppose the amended statute. Their principal con-
tention is that the insurance company investigates the case, hires the
attorneys, controls the negotiations, settlements and litigation, and has
a direct financial interest in the outcome. Therefore, it is argued, the
liability insurer is a real party in interest and should be included in the
lawsuit.
Further debate on the joinder issue has occurred between the legis-
lature and the judiciary, as evidenced by the re-enactment of this non-
joinder statute in response to the Market decision. These legal argu-
ments involve the separate powers of the legislature and the judiciary,
and are based on the nebulous distinction between substantive and pro-
cedural law.
This article focuses on the history of these arguments and the pub-
lic policy and constitutional issues involved. The amended statute is ex-
amined in light of these issues, and an attempt is made to answer the
current question of whether the statute will withstand judicial scrutiny
under the substantive-procedural test.10
bility insurance policies contractual provisions that preclude persons who
are not designated as insureds in such policies from bringing suit against
such insurers prior to first obtaining a judgment against one who is an
insured under such policy for a cause of action which is covered by such
policy. The contractual provisions herein authorized shall be fully
enforceable.
10. The current questions of whether the statute can be applied retroactively,
and whether retroactive application of the statute violates a plaintiff's constitutional
rights are not within the scope of this article.
5891
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Development Of The Law
Prior to Shingleton, Florida followed the majority view" which
prohibits maintenance of a cause of action directly against the insurer
until the tortfeasor's liability is established.12 At common law, the join-
der of the insurer was often denied on the ground that an action ex
contractu cannot be joined with an action ex delicto13 In most jurisdic-
tions today, however, denial of direct actions against the liability in-
surer is generally based on "no action" or "nonjoinder" clauses con-
tained in the insurance policies.1 4 Generally, unless the policy
specifically provides for direct action against the liability insurer, or is
construed to so provide, direct action by the injured party is only per-
mitted by statute.1 5
The Shingleton court hurdled the obstacles of both a "no action -
nonjoinder" clause in the policy 6 and prior decisions which had refused
to recognize the injured persons as third party beneficiaries of the in-
surance contract.17 The court recognized that the majority of jurisdic-
11. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4861 (Rev. 1981).
12. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936), overruled in Shin-
gleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969); Hayes v. Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla.
2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Thompson v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1967).
13. See, e.g., Jennings v. Beach, 1 F.R.D. 442 (D. Mass. 1940); Conwell v. Hays,
103 W. Va. 69, 136 S.E. 604 (1927); Ellis v. Bruce, 215 Iowa 308, 245 N.W. 320
(1932); Baggett v. Jackson, 244 Ala. 404, 13 So. 2d 572 (1943).
14. See 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 11.
15. For a discussion of direct action statutes see 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 11;
Comment, The Louisiana Direct Action Statute, 22 LA. L. REV. 243 (1961); Com-
ment, The Insurer as Party Defendant in Automobile Accident Cases, 1953 Wis. L.
REV. 688. Direct action legislation was introduced in both houses of the 1969 Florida
Legislature. Fla. S. 468, Reg. Sess. (1969) was tabled May 6, 1969. Fla. H.R. 1120,
Reg. Sess. (1969) died in committee June 6, 1969. Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial
Creation of Direct Action Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REV.
145, 146 n.12 (1969).
16. The insurance contract provided that: "No action shall lie against the Com-
pany . . . until the amount of the obligation of the Policyholder . . . shall have been
finally determined by judgment after trial. . . . This policy shall not give any right to
join the Company in any action to determine the liability of an insured person or or-
ganization." Brief for Federation of Insurance Counsel and Florida Defense Lawyers
Association, amici curiae at 9, Shingleton v. Bussey, 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
17. Artille v. Davidson, 126 Fla. 219, 170 So. 707 (1936)(under an indemnity
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tions sustained such clauses as a bar to joinder in actions to determine
the insured's liability. Nonetheless, after emphasizing Florida's public
policy favoring elimination of multiplicity of suits, the court construed
the policy restriction to grant to the insurer only the right to assert
nonliability; the policy restriction did not grant the right to assert non-
joinder.18 The court further reasoned that securance of motor vehicle
liability insurance "is an act undertaken by the insured with the intent
of providing a ready means of discharging his obligations that may ac-
crue to a member or members of the public as a result of his negligent
operation of a motor vehicle. . . ... Finding this intent, the court de-
termined that motor vehicle liability insurance is "amenable to the
third party beneficiary doctrine"20 by operation of law.
After thus rejecting the insurance company's assertion that the no
action clause prohibited joinder, the court accepted the appellate
court's analysis and conclusion that the insurer is a real party in inter-
est in litigation brought against the insured.2 1 The appellate court
reached this decision after taking notice of the policy provisions
whereby the insurance company (1) reserves the right to control litiga-
tion against its insured, (2) is obligated to defend the litigation, and (3)
will be liable for any resulting assessment of damages up to the policy
policy, no action could be maintained by a third party since no breach of contract
which would create in the insured a right to maintain an action on the policy); Hayes v.
Thomas, 161 So. 2d 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (contention that a liability
policy obtained pursuant to Florida's Financial Responsibility Act, FLA. STAT. ch. 324
(1967) permitted maintenance of a direct action against the insurer rejected); Thomp-
son v. Safeco Ins. Co., 199 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1967)(court noted
Florida does not recognize the third party beneficiary doctrine under automobile liabil-
ity insurance policies in the absence of a policy provision).
18. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
0 19. Id. at 716.
20. Id. Appellate courts soon expanded this rationale to other forms of liability
insurance. Duran v. McPherson, 233 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1970) (Shin-
gleton applied to professional liability insurance); Shipman v. Kinderman; 232 So. 2d
21 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970)(Shingleton applied to medical malpractice insur-
ance); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 231 So. 2d 235 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1970)(Shingleton applied to homeowners liability insurance). Finally in Beta Eta
House Corp., Inc., of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970), the Florida
Supreme Court expressly held the Shingleton principles applied to other forms of lia-
bility insurance.
21. Bussey v. Shingleton, 211 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
591 1Florida Statutes 627.7262
149
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
limits. 2 2 Therefore, as a real party in interest, the insurer may be joined
as a codefendant under the liberal joinder provisions of rule 1.210(a) of
the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure.2 Recognizing that this rule pro-
motes the goal of "providing an efficient and expeditious adjudication
of the rights of persons possessing adverse interests in a controversy, "24
the Florida Supreme Court illustrated how an injured plaintiff may be
adversely affected if he cannot immediately align the insurance com-
pany with the insured. Citing Bergh v. Canadian Universal Insurance
Co.25 and Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.,2" the court
emphasized the importance of joinder to prevent defeat of a plaintiff's
recovery. Assertions of policy defenses by the insurance company based
on the possible negligence of the insured or absence of his motivation to
protect the injured party are examples of when an injured person's re-
covery is defeated.
22. Id. at 596. The court also relied heavily on briefs filed in In re Rules Gov-
erning Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, (which was referred to as Case No. 35,524 by
the Bussey court). This case involved a petition filed in 1966 by the Florida Bar Associ-
ation seeking additional rules governing the conduct of "in house" counsel; the rule
would have precluded attorneys for insurance companies from defending the insured. In
opposing the adoption of the rule, counsel for the insurance industry openly admitted
the "'direct financial interest" of the insurer ...... an identity and community of
interest in the defense of any suit brought against the insured," . . . . [and] that the
insurer. . . "has or claims an interest adverse to the plaintiff.'" Bussey v. Shingleton,
211 So. 2d at 595-96 (quoting various briefs filed in In re Rules Governing Conduct of
Attorneys in Florida, Case No. 35,524).
23. Rule 1.210 provides:
PARTIES (a) Parties Generally. Every action may be prosecuted in the
name of the real party in interest. . . .All persons having an interest in
the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded may join as
plaintiffs and any person may be made a defendant who has or claims an
interest adverse to the plaintiff. Any person may at any time be made a
party if his presence is necessary or proper to a complete determination of
the cause.
(emphasis added).
24. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
25. 216 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 1968). The fact that the court cited this malpractice
case was an indication that the Shingleton joinder principles were not limited to motor
vehicle liability insurers.
26. 185 So. 2d 689 (Fla. 1966). This was an uninsured motorist case involving
policy questions.
592 Nova Law Journal
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After Shingleton
Shingleton's initial impact was described as "almost cataclys-
mic"'27 and as creating "near chaos in tort litigation in this State. '28
Although clearly reversing Florida law on joinder of automobile liabil-
ity insurers, Shingleton left a number of questions unanswered; 29 most
of these questions have been answered, albeit by a number of supreme
court decisions on the same issues.
In Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory,30 while
purporting to extend the principles announced in Shingleton to other
forms of liability insurance, the court actually appeared to recede from
some of them. In Shingleton, the court had advocated a "candid admis-
sion at trial of the existence of insurance coverage, the policy limits of
same, and an otherwise aboveboard revelation of the interest of the in-
surer. . ... -1 However in Beta Eta, the court maintained that Shin-
gleton merely requires "the parties to 'lay their cards on the table' in
discovery proceedings, settlement negotiations, and pre-trial hearings.
The existence or amount of insurance coverage has no bearing on the
issues of liability and damages, and such evidence should not be consid-
ered by the jury.' '3 2 Within only a few months, the court translated
candid admissions at trial into concealment of insurance.
Furthermore, Singleton indicated that if it should clearly appear
in pretrial procedures that joinder of the insurer would interpose issues
between the insured and insurance company that would unduly compli-
cate the trial on the negligence issue, a motion to sever these issues for
separate trial could be granted.33 Yet in Beta Eta, the court held that
the trial judge may, upon motion of either party, order separate trials
27. Jurisdictional Brief for Respondent at 2, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v.
Roach, 237 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 1970)(consolidated with Beta Eta for oral argument
purposes).
28. Brief for Petitioner at 8, North Miami Gen. Hosp., Inc. v. Roach, 237 So. 2d
173 (Fla. 1970).
29. See generally Comment, Civil Procedure: Judicial Creation of Direct Action
Against Automobile Liability Insurers, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 145 (1969).
30. 237 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 1970).
31. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718 (emphasis added).
32. Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 165 (emphasis added).
33. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 720.
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whenever the insurance company is joined.3 4 Based on this holding, all
an insurer codefendant needed to do was file a timely motion to sever,
and the trial judge would grant it. Thus it appeared for a time that the
remedial principles announced in Shingleton had quickly fallen into
desuetude. 5
The severance issue was substantially resolved in Stecher v. Pome-
roy.86 After reaffirming the Shingleton conclusion that the insurer is a
real party in interest in actions to determine the insured's liability,37
the court concluded that Shingleton referred only to severance of issues
between the insured and the insurer - not on the negligence issue.
"[A] bsent a justiciable issue relating to insurance, such as a question
of coverage or of the applicability or interpretation of the insurance
policy or other such valid dispute on the matter of insurance coverage,
there is no valid reason for a severance and it should NOT be
granted." 8
In Godshall v. Unigard Insurance Co.,"9 the court further clarified
the issue of severance in holding that in absence of a justiciable issue
relating to insurance, severance could not be regarded as harmless
34. Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 165. The appellate court, at 230 So. 2d 495,500
(Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1970), concluded that
[p]ursuant to the provisions of this rule [Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.270(b), Separate
Trials] the trial court should on motion of a party order that the issues
relating to the cause of action sued upon be first tried under circumstances
which exclude any reference to insurance, insurance coverage or joinder in
the suit of the insurer as codefendant. After this trial has been concluded
and a verdict rendered for the plaintiff, a second trial confined solely to the
issue of insurance cverage should be held if such an issue has been raised.
If no such issue is present, judgment against the insurer within the policy
limits would follow the verdict rendered in the first trial on the merits.
(emphasis added).
35. See Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 166 (Boyd, J., dissenting in part and concurring
in part) ("The decision distorts the law of severance and offends equal protection and
due process by requiring special treatment of liability insurers not afforded other
codefendants").
36. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
37. Id. at 423. The court again cited the insurance counsel's arguments in In re
Rules Governing Conduct of Attorneys in Florida, (Case No. 35,524). See supra note
22.
38. Stecher, 253 So. 2d at 424.
39. 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
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Underlying Rationale: Fear of Prejudicial Impact on Juries
The underlying rationale for prohibiting mention, and thus joinder,
of liability insurance has traditionally been the assumption that juries
are unduly swayed by knowledge that the defendant is insured.41 Sup-
posedly, such knowledge increases botl the size and number of plain-
tiff's verdicts. Based on this assumption, evidence of a defendant's lia-
bility insurance is not relevant as evidence of negligence, and is
inadmissible.42
Prior to Shingleton, Florida courts generally followed this tradi-
tional view, and held that deliberate injection of insurance into a tort
trial was prejudicial error.43 As previously noted, 4 the Shingleton court
embraced a more modern view. "[T]he stage has now been reached
40. But cf. Damico v. Lundberg. 379 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1979)(Although the circuit court erred in dismissing the defendant's insurer, it was not
reversible error. No amount of emphasizing the defendant's financial responsibility
could have countered plaintiff husband's admission of his own negligence in entering
the intersection.).
41. See, e.g., International Co. v. Clark, 147 Md. 34, 42, 127 A. 647, 650
(1925); Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 553, 18 N.W.2d 582, 589 (1945); W.
PIERSON, THE DEFENSE ATrORNEY AND BAsic DEFENSE TACTICs § 140 (1956); Ap-
pleman, Joinder of Policy Holder and Insurer as Parties Defendant, 22 MARQ. L.
REV. 75, 91 (1938); In Texas Co. v. Betterton, 126 Tex. 359, 88 S.W.2d 1039 (1936),
adherence to this assumption approached absurdity when the court reversed the plain-
tiff's judgment against one of the largest oil companies in the world because the defen-
dant's liability insurance coverage was brought to the attention of the jury.
42. Compare Jeddeloh v. Hockenhull, 219 Minn. 541, 554, 18 N.W.2d 582, 589
(1945), with Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 558, 119 A. 705, 705 (1923)(de-
fendant's reply to a caution about his driving shortly before the accident, "Don't worry;
I carry insurance for that," was competent evidence bearing directly upon his negli-
gence). See generally C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 168
(1954); Note, Evidence: Proper disclosure during trial that defendant is insured, 26
CORNELL L.Q. 137 (1940) (discussion of exceptions to. the general rule of
inadmissibility).
43. Carls Markets v. Meyer, 69 So. 2d 789, 793 (Fla. 1953); Rose v. Peters, 82
So. 2d 585, 586 (Fla. 1955); Seminole Shell Co. v. Clearwater Flying Co., 156 So. 2d
543, 545 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
44. See supra text accompanying note 31.
595 1Florida Statutes 627.726217:1983
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where juries are more mature. '45 Although the court confusingly re-
ceded from this position in Beta Eta,'4 it concluded in Stecher v. Pome-
roy 7 that in order to "reflect the presence of financial responsibility,
. . . [the presence of the insurer as the real party in interest] should be
left apparent before the jury (without other express mention, of
course). . . .,,4 Again, the court clarified its position in Godshall v.
Unigard Insurance Co.,49 by announcing that a legitimate purpose of
joinder of the insurance company is to reflect the presence of financial
responsibility."0 "The interest which plaintiff has in presenting to the
jury the truest possible picture of the existence of financial responsibil-
ity is much too important to allow the loss of that interest .... ,51
Notwithstanding this neoteric posture of Florida courts, insurance
and defense counsel staunchly assert that injection of insurance into
trial unduly influences jury findings of liability and damages.5 2 Empiri-
cal studies do lend some support to this "prejudice theory," and to the
belief that a judge's curative instructions are ineffective. 53 On the other
45. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718.
46. See supra text accompanying note 32.
47. 253 So. 2d 421 (Fla. 1971).
48. Id. at 424. The court reasoned:
This offsets any indulgence by counsel or the jury with unfounded argu-
ments like, "This poor, hard working truck driver and his family" ap-
proach, when in fact there is an ability to respond. It is probably not a
factor in other instances where there is an obviously responsible principal
defendant as in Compania Dominicana de Aviacion.
Id. at 423.
In Compania Dominicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1971), the court rejected the defendant's contention that reference made during
trial to a collateral settlement by Lloyd's of London could not be remedied by a cura-
tive instruction.
49. 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
50. Id. at 501.
51. Id. at 502.
52. See Brief for American Insurance Association, amicus curiae at 6, O'Quinn
v. Thompson, No. 52577 (Fla. 1978)(one of three consolidated cases in Markert v.
Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978)).
53. See Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. REV. 744,
(1959), which reports of experiments with juries and insurance.
Where the defendant disclosed that he had no insurance the average
award of all verdicts was $33,000. Where defendant disclosed that he had
insurance but there was no objection the average award rose to $37,000.
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hand, evidence also exists indicating that lower awards result when in-
surance coverage is known by the jurors."s Assuming arguendo that
juries return higher awards when insurance coverage is known, no evi-
dence exists to determine whether such award is merely adequate
rather than excessive. 55 In other words, whether justice or injustice is
achieved by concealment of liability insurance coverage is an unan-
swered question.
Realism requires acceptance of the fact that most if not all juries
become aware of the defendant's insurance coverage at some point dur-
ing trial. This is particularly true in automobile litigation where the
average juror assumes, rightly or not, that an insurance company will
eventually bear the cost of an adverse judgment.56 An able plaintiff's
Where, however, the defendant said he had insurance and there was an
objection and an instruction to disregard, the average award rose to
$46,000 ...
Id. at 754. See also Neitzert, Jury Trials of Insurance Companies and Large Corpora-
tions, 18 CHI. B. REc. 87 (1937).
54. See Gladewater Laundry & Dry Cleaners v. Newman, 141 S.W.2d 951
(Tex. Civ. App. 1940)(evidence of instirance policies was introduced in the first trial,
and the jury awarded $7,500. After reversal, in the second trial in which no evidence of
insurance was permitted, the jury awarded $12,000.). See also 8 J. APPLEMAN, supra
note 11, § 4861, at n.1 ("extensive studies have demonstrated that injection of insur-
ance tends to diminish the size of jury verdicts; and states like Wisconsin which have
permitted direct action have lower verdicts than neighboring states not permitting men-
tion of the insurer's presence"); W. PIERSON, THE DEFENSE ATrORNEY AND BASIC DE-
FENSE TACTICS § 145 at 325 (1956); Note, Direct Action Statutes: Their Operational
and Conflict-of-Law Problems, 74 HARV. L. REV. 357, 358 n.12 (1960).
55. See Note, The Liability Insurer as a Real Party in Interest: Proposed
Amendments to the Minnesota Rules of Civil Procedure, 41 MINN. L. REV. 784, 788
n.33 (1957)(Citing a letter from Professor Harry Kalven, Jr., Director of the Jury
Study Project, Jan. 8, 1957. In the Chicago Jury Study Project, interviews with experi-
mental jurors indicated the effect of insurance knowledge was to impel rendering of
what they thought was an adequate award. The absence of insurance knowledge caused
the jurors to award what they considered to be less than adequate.).
56. See Beta Eta, 237 So. 2d at 167 (Fla. 1970)(Ervin, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)
The universality of insurance protection explodes the out-moded concept
that to avoid prejudice an insured's applicable insurance must be isolated
from the jury's knowledge. The feature of insurance has become an inte-
gral factor in the modern jury's actual approach to the discharge of its role
in assessing personal injury litigation issues, notwithstanding contrary the-
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attorney has many "legitimate" ways of indirectly communicating to
the jury the existence of insurance. 57 Therefore, it is submitted that
arguments for and against joinder of liability insurers should not be
premised upon illusory and theoretical foundations of prejudicial im-
pact on juries.
The Power Behind Markert v. Johnston: The Supreme Court's
Rulemaking Authority
The Florida Constitution authorizes the supreme court to promul-
gate rules regulating practice and procedure in all Florida courts.5 8 In
1973, in response to the legislature's enactment of various laws which
related to practice and procedure, the court held that the mandate to
regulate practice and procedure was an exclusive grant to the supreme
court.59 The legislature may veto or repeal a court rule by a general
law enacted by a two-thirds vote in each house of the legislature,60 but
it may not amend or supersede a rule.61 If a statute is subsequently
oretical considerations. It is general public knowledge that in a world
fraught with personal risks most of our citizens have the protection of
insurance.
Accord Schevling v. Johnson, 122 F. Supp. 87, 89 (D. Conn. 1953); See also Kalven,
The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 OHIo ST. L.J. 158,
171 (1958); Lassiter, Direct Actions. . .Against the Insurer, 1949 INs. L.J. 411, 416.
57. The most widely used method is to examine jurors on voir dire regarding
their interest in the defendant's insurance company. See, e.g., Ryan v. Noble, 95 Fla.
820, 822, 116 So. 766, 768 (1929); City of Niceville v. Hardy, 160 So. 2d 535, 538
(Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1964); Purdy v. Gulf Breeze Enters., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1325,
1331 (Fla. 1981)("Since there is no longer any reason for not mentioning insurance in
front of jurors, an attorney may question prospective jurors about any possible
prejudice or bias they may have whether it be for or against insurance companies.").
58. The supreme court shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all
courts including the time for seeking appellate review, the administrative supervision of
all courts, the transfer to the court having jurisdiction of any proceeding when the
jurisdiction of another court has been improvidently invoked, and a requirement that
no cause shall be dismissed because an improper remedy has been sought. These rules
may be repealed by a general law enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership of
each house of the legislature. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
59. In re Clarification of Florida Rules of Practice & Procedure, 281 So. 2d 204,
205 (Fla. 1973).
60. See supra note 58.
61. In re Clarification, 281 So. 2d at 205.
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adopted by the court as a rule of practice and procedure, no attempt by
the legislature to amend the statute is valid.62 The supreme court has
interpreted the last sentence of article V, section 2(a)63 as requiring
knowledge and specific intent on the part of each house to override a
specific rule. 4 No such specific intent was evinced in the passage of the
Revised Insurance Code. Therefore, the re-enactment of section
627.7262 is not a constitutional repeal of rule 1.210(a).65
That neither the constitutional language nor the intent of the
framers mandates the court's holding of exclusive authority to regulate
practice and procedure has been the subject of recent commentary.66
Nevertheless, the court remains firmly entrenched in the notion of its
exclusive power to promulgate rules of practice and procedure.6 7 Nor is
Florida unique in constitutionally granting exclusive power to the su-
preme court over rules of practice and procedure.68
The Boundaries of the Court's Rulemaking Authority
It is fundamental that court rules cannot contravene constitutional
provisions, extend or abridge jurisdiction, or abrogate or modify sub-
stantive law. 69
62. Id. 1955 Fla. Laws 265, ch. 29737, § 3 similarly provided in part: "When a
rule is promulgated and adopted by the supreme court concerning practice and proce-
dure, and it conflicts with the statute, the rule supersedes the statutory provision."
63. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 2(a).
64. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 808 (Fla. 1976)(England, J., concur-
ring), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
65. See supra notes 8 & 23 and accompanying text.
66. See Means, The Power to Regulate Practice and Procedure in Florida
Courts, 32 U. FLA. L. REv. 442 (1980), for a history of the rulemaking authority and
a cogent urging of the abandonment of the idea of exclusivity.
67. See School Bd. of Broward County v. Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973);
Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977);
Avila South Condominium Ass'n v. Kappa Corp., 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977); Markert
v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978); Cozine v. Tullo, 394 So. 2d 115 (1981).
68. See, e.g., ARIZ. CoNsr. art. VI, § 5; MICH. CONST. art. VI, §§ 4, 5; PA.
CONST. art. V, § 10(c). No provision is made in these constitutions for legislative veto
or repeal of court promulgated rules.
69. See Green, To What Extent May Courts Under the Rule-Making Power
Prescribe Rules of Evidence?, 26 A.B.A. J. 482, 482 (1940); Joiner & Miller, Rules of
Practice and Procedure: A Study of Judicial Rule Making, 55 MICH. L. REv. 623,
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The constitutional grant of the court's rulemaking authority is ex-
pressed in the terms "practice and procedure.""0 Since "practice" and
"procedure" are generally considered synonymous,7 the actual distinc-
tion is between procedural and substantive law.
Florida has drawn the boundaries, if boundaries are to be drawn,
according to the definitions expressed by Justice Adkins:
Practice and procedure pertains to the legal machinery by
which substantive law is made effective. . . .[S]ubstantive law cre-
ates, defines, adopts and regulates rights, while procedural law
prescribes the method of enforcing those rights.
... The entire area of substance and procedure may be described
as a "twilight zone" and a statute or rule will be characterized as
substantive or procedural according to the nature of the problem
for which a characterization must be made.
...Practice and procedure encompasses the course, form, manner,
means, method, mode, order, process or steps by which a party en-
forces substantive rights or obtains redress for their invasion.
"Practice and procedure" may be described as the machinery of
the judicial process as opposed to the product thereof.
.. .The term "rules of practice and procedure" includes all rules
governing the parties, their counsel and the Court throughout the
progress of the case from the time of its initiation until final judg-
ment and its execution. 2
These broad statements supposedly define the distinction between
substance and procedure. Article II, section 373 expressly restricts the
exercise of authority by one branch in areas of power belonging to an-
other. Since the supreme court has exclusive authority over practice
and procedure,74 the legislature may not enact statutes which are pro-
cedural.75 If the subject matter is substantive, the legislature may act
634 (1957).
70. See supra note 58.
71. Poyser v. Minors, 7 Q.B.D. 329, 334 (1881).
72. In re Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 272 So. 2d 65, 65 (Fla.
1972)(Adkins, J., concurring).
73. FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, Branches of Government. See supra note 4.
74. See supra text accompanying notes 59-62.
75. Chappell v. Florida Dept. of Health & Rehabilitative Services, 391 So. 2d
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upon it.7 8
Joinder of Liability Insurers: Substantive or Procedural
One Shingleton question remains unanswered: whether joinder and
nonjoinder of liability insurers is procedural or substantive? The an-
swer is of paramount importance in determining whether the new stat-
ute will withstand supreme court scrutiny, as undoubtedly the issue will
be decided there. If joinder of insurers is deemed procedural and in
conflict with rule 1.210(a),"8 the statute will be struck as an invasion of
the supreme court's exclusive rulemaking authority. 9 If joinder (and
nonjoinder under the new statute) is deemed to involve substantive
rights, the legislature has acted within its authority, and the statute
will be held valid.
Unfortunately, when squarely faced with an opportunity to resolve
this issue, the court demurred. Instead, the court in Markert v. John-
ston"0 decided that resolution of the issue was not essential since the
language of the statute provided "rather clearly that joinder of insurers
is merely a procedural step in the conduct of a motor vehicle tort law-
suit." 81 The statute before the court8O 2 provided for both nonjoinder, at
the commencement of the suit, and joinder, at a later stage. Consistent
358 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Military Park Fire Control Tax Dist. No. 4 v.
DeMarios, 407 So. 2d 1020, 1021 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1981). See cases cited supra
note 67.
76. See supra note 75.
77. Since the effective date of the re-enactment of the nonjoinder statute, Florida
circuit courts have been deluged with defendant liability insurers' motions to dismiss in
reliance on the new statute. To the author's knowledge, most courts have denied the
motions and concluded that the new statute is unconstitutional under the authority of
Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978). See, e.g., Shields v. Richardson, No.
82-3503-CA (Fla. 4th Cir. Ct. Oct. 8, 1982); Feldman v. Boyd, No. 81-5515-
CA(L)01-C (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Dec. 9, 1982); Scioli v. McClean Trucking Co., No. 82-
632 CA-10 (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Dec. 29, 1982); Shurtleff v. Sunstream Equip. Co., Inc.,
No. 82-5578 CA(L)01-K (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 12, 1983); Moran-Hernandez v.
North East Ins. Co., No. 82-3455 CA(L)01-B (Fla. 15th Cir. Ct. Jan. 17, 1983).
78. FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.210(a), see supra note 23.
79. See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, and art. V, § 2(a).
80. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1978).
81. Id. at 1005.
82. See supra note 1.
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with Shingleton, the insurer would at some point be joined. The statute
thus attempted to control the "timing of joinder during the course of a
trial, . . . [which] is, without question, a matter of practice or proce-
dure. .... "83 However, in his specially concurring opinion advocating
adoption of the substance of the invalid statute as a court rule, Justice
Alderman indicated that joinder or nonjoinder, not merely timing of
joinder, of insurers is procedural.8
Two years later, in Cozine v. Tullo,85 the court again faced the
issue with an equivalent statute prohibiting joinder of all liability insur-
ers. 86 Similarly begging the substantive-procedural question, the major-
ity held the statue unconstitutional "[flor the reasons expressed in
Markert v. Johnston. . . . 11 In his dissent, Justice McDonald ex-
pressed the view that neither section 627.7262(1)88 nor section
768.04589 was entirely procedural so as to encroach upon the court's
exlusive domain. In concluding that "substantive rights are affected by
the nonjoinder statutes,"90 he relied upon specific language in Shin-
gleton,91 and the fact that the insurance industry and the plaintiffs' bar
show such opposing interests in the joinder issue. This "fact" is un-
doubtedly correct. However, such reasoning does not compel the con-
clusion that nonjoinder statutes are substantive rather than procedural.
83. Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1006.
84. Id. See also, Piccolo v. Hertz Corp., 421 So. 2d 535, 536 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982)("The question of joinder is different from the question of whether a suit
may be maintained in the first place; the former is procedural, whereas the latter is
substantive.")
85. 394 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1981).
86. FLA. STAT. § 768.045 (1977). The principal difference from section 627.7262
(1977) was the inclusion of "liability" in the title, and the exclusion of "motor vehicle"
in the first sentence.
87. 394 So. 2d at 115 (1981).
88. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1977).
89. FLA. STAT. § 768.045 (1977).
90. Cozine, 394 So. 2d at 116.
91. [U]nless the legislature in the exercise of its police power regulation of
insurance, affirmatively gives insurers the substantive right to insert "no
joinder" clauses in liability policies there is no basis in law for insurers to
assume they have such contractual rights as a special privilege not granted
other citizens to contract immunity with their insureds from being sued as
joint defendants by strangers.
Id. (quoting Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19 (Fla. 1969)).
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The fact that the joinder issue is considered crucial does not render it
substantive. Furthermore, the Shingleton logic supports the conclusion
that there was no alteration of substantive law.92
The court's refusal to resolve the substantive-procedural contro-
versy involved in nonjoinder statutes impels extraction of its views on
the issue from other cases. Virtually all of these decisions rely on prin-
ciples announced in Shingleton.
The Beta Eta decision shed the first light on the substantive-proce-
dural issue. By affirming the decision of the first district,93 the supreme
court impliedly accepted the statement that the Shingleton decisions
"were not intended to nor do they have the effect of changing the sub-
stantive law of this state. These decisions have merely created a proce-
dural innovation which permits a direct action against a liability insur-
ance carrier as a codefendant in a suit brought against its
insured. . . ." Since the supreme court modified the district court's
decision on the severance issue,95 a debatable question existed as to the
supreme court's approval of the district court's statement that the sub-
stantive law of Florida prohibits any reference at trial to the defen-
dant's insurance coverage. (Joinder of the insurer necessarily involves
reference at trial to the defendant's insurance coverage).
The next venture into the "twilight zone" of substance and proce-
dure as it relates to joinder of insurers was in School Board of Brow-
ard County v. Surette.9" At issue was section 455.06(2), Florida Stat-
utes,97 which dealt with the liability and insurance of local
governmental units. Pursuant to the statute, a condition precedent to
automatic partial waiver of governmental immunity was that no at-
tempt to suggest the existence of insurance be made at trial. The su-
92. See Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718. The case was based primarily upon the
joinder provisions of 1.210(a) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note
23 and accompanying text.
93. Beta Eta House Corp., Inc. of Tallahassee v. Gregory, 230 So. 2d 495 (Fla.
1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970).
94. Id. at 499 (emphasis added). Accord Durrett v. Davidson, 239 So. 2d 46, 48
(Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1970); Kephart v. Pickens, 271 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1972).
95. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
96. 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
97. FLA. STAT. § 455.06(2)(1977).
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preme court agreed this provision was unconstitutional as contrary to
article V, section 2(a), 98 in light of the joinder and severance rules.
"This portion of Fla. Stat. § 455.06(2) which provides for severance of
a political body's insurer relates to joinder and severance, truly a proce-
dural matter, and is therefore superseded and rendered ineffec-
tive. . ... -9 Although the invalid portion of the statute referred to ref-
erences to insurance at trial, the court did not discuss any substantive
rights, indicating that none was involved. Thus it appeared the Beta
Eta district court's statements that references to insurance involved
substantive law were not accepted by the supreme court.
This became explicitly clear in Carter v. Sparkman,100 where the
court confronted another statute prohibiting references to insurance.
Section 768.47(1), Florida Statutes,101 prohibited "any reference to in-
surance, insurance coverage or joinder of an insurer as a codefendant in
the suit. °1 0 2 The court concluded the legislature intended only to bar
"any reference" to joinder of insurers rather than joinder itself.103 Fur-
thermore, the court held that "references" to insurance or insurance
companies during the course of a trial "is a purely procedural matter
having to do with the conduct of trial proceedings. To the extent the
Legislature has attempted to control 'references' during the course of
trial . . . it has acted beyond its power." 1 4
In School Board of Broward County v. Price,10 5 the court stated
98. FLA. STAT. art V, § 2(a).
99. Surette, 281 So. 2d at 483.
100. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
101. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1)(1977), formerly FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1)(1975),
enacted as part of the Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1975.
102. FLA. STAT. § 768.47(1), formerly FLA. STAT. § 768.134(1).
103. Carter v. Sparkman, 335 So. 2d 802, 806 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977). The court could have addressed the substantive-procedural aspect of
joinder here too.
104. Id. at 806(Fla. 1976)(footnote omitted). In view of the legislature's special
finding of a "crisis" in skyrocketing medical malpractice premiums (Preamble to ch.
75-9, 1975 Fla. Laws 15), the court adopted the substance of the "reference" provision
as rule 1.450(c) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. Adoption of a nonjoinder rule
was unsuccessfully urged upon the Markert court. See Brief for Respondent at 14,
Markert v. Johnston, 367 So. 2d 1003 (1978).
105. 362 So. 2d 1337 (Fla. 1978).
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specifically it was receding from the Surette1 08 holding. Section
230.23(9)(d)(2), Florida Statutes,0 7 contains a provision substantially
identical to the statute in Surette and conditions waiver of governmen-
tal immunity upon no suggestion at trial of the existence of insurance.
Adhering to the precedent of Surette,108 Sparkman,109 and Godshall,110
the Fourth District Court of Appeal concluded the statute was uncon-
stitutional. In its reversal, the supreme court distinguished the Spark-
man statute since it was "part of an enactment, under the Legislature's
police power, to meet a public health crisis in Florida. The prohibition
of insurance references at trial, although undoubtedly designed to re-
duce the crisis, was clearly not part of any substantive right."' " Fur-
thermore, the statute at issue in Price waives sovereign immunity for
school boards. This is specifically within the constitutional power of the
legislature.112 The prohibition of the statute "sets the bounds of the
substantive right to sue a political subdivision of the State."11 3 Thus,
the legislature's constitutional authority to waive sovereign immunity
and its implicit power to condition the waiver "saved" the statute by
injecting substantive rights.1 4
Although not involving insurance companies, Avila South Condo-
minium Association, Inc. v. Kappa Corp.,115 also sheds light on the
court's views of substance and procedure. The court held that the legis-
lative attempt to confer standing on a condominium association to
bring a class action on behalf of its members was an impermissible
violation of article V, section 2(a). Citing Justice Adkin's standard for
106. 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
107. FLA. STAT. § 230.23(9)(2) (1979).
108. 281 So. 2d 481.
109. 335 So. 2d 802.
110. Godshall v. Unigard Ins. Co., 281 So. 2d 499 (Fla. 1973).
111. Price, 362 So. 2d at 1339.
112. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 13 authorizes the legislature to enact provisions for
bringing suit against the state.
113. Price, 362 So. 2d at 1339.
114. The court "excused" the incompatible Surette decision because it didn't ap-
pear that this constitutional argument had been advanced before the Surette court. On
the contrary, this argument was cogently urged upon the court. See Reply Brief for
Petitioner at 3-5, and Brief for Amicus Curiae at 4, School Bd. of Broward County v.
Surette, 281 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1973).
115. 347 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1977).
6051
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distinguishing between substance and procedure,11 the court concluded
that "[e]ssentially the statutory sections seek to define the proper par-
ties in suits litigating substantive rights. Clearly this has to do with 'the
machinery of the judicial process as opposed to the product
thereof.' ,117
These decisions indicate the court continues to adhere to "strict"
substantive-procedural definitions. The fact that a rule of procedure
may reflect prevailing public policy does not enable the legislature to
invade the court's rulemaking authority.1 8 The court has specifically
stated that joinder is truly a procedural matter,119 that references at
trial to insurance coverage is clearly not part of any substantive
right, 20 and that the determination of proper parties in suits litigating
substantive rights is a procedural matter.121
The New Statute - Section 627.7262
The new section was "substantially reworded to permit insurers to
insert non-joinder clauses in their contracts.1 22 Subsection (1) states,
in essence, that a plaintiff may not sue a liability insurer until a judg-
ment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause of action
covered by the policy. Subsection (2) provides that no person shall be
considered a third party beneficiary under a liability insurance policy
until a judgment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause
of action covered by the policy. Subsection (3) "affirmatively" grants to
insurers the "substantive" right to include provisions in policies which
preclude a noninsured person from filing an action against the insurer
until a judgment first has been obtained against the insured for a cause
116. See supra text accompanying note 72.
117. 347 So.. 2d at 608. Observing that "the peculiar features of condominium
development, ownership, and operation indicate the wisdom of providing a procedural
vehicle for settlement of disputes affecting condominium owners,. . ." the court
adopted the substance of the stricken statute as Rule 1.220 of the Florida Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id.
118. See Markert, 367 So. 2d at 1005, n.8.
119. See supra text accompanying note 104.
120. See supra text accompanying note 111.
121. See supra text accompanying note 117.
122. STAFF REPORT, supra note 8, at 92.
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of action which is covered by the policy.12
Subsections (1) and (2) are in direct opposition to Shingleton prin-
ciples. The Shingleton court viewed the injured party's cause of action
against the insurer as vesting in or accruing at the same time the party
becomes entitled to sue the insured. 24 Thus, initial joinder was permis-
sible. Subsection (2) is an attempt to abrogate the third party benefi-
ciary principles first articulated in Shingleton. As previously dis-
cussed,25 Shingleton and Beta Eta established that liability insurance
is secured with the intent to benefit injured third parties. Based on this
doctrine, joinder of liability insurers was permissible.
At first blush, subsection (3) appears to receive support from Shin-
gleton. The Shingleton court noted that the joinder rule "raises the
presumption that unless the Legislature in the exercise of its police
power regulation of insurance, affirmatively gives insurers the substan-
tive right to insert 'no joinder' clauses in liability policies there is no
basis in law for insurers to assume they have such contractual
right. .... ,,126 However, much of the opinion indicates that the legisla-
ture cannot constitutionally grant such right to the insurance compa-
nies. In striking these no joinder clauses, the court relied upon the Flor-
123. By use of the terminology "for a cause of action which is covered by such
policy," the statute should have no effect on an injured person's right to bring a direct
action against the insurer for recovery of judgment in excess of policy limits, based on
alleged fraud or bad faith of insurer in conduct or handling of suit. See, e.g., Thompson
v. Commercial Union Ins. Co. of New York, 250 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 1971); Boston Old
Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 388 So. 2d 54 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 922
(1981); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Perez, 384 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
124. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 716. Accord Travelers Ins. Co. v. Perez, 384 So.
2d 971, 973 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980). But cf. Davis v. Williams 239 So. 2d 593,
595 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1970) and Clemons v. Flagler Hosp., Inc., 385 So. 2d
1134, 1135-36 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980)(for statute of limitations purposes, the
injured party's cause of action against the insurer does not accrue until entry of judg-
ment against the tortfeasor).
125. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
126. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 718-19 (Fla. 1969). But see J. Drew's dissenting
opinion at page 722 ("The majority opinion, in relying solely upon Rule 1.210. . .and
our rule-making power under the Constitution for the conclusion there reached neces-
sarily holds that the Legislature is wholly devoid of power to enact laws prohibiting
joinder of insurance companies as parties defendant under the circumstances presented
in this case.").
607 1Florida Statutes 627.7262
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ida Constitution's guarantee of access to the courts. 2 7 Furthermore, in
discussing the procedural effects of these clauses, whereby a plaintiff
would have to first recover a judgment against the tortfeasor and then
file another action against the insurance company to enforce the judg-
ment, the court stated:
The unfettered right of a plaintiff to sue defendants jointly is so
universal and essential to due process that it can rarely be cur-
tailed or restricted by private contract between potential
defendants.
...It is an anomaly in the law and discriminatory for parties
to a contract to attempt to deny nonconsenting members of the
public a full, complete, adequate remedy at law which is constitu-
tionally guaranteed all citizens.
. . . [I]t seems anomalous to public policy to procedurally
sanction and condone a situation where the ultimate beneficiary of
policy proceeds is deprived by a provision in the policy of an open,
speedy and realistic opportunity to pursue by due process his right
of an adequate remedy at law jointly against the insured and
insurer.128
The constitutional overtones are clear. If due process is violated by
the insertion of nonjoinder clauses in insurance policies, the fact that
the legislature grants the power to do so does not eliminate the viola-
tion. In other words, the legislature has no more authority to violate
due process than have insurance companies. 29
127. Id. at 718.("The insured and the insurer cannot constitutionally contract
away or postpone the speedy and adequate remedy the law affords a third party, nor
impose unusual limitations upon the latter's right to jointly sue adverse parties.").
128. Shingleton, 223 So. 2d at 717-19 (emphasis added).
129. If a law is passed by unanimous legislature, clamoured for by the
general voice of the public, and a cause is before [a judge] on it, in which
the whole community is on one side and an individual nameless or odious
on the other, and he believe it to be against the constitution, he must so
declare it, - or there is no judge.
Brief for Respondent at 5, O'Quinn v. Thompson, 367 So. 2d 1003(Fla. 1978)(consoli-
dated case in Markert)(quoting address of Attorney General Rufus Choate, given
before the Constitutional Convention of 1853).
Nova Law Journal 7:1983
166





Most likely the court will scrutinize the new statute to determine
whether it is substantive or procedural. Although the word "nonjoin-
der" has been excluded from the text of the statute, 3 ' the effect of the
new statute is identical to that of the old statute: to prohibit initial
joinder of the insurer by making a judgment against the insured a con-
dition precedent to maintenance of a cause of action against the in-
surer. As such, the legislature has again attempted to prescribe the
timing of joinder. The supreme court has clearly held that any such
attempt is an unconstitutional usurpation by the legislature of the judi-
cial function. The new statute, like the old, will not withstand judicial
scrutiny on this point.
Liability insurers control the litigation, choose the attorneys, de-
fend the case, and have a direct financial interest in the outcome. The
Florida judiciary has recognized that realism dictates continued ac-
knowledgement of liability insurers as real parties in interest in actions
to determine the insured's liability. Keeping this reality in mind, the
court should directly address the substantive-procedural issue and make
a definitive statement. Since Shingleton, the court has not expressed a
clear policy, and in fact has gone to great lengths to avoid the issue.
Should the court determine the new statute substantive rather than
procedural, the due process issues expressed in Shingleton surely de-
serve further attention - much more than the court has been willing
to give.
Ilene D. Napp
130. The statute is still entitled "Nonjoinder of Insurers". FLA. CONST. art. III,
§ 6 requires the text of a statute to come within the scope of its title.
6091Florida Statutes 627.7262
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Entrapment: A Review of the Principles of Law
Governing This Defense as Applied by the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals
Certain types of criminal activity are consensual and covert. Hence
they are virtually undetectable without the use of a government
agent or informer. Narcotics peddlers, brokers of counterfeit
currency. . . all do business clandestinely. Their crimes are likely
to go unchecked unless the government can itself approach a
suspect to offer him the opportunity to commit a crime and thus
give evidence of his guilt.'
Introduction
A sentiment clearly evinced by the Fifth and Eleventh Circuit
Courts of Appeals is that informants and undercover government
agents are necessary to combat crime.2 The use of these methods by
law enforcement agencies has caused an outcry from criminal defen-
dants and their attorneys.3 The cry "I was entrapped" has become
quite commonplace, and thus a popular avenue of defense. However,
the general principles of law regarding the defense of entrapment are
multi-faceted. The purpose of this note is to review those principles as
they have been applied by the recently organized Eleventh Circuit and
its progenitor, the former Fifth Circuit.4
Burdens of Proof
The entrapment defense was first recognized by the United States
1. Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163, 165 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396
U.S. 960 (1969).
2. United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381, 385 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102
S. Ct. 2908 (1982).
3. See Winter, Probing the Probers, Does Abscam Go Too Far? 68 A.B.A. J.
1347 (1982).
4. The Eleventh Circuit in the case Bonner v. City of Pritchard, 661 F.2d 1206
(11th Cir. 1981) (en banc), adopted as precedent the decisions of the former Fifth
Circuit handed down prior to the close of the business day September 30, 1981.
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Supreme Court in Sorrells v. United States.5 The Court has since re-
stated that entrapment occurs "when the criminal design originates
with the officials of the Government, and they implant in the mind of
an innocent person the disposition to commit the alleged offense and
induce its commission in order that they may prosecute."' Thus, the
central theme of the entrapment defense is that the individual lacked
the predisposition to commit the crime.7
Since entrapment is an affirmative defense, the defendant must
present some initial evidence before the issue is properly raised.8 Al-
though the Fifth Circuit employed various formulations of the defen-
dant's burden of production in United States v. Hill,9 the Eleventh Cir-
cuit has arrived at a definitive standard:
If there is any evidence in the record that, if believed by the jury,
would show that the government's conduct created a substantial
risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than
one ready to commit it, then, as in all other cases, involving ques-
tions of guilt or innocence, the jury must be permitted to resolve
the matter.10
5. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
6. United States v. Branca, 677 F.2d 59, 61 (1 th Cir. 1982) (quoting Sorrells v.
United States, 287 U.S. 435, 442 (1932)).
7. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 834 (11th Cir. 1982). See also United
States v. Humphrey, 670 F.2d 153, 155 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Webster,
649 F.2d 346, 348 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
8. See Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155; Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384.
9. 626 F.2d 1301, 1303 n.3 (5th Cir. 1980), the court noted that the different
constructions of the defendant's burden of production had not lead to dissimilar results.
They settled with the Pierce formulation, while inviting comparisons of the various
tests. Compare e.g., United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77, 80 (5th Cir. 1979)("defen-
dant must adduce some evidence, more than a scintilla, which tends to show govern-
ment inducement and lack of predisposition"), with United States v. Timberlake, 559
F.2d 1375, 1379 (5th Cir. 1977)(defendant must submit entrapment theory "for which
there is any foundation in the evidence"), and with United States v. Gomez-Rojas, 507
F.2d 1213, 1218 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 826 (1975) (defendant must
present "a prima facie case of entrapment indicating the government created a 'sub-
stantial risk that the offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to
commit it' ").
10. Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155 (originally enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in
Pierce, 414 F.2d at 168).
169
et al.: Nova Law Review Full Issue
Published by NSUWorks, 1983
Entrapment
7:1983
This standard requires the defendant come forward with evidence
showing the government's conduct created a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by a person other than one ready to com-
mit it." Whether the defendant's evidence is sufficient to meet this bur-
den of production is a question of law for the court. 2 Former Fifth
Circuit opinions appear to only require some evidence of government
inducement.. In Hill, however, the Fifth Circuit Court made clear that
"a reading of those cases reveal[ed] that 'inducement' represent[ed]
more than mere suggestion, solicitation, or initiation of contact and, in
fact, embodies an element of persuasion or mild coercion functionally
equivalent to that denoted in the Pierce formulation .. ."IS To raise
entrapment, a defendant must, therefore, prove more than that the gov-
ernment solicited him or provided the opportunity for the crime.' 4 He
must show "mild persuasion or coercion"' 5 by the government. Evi-
dence from the government's case in chief may be sufficient to raise the
issue.' 6 Once the defendant has sustained this burden, the issue of en-
trapment becomes a question of fact for the jury.'7
11. The Eleventh Circuit recalled the comparisons made by the Hill court, and
similarly adopted the "substantial risk" formulation of Pierce in Humphrey, 670 F.2d
at 155.
12. United States v. Tate, 554 F.2d 1341, 1344 (5th Cir. 1977).
13. 626 F.2d at 1304. Also, in Hill the court invited perusal of prior cases in
which defendants had submitted evidence of government inducement. These cases in-
cluded United States v. Hammond, 598 F.2d 1008, 1011 (5th Cir. 1979) (testimony
indicated that the government had thought of a scheme, attempted to "push" it on
defendant, and that defendant had not favorably received the government plan); Tim-
berlake, 559 F.2d at 1379 (numerous attempts at setting up illicit deals had failed and
witness testified that on at least one occasion defendant had directly rejected govern-
ment entreaty); United States v. Costello, 483 F.2d 1366, 1367-68 (5th Cir. 1973)(up-
holding trial court's refusal to submit entrapment question, finding no "inducement"
where there was no evidence of persuasion or coercion, even though government agent
proposed the illicit transaction to the defendant).
14. 679 F.2d at 835. See also Tobias, 662 F.2d at 384 (citing United States v.
Dickens, 524 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 994 (1976)): "A prose-
cution cannot be defeated merely because a government has provided the accused with
the opportunity or the facilities for the commission of the crime."
15. Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 835.
16. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord Hill, 626 F.2d
1301, and Pierce, 414 F.2d 163.
17. United States v. Groessel, 440 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1971).
613 1
170
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
614 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
After having satisfied the burden of production, the burden of per-
suasion will then be on the government to prove that the defendant was
predisposed to commit the charged offense beyond a reasonable
doubt.18 The government must show that the defendant was ready and
willing without persuasion to commit the offense and that the govern-
ment merely provided a propitious opportunity.1 9
In addition, the law of the Eleventh Circuit requires that the de-
fendant admit the acts charged against him when he pleads entrap-
ment °.2 The rationale for this rule is based on the fact that it would be
inconsistent to deny the very acts upon which the prosecution is predi-
cated at the same time as pleading the defense of entrapment, which
assumes that acts charged were committed.21
Predisposition
"The function of law enforcement is the prevention of crime and
the apprehension of criminals. Manifestly, that function does not in-
clude the manufacturing of crime. Criminal activity is such that stealth
and strategy are necessary weapons in the arsenal of the police of-
18. Humphrey, 670 F.2d at 155.
19. See Wolffs, 594 F.2d at 80; United States v. Benavidez, 558 F.2d 308, 310
(5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Sherman, 200 F.2d 880, 882-83 (2d Cir.
1952)(Hand, J.).
20. See United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d 1329 (1lth Cir. 1982) and United
States v. Nicoll, 664 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1982). This premise has been hotly debated
throughout the circuits. Compare United States v. Greenfield, 554 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1977), with United States v. Demma, 523 F.2d 981 (9th Cir. 1975)(en banc) (both
cases allowed defendant to both deny wrongdoing and plead entrapment). A narrow
exception to this rule was articulated in Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139, 143-44
(5th Cir. 1965). The court held that a defendant may argue simultaneously that he was
entrapped to commit the overt acts charged in the indictment but was not a member of
the conspiracy. This holding, however, is limited to the situation where the govern-
ment's own case in chief injects substantial evidence to support a theory of entrapment.
In this event the defense is raised-by a motion of acquittal and by a' requested jury
instruction in which the government must still prove beyond a reasonable doubt defen-
dant's guilt of the act charged. For a discussion of this debate see note, Denial of the
Crime and the Availability of the Entrapment Defense in the Federal Courts, 22
B.C.L. REV. 911 (1981).
21. United States v. Williamson, 482 F.2d 508, 513 (5th Cir. 1973).
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ficer." 22 Nevertheless, the fact that government agents merely afford
opportunity for the commission of an offense does not constitute entrap-
ment: "[T]o determine whether entrapment has been established a line
must be drawn between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap
for the unwary criminal. 28 The defendant's lack of predisposition to
commit the crime is the principal element of the entrapment defense. 4
Evidence Admissible to Prove Predisposition
The United States Supreme Court has enunciated a number of
elements which can be considered in determining whether a defendant
was a person "otherwise innocent" 25 in whom the government had im-
planted the criminal design. These elements were more distinctly stated
by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Reynoso Ulloa. 2
1. The character of the defendant including any previous criminal
activity.
2. Whether the suggestion to engage in criminal activity originated
with the government.
3. Whether defendant sought financial profit from the criminal
activity.
4. Whether there is evidence of reluctance on the part of the defen-
dant to proceed with the offense.
5. Whether the government induced the defendant to act by repeti-
tive persuasion.
6. The nature of the government's inducement or persuasion.
The United States Supreme Court has found evidence of a reluctance
to engage in criminal activity which was overcome by repeated govern-
ment inducement to be highly significant.28
22. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
23. Id. at 372.
24. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
25. Sherman, 356 U.S. at 372.
26. 548 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 926 (1977).
27. Id. at 1336. However, fact number two does not prove entrapment since mere
solicitation is insufficient. See Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
28. See, e.g., Sherman, 365 U.S. at 373 (one request by government was not
enough, "additional ones were necessary to overcome, first petitioners refusal, then his
evasiveness, and then his hesitancy. . . "); Sorrells, 287 U.S. 436 (The government
615 1
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By raising a defense of entrapment, the defendant opens himself
up to a "searching inquiry into his own conduct and predisposition." 9
Evidence of the defendant's prior similar acts is essential to the ques-
tion of predisposition, and under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) evi-
dence of prior convictions are admissible to prove predisposition. The
government, however, is not restricted to only introducing past crimes
to prove predisposition. A defendant's use of drugs may be effective to
establish a predisposition to deal in narcotics when he is charged with
an offense of this nature. 1 In addition, the defendant's own statements
may provide evidence of his predisposition. In United States v. Jen-
kins, 2 the court found that the defendant's post-crime statement ("if
you need more, I'll be there"3 3) constituted sufficient evidence to permit
the trier of fact to infer a prior willingness to commit a narcotics of-
fense. It is important to note, however that the government may not
introduce out-of-court statements about the defendant's reputation for
criminal conduct as evidence of predisposition.
agent asked for liquor and was twice refused, but the agent persisted in soliciting the
defendant and taking advantage of sentiment aroused by conversation about their ser-
vice together as companions in World War I.).
29. Sorrells, 287 U.S. at 451.
30. Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) states:
Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show that he
acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other
purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake.
31. United States v. Smith, 407 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1969). It is also significant to
note that testimony concerning a defendant's drug use at the time of the crime would
have been admissible to establish the res gestae. See United States v. McDaniel, 574
F.2d 1224, 1227 (5th Cir. 1978).
32. 480 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1973).
33. Id. at 1200.
34. See United States v. Webster, 649 F.2d 346, 347 (5th Cir. 1981)(en banc),
where the court held that "only in special circumstances may the government prove
what its agents have been told about the defendant as evidence of good faith, reasona-
bleness or proper motive of the government and then only to rebut contrary assertions
by the defendant." In Webster, the defendant was charged with possessing and distrib-
uting cocaine. The defendant's defense was entrapment. He tried to prove that his ille-
gal acts were precipitated by the incessant urgings of a female informant. To rebut this
claim that the defendant was just an "innocent dupe," a Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration Agent testified for the prosecution that a few months before the arrest he had
Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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Once a defendant makes it clear that his defense is entrapment,
there is nothing to prevent the prosecution from going forward with its
evidence on predisposition. Thus, the prosecution need not wait until
rebuttal to introduce predisposition evidence, but may do so in its case
in chief. In United States v. Vendetti, 5 after the defendant raised the
entrapment defense in his opening statement, the government presented
its evidence of predisposition during its case in chief. The defendant
attacked this order of proof in his appeal. The court responded: "No
cases are cited, nor can be found which require the prosecutor to wait
until a defendant has fully developed his proof before presenting evi-
dence on predisposition."' 6
Entrapment as a Matter of Law
Many defendants have argued entrapment as a matter of law rely-
ing upon United States v. Bueno.7 In Bueno, the facts gave rise to
what later has been called a "full circle" transaction 8 in which a gov-
ernment agent supplied drugs to the defendant for sale to another gov-
ernment agent.3 9 This type of transaction is distinguished from the
more common one, where the defendant procures the narcotics from a
private source. However this case and others like it, which have found
entrapment as a matter of law, have been undermined, if not rejected
entirely. 0 The United States Supreme Court, in Hampton v. United
been told by a reliable informant that he had purchased cocaine from the defendant on
several occasions. The trial court had allowed this testimony because prior to Webster
the Fifth Circuit had permitted the prosecution to introduce both hearsay and double-
level hearsay as a means of proving the defendant's predisposition. This evidence was
permitted through the character/reputation provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence
404(a)(1), 405 and 803(21) collectively). In striking down this practice the Webster
court adamantly asserted: "predisposition is a state of mind, not a character trait." 649
F.2d at 350.
35. No. 7805668, slip op. at 1 (5th Cir. Apr. 24, 1979).
36. Id. at 2. In addition, the procedure under attack was followed and approved
in Rocha v. United States, 401 F.2d 529, 530 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
1103 (1969).
37. 447 F.2d 903 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 949 (1973).
38. See United States v. Evers, 552 F.2d 1119, 1122 (5th Cir. 1977), reh'g de-
nied, 556 F.2d 579 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 929 (1977).
39. Id.
40. Id. The court intimated that the Bueno defense had become obsolete in the
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States,41 indicated that not even a "full circle" transaction was entrap-
ment "per se". This is because the primary focus of the entrapment
defense is not on what acts the government agents committed, but
rather on whether the defendant was predisposed to commit the of-
fense.4 2 If the defendant was willing to commit the act, no entrapment
occurs regardless of surrounding circumstances.
Governmental Misconduct and Overreaching
The governmental misconduct defense, also available to defendants
and often employed in tandem with entrapment, is based on principles
of due process and the supervisory powers of the court. While the en-
trapment defense requires the court to focus on predisposition of the
defendant to commit the crime, the United States Supreme Court has
established that, for cases involving alleged governmental misconduct,
the focus of the court's inquiry shall be directed solely toward the gov-
ernment's conduct. 43 Often cited by defendants in support of this de-
fense is the following statement from United States v. Russell." "[W]e
may some day be presented with a situation in which the conduct of
law enforcement agents is so outrageous that due process principles
would absolutely bar the government from invoking judicial processes
to obtain a conviction. . . . "" This was the type of defense employed
in Rochin v. California.46 In Rochin, the United States Supreme Court
found that the record revealed "a shocking series of violations of consti-
tutional rights."' 47 In that case, deputy sheriffs illegally broke into
wake of Hampton v. United States, 425 U.S. 484 (1976) and United States v. Russell,
411 U.S. 423 (1973). In United States v. Graves, 556 F.2d 1319 (5th 1977), reh'g
denied, 562 F.2d 1257, (1977) cert. denied, 435 U.S. 923 (1978), the court stated
"whatever the fate of Bueno, it is now clear that the expression 'entrapment as a mat-
ter of law', has become a misnomer with respect to predisposed defendants." Id. at
1324.
41. 425 U.S. at 489-90.
42. Whether the defense is designed to deter objectionable police conduct or to
protect "otherwise innocent" defendants is discussed in Note, Entrapment: A Source of
Continuing Confusion in the Lower Courts, 5 AM. J. TRIAL AD. 293 (1981).
43. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490.
44. United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973).
45. Id. at 431-32.
46. 342 U.S. 164 (1952).
47. Id. at 172.
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Rochin's home and forceably attempted to extract capsules which
Rochin had ingested. At the hospital, the deputy sheriffs directed a
doctor to "pump" Rochin's stomach in order to obtain two morphine
capsules. The Court found this was conduct that "shocks the con-
science" 48 and offends even those with hardened sensibilities, constitut-
ing methods "too close to the rack and screw."'49 Both the Hampton
and Rochin decisions indicate the defense is intended to embody only
profoundly outrageous and shocking conduct which violate the defen-
dant's constitutional rights.50
While the Court in those cases stated they cannot condone police
activity as employed in Rochin, the Supreme Court asserted that it will
not allow defendants to raise "defenses" which in essence, would give
the federal judiciary an absolute veto right over law enforcement
practices.51
Use of Confidential Informants
An issue often appearing in relation to government conduct is the
government's use of confidential informants. 52 Defendants frequently
rely on Williamson v. United States. 3 In Williamson, a Fifth Circuit
case, an informer was hired by a government agent to procure evidence
against persons known by the agent to be involved in an illicit whiskey
business. The informer would be rewarded predetermined sums upon
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Due process considerations are given excellent treatment in Note, Entrap-
ment as a Due Process Defense: Developments After Hampton v. United States 57
IND. L.J. (1982) and Abramson & Lindeman, Entrapment and Due Process in the
Federal Courts, 8 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 139 (1980).
51. Hampton, 425 U.S. at 490. See also United States v. Tobias, 662 F.2d 381
(5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 2908 (1982), which sets the "outer limits to
which the government may go in the quest to ferret out and prosecute crimes in this
circuit," id. at 387, without violating due process notions. (D.E.A. established a chemi-
cal supply plant, placed an advertisement in High Times Magazine offering chemicals
and laboratory equipment, set-up and advised the defendant how to manufacture
Phencyclidene (P.C.P.)).
52. For a discussion on how law enforcement agencies are using unsuspecting
middlemen to, in effect, destroy the entrapment defense, see Note, Entrapment
Through Unsuspecting Middlemen, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1122 (1982).
53. 311 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
619 1Entrapment17:1983
176
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
620 Nova Law Journal 7:1983
conviction of several specified individuals. The informant made the
transaction for which the defendants were convicted. However, the re-
cord lacked evidence to indicate the agents had sufficient knowledge of
defendant's involvement in the illicit whiskey trade to justify con-
tracting on a contingent fee basis to obtain legally admissible evidence.
Further, the record did not show whether the agents carefully in-
structed the informer on the rules of entrapment. Under these circum-
stances, the court held that it could not sanction the contingent fee
arrangement.
The Fifth Circuit, however, declined to extend Williamson to
other contingency fee arrangements." The court, in United States v.
McClure,55 listed the following factors for taking a case out of the do-
main of Williamson: (1) the possibility that the informant was in-
structed in the law of entrapment,56 (2) that the agent and not the
informant made the purchase 57 and (3) prior to employing the inform-
ant, the agent did not know the defendant.58 Additionally, in United
States v. Edwards,5 9 the court held that Williamson would not be use-
ful to defendants where the informant had been given a subsistence
allowance, with a later reward following conviction, so long as he was
not given a specific sum to convict a particular person.
Jury Instructions
The defendant must show "mild persuasion or coercion""0 on the
54. See, e.g., United States v. Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. de-
nied, 414 U.S. 913 (1973)(where the Court refused to apply Williamson to a case in
which no specific arrangement for payment existed, no particular person was the target
of the effort to buy, and in which the purchase was made by the government agent, not
the informer); United States v. Onori, 535 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. 1976) (the court held
that the fact that an informant was paid on a contingent fee basis for making a case
did not make it entrapment).
55. 546 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1977).
56. Id. at 673. See also United States v. Garcia 528 F.2d 580 (5th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 898 (1976).
57. McClure, 546 F.2d at 673. See also Jenkins, 480 F.2d 1198.
58. McClure, 546 F.2d at 674. See also United States v. Joseph, 533 F.2d 282
(5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 905 (1977).
59. 549 F.2d 362 (5th Cir. 1977).
60. United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982).
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part of the government before he is entitled to an entrapment instruc-
tion."' While evidence from the government's case in chief may be suf-
ficient to raise the issue of entrapment,62 the entrapment issue need not
be presented to the jury if the evidence does not sufficiently raise the
issue.63 The United States Supreme Court stated in Lopez v. United
States: "Indeed the paucity of the showing [of entrapment] might
well have justified a refusal to instruct the jury at all on entrapment."6 5
United States v. Pierce"6 enunciated the Eleventh Circuit's policy on
the instruction: "If the record as a whole is devoid of such [entrap-
ment] evidence, astute defense counsel may not invite confusion of the
jury by seeking charges on this or any other problem not presented by
the case before the court. '6 7 Nevertheless, failure to give an instruction
when the defendant has met his burden is reversible error.68 The in-
struction should state that the government has the burden of proof be-
yond a reasonablb doubt to show the defendant was predisposed to
commit the crime.69
Conclusion
Entrapment has been employed to defend those charged with
crimes ranging from counterfeiting to illegally shipping obscene materi-
als. Most frequently it has been relied upon to defend those charged
with crimes involving the purchase of narcotics. This defense is most
61. Id. at 835 (only showing made was government made initial contact).
62. United States v. Reyes, 645 F.2d 285 (5th Cir. 1981). Accord United States
v. Hill, 626 F.2d 1301 (5th Cir. 1980); Pierce v. United States, 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir.
1969).
63. Pierce, 414 F.2d at 167.
64. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
65. Id. at 436.
66. 414 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1969).
67. Id. at 168.
68. Bagnell, 679 F.2d at 835.
69. However, it is not reversible error if the jury charge fails to unequivocally
state that the government had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was not entrapped so long as the court has given a general instruction on
the burden of proof and has told the jury to consider the charge as a whole. United
States v. Sonntag, 684 F.2d 781 (11 th Cir. 1982); United States v. Vadino, 680 F.2d
1329 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979).
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appropriate when the defendant has been apprehended because of evi-
dence developed by undercover police officers and confidential
informants.
However, the entrapment defense often has been misapplied and
misunderstood. Prosecutors and defense counsel alike must be alert to
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Federal Judges' Absolute Immunity from Criminal
Prosecution Prior to Impeachment: U.S. v. Hastings
I. INTRODUCTION
On January 19, 1983, in Miami's federal courthouse, opening
statements began in the criminal trial of Federal Judge Alcee L. Has-
tings, United States District Judge for the Southern District of Florida.
Judge Hastings had been indicted for bribery. Prior to the commence-
ment of this criminal trial, Judge Hastings instituted a constitutional
challenge to the criminal justice system. Judge Hastings is the first fed-
eral judge in United States history to claim that an active federal judge
is immune from criminal prosecution prior to impeachment by
Congress.
The major issue throughout this monumental case is best stated by
the Roman philosopher, Juvenal: "Quis quatodiet ipsos custodes, or,
who is to judge the judges[?]" 1 This article will focus on the decision
issued by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.2 The position taken in
this paper is not designed to address the merits of the criminal trial.
Nor is this article to be construed as to imply the guilt or innocence of
Judge Hastings but rather to examine the narrow procedural issues dis-
cussed in the decision by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
1. Thompson & Pollitt, Impeachment of Federal Judges-An Historical Over-
view, 49 N.C.L. REV. 87, 87 (1970).
2. The first issue in United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982),
whether the court of appeals has jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal, will not be
discussed in this article. The Eleventh Circuit held that they had jurisdiction because
the issue was collateral in that it could not be effectively reviewed from a final judg-
ment. See Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S.
651 (1977); United States v. Brizendine, 659 F.2d 215 (D.C. Cir. 1981); United States
v. Dunbar, 611 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Myers, 635 F.2d 932 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 956 (1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1254(c) (1976); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1976).
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II. INDICTMENT
On December 29, 1981, a federal grand jury, in the Southern Dis-
trict of Florida, returned a four count indictment against Federal Judge
Alcee L. Hastings and William A. Borders, Jr. Mr. Borders, allegedly
became involved with Judge Hastings when an undercover agent, pos-
ing as a defendant in one of Hastings' cases (United States v. Ro-
mano)3 approached Borders to set up a bribe. Other than this connec-
tion, Mr. Borders had not been involved in any way with this case.
Hastings, a federal judge since November 30, 1979, was charged with
offenses in two counts of the indictment.'
The first count charged Judge Hastings with "conspiracy to solicit
and accept money in return for unlawful influence in performance of
lawful governmental functions in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371."' The
indictment charged that Judge Hastings and Mr. Borders solicited and
accepted a bribe from an undercover agent posing as a defendant in
Romano. Specifically, Hastings was alleged to have agreed to reduce
the defendant's prison sentence and to revoke an order which required
the defendant to forfeit certain property in return for $150,000.6
3. 523 F. Supp. 1209 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
4. Counts III and IV of the indictment charged only Borders with traveling in
interstate commerce in furtherance of bribery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1976).
After a change of venue to the Northern District of Georgia, Borders was convicted by
a jury on all four counts on May 7, 1982. He has appealed the conviction.
5. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 707 n.2 (1982). 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1976) provides in full:
If two or more persons conspire either to commit any offense against the
United States, or to defraud the United States, or any agency thereof in
any manner or for any purpose, and one or more of such persons do any
act to effect the object of the conspiracy, each shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
If, however, the offense, the commission of which is the object of the
conspiracy, is a misdemeanor only, the punishment for such conspiracy
shall not exceed the maximum punishment provided for such
misdemeanor.
However, in the Brief for Appellant the Hon. Alcee L. Hastings at 3, United States v.
Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Hastings Brief] the
charge stated that he "had been influenced in making a judicial decision by the prom-
ise of a bribe. (R. 1-5)." (emphasis added).
6. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 707.
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The second count charged Hastings "with corruptly impeding due
administration of justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 12 and § 1503.''7
The indictment alleged that Hastings obstructed the due administration
of justice by disclosing to Borders the substance of the unissued order
in Romano. The acts alleged would have involved the exercise of Has-
tings' judicial authority.
Hastings' first argument was made in the motion to quash the in-
dictments. He claimed that a federal district court does not have juris-
diction over the criminal prosecution of an active federal judge prior to
removal from office. This motion was denied by the district court. How-
ever, on appeal, a stay was granted by the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals" until they reviewed and affirmed the district court's decision
7. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 707 n.2.
18 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) provides in full:
(a) Whoever commits an offense against the United States or aids, abets,
counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is punishable as a
principal.
(b) Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if directly performed
by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is pun-
ishable as a principal.
18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976) provides in full:
Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter
or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any wit-
ness, in any court of the United States or before any United States magis-
trate or other committing magistrate, or any grand or petit juror, or officer
in or of any court of the United States or officer who may be serving at
any examination or other proceeding before any United States magistrate
or other committing magistrate, in discharge of his duty, or injures any
party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or
having attended such court or examination before such officer, magistrate,
or other committing magistrate, or on account of his testifying or having
testified to any matter pending therein .... or injures any such officer,
magistrate, or other committing magistrate in his person or property on
account of the performance of his official duties, or corruptly or by threats
or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, influences, ob-
structs, or impedes, or endeavors to influence, obstruct or impede, the due
administration of justice, shall be fined not more than $5000 or impris-
oned not more than five years, or both.
(emphasis added).
8. Historically, when a criminal action was brought against a federal judge, prior
to impeachment, the House of Representatives stayed its hand until the criminal pro-
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rejecting Hastings' argument. As a result of the Eleventh Circuit's de-
cision, the criminal trial commenced on January 19, 1983, prior to the
initiation of any impeachment proceeding.
III. HASTINGS' THREE ARGUMENTS
A. Textual Reading of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of United States
Constitution
Hastings raised three major issues on appeal. The first argument
was that a literal reading of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of the
United States ConstitutionO mandated a sequence of impeachment
prior to criminal prosecution. This granted Congress the exclusive
power to remove a federal judge. Through the use of the maxim, Ex-
pressio unius exclusio est aterus, a federal judge has an absolute right
not to be tried in federal court unless and until he is impeached and
convicted (removed) by Congress. 10 The explicit language in the Con-
stitution precludes the existence of concurrent power to prosecute un-
lawful acts of a federal judge. Hastings argued that through the indict-
ment the executive branch has "chose[n] to bypass the judicial
mechanisms Congress created."""
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine
Hastings' primary argument was that the separation of powers
doctrine is designed to prevent one branch of government from en-
croaching on the powers of the other branches of government. Congress
ceedings were adjudicated. See Brief for Appellee United States of America at 40,
United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (1 1th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as United
States Brief]. Never has a judge, after conviction of an impeachable crime, remained in
office. Id.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 states:
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to re-
moval from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of
honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted
shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and
Punisment, according to Law.
10. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 17.
11. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 48.
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is explicitly given the power to cut across the lines fixed by the separa-
tion of powers doctrine through the impeachment provision in the Con-
stitution. The separation of powers doctrine stands in the way of any
legislative removal of executive and judicial officers except as such re-
moval is expressly authorized in the impeachment provision.
C. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
Hastings' final argument was that the creation of The Judicial
Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 198012
(hereinafter referred to as the Judicial Conduct Act of 1980) reaf-
firmed his argument that impeachment was the exclusive form of re-
moval for a federal judge.13 Through this act "Congress expressly re-
tained and asserted the exclusivity of its removal power."1
IV. GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE
A. Interpretation of Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 of United States
Constitution
The government maintained that in Article I, Section 3, Clause 7
the framers of the Constitution explicitly provided for the procedural
rights of an accused during the impeachment process.15 This clause was
not intended to prevent criminal prosecutions of federal judges' unlaw-
12. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. IV 1980).
13. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9 § 21, 1st Cong., 2d Sess., I Stat. 117 (1845).
Hastings also examined the Act of 1790 created by the First Congress. The pertinent
part of the statute stated that a federal judge convicted of bribery "shall forever be
disqualified to hold any office of honour, trust or profit under the United States." Id.
Hastings argued that this statute did not specify if criminal prosecution was to precede
removal. The government countered that the Act of 1790 would be superfluous unless
criminal prosecution took place prior to impeachment because a judge convicted in an
impeachment proceding would already be removed from office and thereby disqualified
from holding the position. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 27. This statute indi-
cates that Congress anticipated trials for bribery prior to the initiation of impeachment
proceedings.
14. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 25.
15. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 710.
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ful acts.16 Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 clarifies the rights of civil of-
ficers, which includes judges, and was not intended to limit the jurisdic-
tion of Article III courts.17 It does not establish a mandatory sequence
between these two independent processes.18 Instead the purpose behind
Article I, Section 3, Clause 7 was twofold: 1) to distinguish impeach-
ment from English Common Law where criminal sanctions (severe
penalties such as death) could be imposed on an impeached judge and
2) to anticipate the question concerning double jeopardy and to avoid
this claim if the criminal trial is subsequent to the impeachment
proceedings. 19
B. Separation of Powers Doctrine
Although impeachment is the only explicit method of removal pro-
vided in the Constitution, the government contended that it was not.
necessarily intended to be the exclusive remedy for reprimanding a fed-
eral judge. Nothing in the text of the Constitution either explicitly or
implicitly exempts judges from federal prosecution.2 0 If the drafters in-
tended judicial immunity for judges from criminal prosecution, they
would have explicitly provided for it in the Constitution.
The government took the non-exclusivist position created by Shar-
tel21 and later expanded by Raoul Berger.22 According to this position,
impeachment is not the exclusive means of reprimanding a federal
judge.
The government in analyzing the separation of powers doctrine ar-
gument examined the several Constitutional Conventions. None of the
remarks made in these Constitutional Conventions suggested that
judges were to be immune from traditional judicial controls.23 Rather
16. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 16-17.
17. Hastings. 681 F.2d at 710.
18. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 23.
19. Id. at 21-23.
20. Id. at 17.
21. Shartel, Federal Judges-Appointment, Supervision, and Removal-Some
Possibilities Under the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 870 (1930).
22. Berger, Impeachment of Judges and "Good Behavior" Tenure, 79 YALE L.J.
1475 (1970).
23. Id. at 1503.
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Congress' jurisdiction is to be concurrent and not exclusive.24
A criminal conviction prior to impeachment does not violate the
separation of powers doctrine because "whatever immunities or privi-
leges the Constitution confers for the purpose of assuring the indepen-
dence of co-equal branches of government they do not exempt the
members of those branches 'from the operation of the ordinary criminal
law.' "25 Criminal conduct is not to be protected by the separation of
powers doctrine because criminal acts are not within the necessary
functions to be performed by public officials. The executive branch
would not be intruding upon the judicial branch if the act was outside
the scope of the judge's office.26 In United States v. Nixon,2 7 the Su-
preme Court held that the separate powers allocated to each branch of
government was not intended to operate with absolute independence.
C. The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and
Disability Act of 1980
An analysis of the Judicial Conduct Act of 19801 reveals that it
does not deal with criminal prosecution of federal judges. The Judicial
Conduct Act of 1980 "establishes a mechanism within the judiciary for
processing and remedying complaints against federal judges arising
from their mental or physical disability or conduct prejudicial to the
effective administration of justice."2'
The Judicial Conduct Act of 1980 is based "on the premise that
24. Shartel, supra note 21, at 894.
25. United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124, 1144 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
417 U.S. 976 (1974).
26. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 23-24.
27. 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 372 (Supp. IV 1980). Complaints of senility or physical disabil-
ity of a federal judge do not give rise to an impeachable or indictable offense. This was
the gap that Congress remedied through the enactment of the Judicial Conduct Act of
1980. Under the Judicial Conduct Act of 1980, federal judges who are senile or ill have
their cases assigned to another federal judge.
When a judge is impeached and found guilty, he is denied his salary, tenure, pen-
sion and removed from office, whereas, when a judge's cases are assigned to another
judge he retains his office and his salary.
29. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 36-37.
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the judiciary is subject to controls other than impeachment. '3 0 During
the hearings on the Act, the Honorable Elmo B. Hunter, a United
States District Court judge for the Western District of Missouri, com-
mented that "[w]e need not discuss criminal conduct as such. Federal
and state criminal statutes apply to every federal judge just as they
apply to any other citizen.131
Even though both briefs set forth extensive arguments concerning
this Act, the Eleventh Circuit in Hastings stated in a footnote that
Hastings' argument was totally devoid of merit. 2
V. THE BASIS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT COURT OF
APPEALS DECISION
A. History of Impeachment
In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit Court examined the
history of impeachment as it related to prior cases involving federal
judges.3 3 Through the impeachment provisions of the Constitution,
Congress was given the explicit power to ensure that the federal judges
30. Id. at 37 n.23.
31. Id. at 38. In addition, a similar remark was made by Representative Kas-
tenmeier; "Nothing in the legislation precludes a complainant from bringing any mat-
ter to the attention of the House of Representatives for an impeachment inquiry or to
the U.S. Department of Justice for a criminal investigation." United States Brief,
supra note 8, at 39 n.24 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. H8785 (daily ed. Sept. 15, 1980)).
32. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 712 n.20.
33. 1929-Francis Winslow-Judge in Southern District of New York. Judge
Francis Winslow resigned before his criminal trial commenced and on the day im-
peachment proceedings were to begin in the House of Representatives.
1940-Martin Manton-Second Circuit Judge. Resigned during his criminal trial.
Ultimately tried and convicted. United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1939).
1941-John Warren Davis-Judge in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. He was
indicted and while remaining in office was, a defendant in two criminal trials. The jury
could not reach a verdict in either case and the indictments were dismissed. Before
impeachment proceedings began, he resigned from office.
For a discussion of the proceedings concerning these three federal judges see J.
BORKIN, THE CORRUPT JUDGE (1962); Thompson & Pollitt, supra note 1, at 108;
Ferrick, Impeaching Federal Judges: A Study Of The Constitutional Provisions, 39
FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 25 (1970).
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act within their judicial capacity.34 According to the United States
Constitution, Congress has the "sole power to impeach"35 "civil of-
ficers," 36 including federal judges, for "Treason, Bribery or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors. ' 37 If impeached and convicted by the
United States Senate, the judge is removed from office and precluded
from holding any office in the United States government. 8
B. United States v. Isaacs
Until United States v. Isaacs,39 in 1974, no one questioned the
power of the executive or judicial branch to prosecute federal judges
prior to impeachment.40 The issue was raised in this case because one
of the defendants, Otto Kerner, was a sitting Seventh Circuit federal
judge. The Eleventh Circuit relied solely on this case because it was the
only decision in the area.
34. Since 1796, the qualifications of at least forty-seven federal judges have been
questioned in the House of Representatives. Only nine federal judges have been actu-
ally impeached by the House of Representatives. Out of these nine judges, four were
acquitted by the Senate, four were convicted and one resigned.
For an extensive history on the impeachment of these nine federal judges, see
Ford, Impeachment-A Mace for the Federal Judiciary. 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 669
(1971); Kelley & Wyllie, The Congressional Impeachment Power as it Relates to the
Federal Judiciary, 46 NOTRE DAME LAW. 678 (1971); Thompson & Pollitt, supra note
1.
35. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3, cl. 6 states:
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When
sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the
President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And
no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the
Members present.
36. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4 states:
The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United
States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction
of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.
37. Id.
38. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7.
39. 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
40. In Isaacs, Judge Kerner of the Seventh Circuit raised the same argument as
Judge Hastings on appeal, but it was denied. Judge Kerner was convicted and resigned
prior to being sent to prison.
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In Isaacs, there were nineteen counts to the indictment,4 the ma-
jority of which related to activities that allegedly took place while
Judge Kerner was governor of Illinois and prior to his appointment to
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Even though a majority
of the charges against Judge Kerner in Isaacs did not involve acts
within his judicial capacity, the Seventh Circuit, in dicta, stated "[t]he
Constitution does not forbid the trial of a federal judge for criminal
offenses committed either before or after the assumption of judicial of-
fice." 42 Thus, if a federal judge can be criminally prosecuted for acts
prior to his taking office, a fortiori, he can also be subject to criminal
liability for acts committed within his judicial office. The Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Hastings, extended the holding in Isaacs and used Isaacs' dicta
to reach the holding in Hastings.
C. Immunities
1. Congressmen
The Eleventh Circuit analogized the prosecution of congressmen to
the prosecution of federal judges in reaching their decision. Congress-
men can be criminally prosecuted prior to expulsion by the House of
Representatives.4 3 There is no indication in the Constitution that judges
are to be held to a different standard. A parallel can be drawn between
federal judges and congressmen concerning criminal acts of a federal
official committed within his official capacity. If the framers of the
41. The major charges were mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976); conspiracy, 18
U.S.C. § 1952 (1976); and perjury before a grand jury, 18 U.S.C. § 1623 (1976). All
of these charges related to the conspiracy count which involved an Illinois racing opera-
tion. The perjury charge was the only activity which took place after Kerner took office
as a federal district judge. It is important to note that the perjury charge was in no way
connected with Judge Kerner's performance of his judicial duties. Judge Kerner was
eventually sentenced to three years in prison and fined $50,000.
42. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1142 (emphasis added).
43. A Congressman can argue that he can not be indicted or tried until he is
expelled by Congress, because the Constitution explicitly provides for a method of re-
moving him from office. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710 n.10 (11 th Cir.
1982). U.S. CONsT. art. I § 5, cl. 2.
This argument, which is similar to Hastings' argument, has been rejected. See
United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344
(1906); United States v. Johnson, 577 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1978).
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Constitution wanted to give judicial immunity to federal judges they
would have explicitly provided for it. This argument gains support
when viewed in light of the expressed provisions of the speech and de-
bate clause for congressmen and the limited immunity from arrest
clause for congressmen.4
2. Judges-Civil Immunity
At common law, judges enjoyed absolute immunity from civil lia-
bility for acts committed within their judicial capacity. 5 However, the
immunity does not apply if the act is outside the scope of his judicial
capacity.
Judicial immunity is thus neither an absolute nor an unlimited bar
to any suit brought against a judge or judicial officer. Common-law
immunities extend only so far as the interests of the common good
demand protection for the holder of the office from liability from
carrying out his official functions. The application of the doctrine
44. U.S. CoNsr. art. I § 6, cl. 1 states in part:
They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for
any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any
other Place.
45. The Civil Immunity doctrine for judges was established in Bradley v. Fisher,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1871).
Even when a judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly for the benefit of
the public, he is civilly immune. Judges should be at liberty to exercise their own func-
tion with independence and without fear of consequences. See Burton v. United States,
202 U.S. 344 (1906).
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), created the well-established doctrine that
judges are immune from liability for damages for acts committed within their judicial
jurisdiction.
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978), involved a situation where a judge,
without a hearing or notice to a young retarded girl, ordered the girl sterilized. The
Supreme Court held that the judge was not civilly liable because he was acting within
his judicial capacity.
O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), in this case blacks were deprived of due
process by a state circuit court judge. In dicta the Supreme Court held that no official
is granted immunity from criminal prosecution.
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of judicial immunity is restricted to its single objective of protect-
ing judicial freedom in the process of deciding civil and criminal
cases. Where the initiative and independence of the judiciary is not
effectively impaired the doctrine of judicial immunity does not
hold.4
Thus, the judge's cloak of civil immunity does not grant him im-
munity from criminal prosecution. The criminal statutes, in their appli-
cation, allow no exceptions. 47 Blanket immunity has never been ex-
tended to any class of citizens or governmental officials with the
exception of foreign diplomats.48
The absolute immunity from civil liability was not intended to pro-
tect the judicial office.4'9 The immunity from civil liability is premised
on the balancing of "the public benefit derived from the judicial inde-
pendence created by the immunity [weighed against] the sacrifice suf-
fered by aggrieved individuals who are deprived of their civil reme-
dies." 50 If federal judges were granted immunity from criminal acts, it
would be a great threat to the public interest.5 1 A federal judge should
be able to function in his judicial office without fear of retribution for
his beliefs or unpopular decisions.5 2 A judge can not be criminally pros-
ecuted for the manner in which he exercises his judicial power.
When a criminal act is involved, there is no balancing of interests.
Bribery defeats the purpose of the judicial system. The purpose of the
judicial system is to give a person a fair and impartial trial. Criminal
laws are a method of vindicating a public interest5 3 and are dissimilar
from civil interests which are private in nature. The judicial system has
"never suggested that the policy considerations which compel civil im-
munity for certain governmental officials also place them beyond the
46. Shore v. Howard, 414 F. Supp. 379, 385 (N.D. Tex. 1976).
47.• United States Brief, supra note 8, at 16.
48. Id. at 17.
49. Kurland, The Constitution and the Tenure of Federal Judges: Some Notes
from History, 36 U. Cm. L. REv. 665 (1969). See also Kelley & Wyllie, supra note
34.
50. Hastings, 681 F.2d at 711 n.17.
51. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 34 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424
U.S. 409 (1976)).
52. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978).
53. Kelley & Wyllie, supra note 34, at 891.
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reach of the criminal law." 5'
VI. IMPEACHMENT VERSUS CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
The impeachment process is a separate and distinct mechanism
from the criminal law system. 5 Historically, the impeachment process
was depicted as cumbersome and fraught with political overtones. 56 Im-
peachment was not intended to be a substitute for a criminal trial. The
criminal trial is broader in scope. The impeachment process is a supple-
ment to the criminal prosecution. 57 Impeachment "is a proceeding of
[an] entirely political nature and relates solely to the accused's rights
to hold civil office, not to the many other rights which are his as a
citizen and which protect him in a court of law."58 The impeachment
proceeding does not determine guilt as in a criminal trial but rather
determines if there has been an abuse of power which in turn makes
the judge unfit to hold office.
In addition, the impeachment process lacks many of the procedu-
ral safeguards mandatory in a criminal trial. The safeguards in a crimi-
nal trial consist of an impartial jury, evidentiary rules, the state carry-
ing the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and the defendant's
ability to appeal. A charge on the House floor leaves a judge defense-
less, whereas in a criminal trial he would be innocent until proven
guilty. "[T]he judicial process provides a more appropriate forum for
the resolution of guilt or innocence than does the more political im-
peachment process."5 9 The Seventh Circuit in Isaacs reaffirmed this
statement by stating:
[T]he independence of the judiciary is better served when criminal
54. See supra note 50 (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 428-29).
55. Ford, supra note 34 at 670 (1971).
56. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1144. See Shartel, supra note 21 at 872 (1930). See also
Brief for Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union-Florida at 2, United States
v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706 (11 th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Amicus Curiae Brief],
which states "The framers deliberately designed a cumbersome impeachment process
to ensure that the judiciary would enjoy independence from the other branches of
government.
57. Berger, supra note 22, at 1490 (1970).
58. Ford, supra note 34, at 670.
59. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
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charges against its members are tried in a court rather than in
Congress. With a court trial, a judge is assured of the protections
given to all those charged with criminal conduct. The issues [in a
criminal prosecution] . . . are subject to the rules of evidence, the
presumption of innocence and other safeguards .6
There are different sanctions imposed by each process. Impeach-
ment does not impose a penalty, as in a criminal case, on the judge.
The purpose of the impeachment provisions in the Constitution is not
intended to punish the individual as in a criminal trial, but rather to
protect the public and the political office. Thus, there is a distinction
between an indictable offense and an impeachable offense. 1
An impeachable offense involves conduct of a judge which is inju-
rious to society due to an abuse of his public office. In this context, a
bribery or a conspiracy charge is an act which can be considered both
an indictable and an impeachable offense. The former process is a
criminal mechanism and the latter is a political mechanism. Due to the
inherent political overtones and lack of procedural safeguards, the im-
peachment process can result in non-removal despite clear guilt, or visa
versa.
6 2
VII. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS OF THE Hastings DECISION
The Eleventh Circuit did not examine the ramifications of its deci-
sion and chose not to address whether or under what circumstances an
extended prison sentence might approach in substance a removal from
office.6 3 As previously noted, most judges who have been criminally
convicted have resigned prior to the initiation of the impeachment pro-
ceedings. 4 Yet, the problem remains when a judge is criminally con-
victed and does not resign from office prior to impeachment. With the
slow process of impeachment a convicted criminal could technically re-
main in office until impeached by Congress. Hastings argued that if a
federal judge is first criminally convicted, then impeachment will be a
60. Isaacs, 493 F.2d at 1144.
61. Kelley & Wyllie, supra note 34, at 682.
62. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 44.
63. United States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 712 n.19 (11th Cir. 1982).
64. See supra note 33.
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mere formality and have no independent significance.6 5
The American Civil Liberties Union, in its Amicus Curiae brief,
argued that even an acquittal of Judge Hastings in the criminal trial
would in effect act as a partial removal from office. 66 This is because
Hastings would be compelled to excuse himself whenever the United
States is a party. 7 This would greatly interfere with his judicial duties.
"Any interest of the United States not addressed in the impeachment
process could be resolved at a later trial, if the judge was removed
[first] by the Congress."68
The Amicus Curiae brief expressed the fear that a criminal prose-
cution would induce selective prosecution by the executive branch.6 9
The executive branch may use a criminal prosecution as a mechanism
to oust judges who are unfavorable to the United States government.
The American Civil Liberties Union characterized Hastings as a liberal
judge, a lenient sentencer, and a judge who has ruled against the gov-
ernment on several occasions prior to his indictment. 70 The District
Court in Hastings held that the record was absent any evidence to sup-
port the allegation that the government's motivation in bringing the
criminal charges against Hastings was vindictive or retaliatory in
nature.71
The federal courts adhered to the universal precept:
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No
65. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 43 states: "Although. . conviction of and
imprisonment for criminal abuse of official power does not remove a judge from office,
the clear practical effect of a conviction would be removal."
Relating the Supreme Court opinion in Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957), to the
Hastings case, if Judge Hastings was acquitted, any person tried and convicted before
Judge Hastings would have strong grounds upon which to claim that he was denied the
due process required by the Constitution. Therefore, taking Hastings' argument one
step further, even if a judge is acquitted of all charges he still may not be able to carry
out his duties as a judge. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 44 n.23.
66. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 11.
67. Id. at 11-12.
68. Hastings Brief, supra note 5, at 54.
69. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 2-3.
70. National Council of Churches v. Egan, No. 79-2959 (S.D. Fla. 1979), is an
example of a Hastings decision which was against the government. In this case, the
government was required to continue to issue work permits for Haitian refugees.
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officer of the law may set that law at a defiance with impunity. All
the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest, are
creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it. It is the only su-
preme power in our system of government, and every man who by
accepting office participates in its functions is only the more
strongly bound to submit to that supremacy, and to observe the
limitations which it imposes upon the exercise of the authority
which it gives.72
V. CONCLUSION
"[O]ur rights are only as secure as our judiciary. ' I If immunity
from criminal prosecution was granted to federal judges, it would
"frustrate the overriding need to detect and eliminate corruption in the
judiciary."74 This immunity would erode the public's confidence in the
judiciary system and in the long run it would weaken the judicial
branch. The executive branch has the power, independent of and con-
current with Congress' impeachment power, to criminally prosecute a
federal judge. The rights and immunities granted to the federal judges
are conferred on the office for the benefit of the people and not for the
judge's personal benefit. The judge holds a position of trust and a
fiduciary duty to the public. All are expected to conform to the law
enacted by Congress. Criminal statutes allow no exceptions.
In Hastings, the Eleventh Circuit, following Isaacs, held that an
active judge, prior to impeachment, could be subject to federal criminal
prosecution for acts within the exerxcise of his judicial authority. The
judicial title does not shield its holder from criminal prosecution un-
less the act falls within the prescribed common law immunity for
judges. Thus, the nature of the judicial office does not raise a judge
above the law, but rather holds him to the same legal responsibilities as
any other citizen. 8
72. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220 (1882).
73. Amicus Curiae Brief, supra note 56, at 14.
74. United States Brief, supra note 8, at 6.
75. Braatelien v. United States, 147 F.2d 888, 895 (8th Cir. 1945). Mr. Braate-
lien (defendant) was a Conciliation Commissioner who was administering the Frazier-
Lemke Act. He was found guilty of conspiracy to defraud the United States by cor-
ruptly administering the Frazier-Lemke Act.
76. Prior to the publication of this article, on February 4, 1983, Judge Hastings
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Prior to the publication of this article Judge Hastings was acquit-
ted of all charges in the criminal trial. This vindication supports the
position taken in this paper. The system functioned properly and en-
ables the public to continue their trust in both Judge Hastings and in
the judicial system.
In addition, at the publication of this article, Judge Hastings was
under investigation by a special five judge committee due to a miscon-
duct complaint filed under a 1980 law. 1 This panel will report to the
councils of judges governing the Eleventh Circuit. The 1980 law pro-
hibits disclosure of the investigation and as a result the nature of the
investigation is not clear.
Victoria Santoro
was found not guilty of all criminal charges.
77. The Miami Herald, Apr. 21, 1983, § D, at 1.
6391U.S. v. Hastings
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Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability: An
Incompatible Combination? American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corporation
Introduction
A "new vicarious antitrust liability doctrine"" has emerged from a
recent Supreme Court decision 2 that combines the agency concept of
apparent authority with civil antitrust liability.' American Society of
Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp. for the first time,4 per-
mits an agent acting against the interests of his principal but with ap-
parent authority 5 to subject the principal to antitrust law's punitive
treble damages.6 Even outside the antitrust arena, punitive damages
1. Howe & Badger, The Antitrust Challenge to Non-Profit Certification Organi-
zations: Conflicts of Interest and a Practical Rule of Reason Approach to Certification
Programs as Industry-Wide Builders of Competition and Efficiency, 60 WASH. U.L.Q.
357, 361 (1982).
2. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs v. Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935
(1982).
3. See generally Appleson, Errant Volunteers Put Associations In Peril, 68
A.B.A. J. 796 (1982).
4. 102 S. Ct. at 1950 (Powell, J., dissenting).
5. "Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations of another per-
son by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other, arising from
and in accordance with the other's manifestation to such third persons." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8 (1957).
For other definitions of apparent authority see W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF AGENCY §§ 8D, 18B, 22 (1964); H. REUSHLIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 23 (1979); infra notes 54-57 and ac-
companying text.
6. The Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. 15 (1976) provides for treble damages in
Sherman Act § 1 and other antitrust violations and is as follows:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason
of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefore in any dis-
trict court of the United States in the district in which the defendant re-
sides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in contro-
versy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the
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were not imposed when apparent agency served as the basis of the prin-
cipal's liability.7 On its journey to this land of expanded antitrust liabil-
ity, the High Court picked up an unsuspecting passenger.8 A nonprofit
organization fell victim to these untried extremes of agency and anti-
trust liability, and for the first time was hit with the sanction of treble
damages."
In Hydrolevel, the distension of these areas of liability was dis-
creetly masked in Justice Blackmun's majority opinion but partially
unveiled by Justice Powell in a vigorous dissent.10 This comment exam-
ines Hydrolevel's unclear path of vicarious antitrust liability and the
Court's explication of the principles involved in its decision.
American Society of Mechanical Engineers v. Hydrolevel Corp.
Background
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) is one of
the oldest and largest scientific societies in the United States."" It is a
nonprofit, tax-exempt' 2 organization with more than "90,000 members
drawn from all fields of mechanical engineering."1 s ASME's primary
cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
7. See infra notes 79-87 and accompanying text.
8. See generally Young, Court Widens Treble Damage Liability For Non-Profit
Societies, 68 A.B.A. J. 846 (1982).
9. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975), allowed the application
of antitrust laws to nonprofit organizations but Goldfarb called for flexibility in impos-
ing sanctions on such organizations. Id. at 788 n.17. Hydrolevel is the first case impos-
ing the treble damages sanction upon a nonprofit entity. 102 S. Ct. at 1949 n.2, 1950.
10. In the 6-3 decision five justices supported the expansion of antitrust liability
in an apparent agency context. Chief Justice Burger rejected the majorities' new vicari-
ous liability approach but concurred in the judgment by utilizing the agency doctrine of
ratification. 102 S. Ct. at 1948. The ratification doctrine imposes liability on the princi-
pal only after he expressly or impliedly condones the agent's activities. Id. Justices
White and Rehnquist joined in the dissent. Id. at 1949.
11. For a general historical overview of ASME see B. SINCLAIR, A CENTENNIAL
HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY OF MECHANICAL ENGINEERS, 1880 - 1980 (Univ.
of Toronto Press 1980).
12. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1954) - As a "corporation. . .or foundation organized
and operated exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific testing for public safety,
literary, or educational purposes .
13. 102 S. Ct. at 1938.
7:19831
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function is drafting, publishing and interpreting more than 400 sepa-
rate codes for the industry. 4 Thousands of ASME volunteers partici-
pate on the committees and subcommittees overseeing this process.15
Two ASME volunteers, acting against the organization's interests,
fraudulently interpreted a single provision in an 18,000 page code16 and
thereby subjected ASME to antitrust law's treble damages and a $7.5
million verdict at trial.17
One of the volunteers, John James, served as vice-chairman of the
ASME subcommittee responsible for drafting and interpreting the code
section governing fuel safety devices in boilers. James concurrently
served as vice-president of McDonnell and Miller"" (M&M), the domi-
nant force in the fuel safety device market for more than fifty years.19
The other ASME volunteer, Subcommittee Chairman T. R. Hardin,
was executive vice-president of Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection and
Insurance Company, the nation's leading underwriter of boiler
insurance.20
14. In theory ASME codes are merely advisory and not binding on anyone. How-
ever, in practice the codes are highly influential and a manufacturer whose product
cannot satisfy the applicable ASME code is at a great disadvantage in the market-
place. 102 S. Ct. at 1938.
ASME codes are incorporated by reference into regulations on the federal, state
and local levels and in all but one of the provinces of Canada. Id.
15. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, 635 F.2d 118,
121 (2d Cir. 1980), aff'd, 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
16. ASME's Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code was the subject of the Hydrolevel
litigation. ASME receives 20,000 - 30,000 inquiries a year seeking its interpretation.
102 S. Ct. at 1949.
17. The District Court's finding of liability was affirmed, but a new trial for
damages was ordered by the circuit court because the method utilized for assessing and
trebling damages was incorrect. 635 F.2d at 128.
18. It was common for ASME committee members to be employed by business
entities directly affected by the ASME codes. The conflicts of interest that arose did
not serve as a pretext for ASME's liability in Hydrolevel. Arguably, they could.
19. M & M annually controlled more than 85% of the $10 million market for
boiler fuel safety devices. Meyer, Knocking the Competition - How Rivals' Use of
"Industry Code" Report Created Problems for a Tiny Company, Wall St. J., July 9,
1974, at 36, col. 1.
20. Plaintiff's First Amended Antitrust Complaint at 3, Hydrolevel Corp. v.
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International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT)21 purchased M&M
in 1971. ITT acquired a controlling interest in Hartford Steam in
1970.22 Capitalizing on their positions as chairman and vice-chairman
of the ASME boiler subcommittee, ITT's agents, Hardin and James,
without ASME's knowledge or possible benefit, conspired to destroy
M&M/ITT's newest competitor, the Hydrolevel Corporation.
ASME's procedure for dealing with public inquiries regarding the
ASME codes granted a high level of discretion to highly placed officials
such as Hardin and James.2s Hardin as subcommittee chairman had
the authority to personally interpret the ASME code in response to a
public inquiry merely by terming the response an "unofficial communi-
cation. 24 The "unofficial" response then bypassed full subcommittee
review and was mailed out to the inquiring party.2 5 This ASME proce-
dure served as the mechanism by which ITT and its agents, Hardin
and James, were able to ruin the Hydrolevel Corporation.2 6
Soon after Hydrolevel lured a major customer away from M&M,
James, other M&M officials and Hardin met to plan a course of action.
The ASME committeemen drafted a letter for M&M asking ASME if
Hydrolevel's new fuel safety device with a time delay satisfied the
Boiler Code.27 After receiving the inquiry, ASME referred it to sub-
21. "ITT is a diversified company with subsidiaries and divisions located
throughout the United States and the world." When this suit arose ITT had annual
sales in excess of $5 billion. Id.
22. In 1970, ITT acquired 99% of the outstanding stock in Hartford Fire Insur-
ance Corp., a Connecticut corporation which owned approximately 11% of the out-
standing common stock in Hartford Steam. Id.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 1939, 1940.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. The ease with which an ASME agent could manipulate this procedure to
accomplish bad faith objectives suggests the direct fault of ASME for failing to guard
against such misconduct. However, instead of simply premising ASME's liability on
some fault of the organization, the appellate court and the Supreme Court, for the first
time, founded antitrust liability upon a no-fault apparent authority theory, i.e. even if
ASME did everything possible to prevent misconduct by its officials and was blameless
in its own right, liability would exist solely because of the agency status of the wrong-
doers, which created the appearance of actual authority. See supra note 5.
27. 102 S. Ct. at 1939. Both M & M and Hydrolevel manufactured products
that automatically cut off the fuel supply to the boiler before the water level became
dangerously low. Hydrolevel's new device included a time-delay designed to prevent
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committee chairman Hardin for a reply. Hardin and James then
drafted a response to their own inquiry which cast doubt upon the
safety of Hydrolevel's product. 8
As planned, M&M/ITT seized upon this fraudulent interpretation
of the code to disparage Hydrolevel's product. M&M/ITT saturated
the marketplace with anti-time-delay propaganda informing prospec-
tive purchasers that Hydrolevel's device failed to meet ASME
standards. 9
Hydrolevel, although unaware of M&M/ITT's scheme, learned of
the incorrect ASME code interpretation and demanded that ASME
send corrections to those who received the faulty information." Three
months later ASME mailed Hydrolevel a letter that "confirmed the
intent" of part of the faulty code interpretation letter but, in effect,
admitted that the Hydrolevel product did not violate the code.31 Fol-
lowing an investigation into the faulty code interpretation, ASME, still
believing in the good faith of Hardin and James' acts, concluded that
its officials had acted properly.3 2 Ultimately, the ITT scheme against
Hydrolevel was uncovered by a Senate subcommittee.3 3 However, the
aspersions cast upon the time-delay device by M&M/ITT were never
fully extracted from the minds of a wary buying public. 4 Hydrolevel
brought an antitrust action against M&M/ITT, Hartford Steam and
ASME and in 1979 sold all assets except the lawsuit for a salvage price
premature fuel cut offs. The device allowed the fuel supply to continue for a short time
when the overall water level was safe but occasionally fell below the minimum accept-
able level because of surging water inside the boiler. Id. at 1939 n.1.
28. The reply letter said in part, "If a time delay feature were incorporated in a
low water fuel cut-off, there would be no positive assurance that the boiler water would
not fall to a dangerous point during a time delay period." 635 F.2d 122.
29. M & M included a copy of the fraudulent reply letter in a booklet entitled
"The Opposition - Who They Are, How To Beat Them." The booklet, distributed to M
& M salesmen, stated, "A time delay of any kind would very definitely be against the
ASME code .... [T]his should definitely be brought to the attention of anyone con-
sidering the device. . . ." 635 F.2d at 123.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 1940.
31. ASME stated, "[T]here is no intent in Section IV to prohibit the use of low
water fuel cutoffs having time delays ... " 635 F.2d 123.
32. 102 S. Ct. at 1941.
33. Id.
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of $86,000.
Action in the District Court
In 1979, a jury in federal district court held ASME liable for anti-
trust damages of $7.5 million, three times the actual damages suffered
by Hydrolevel.33 Hydrolevel requested a jury instruction permitting ap-
parent authority as a basis of liability but the trial judge rejected such
an approach.3 6 Instead, since the scheme against Hydrolevel was
outside the scope of employment of the ASME officials, the jury was
told to find ASME liable only if the organization was at fault by ratify-
ing or adopting as its own the misconduct of Hardin and James .
Judge Weinstein charged:
If the officers or agents act on behalf of interests adverse to the
corporation or acted for their own economic benefit or the benefit
of another person or corporation, and this action was not ratified or
adopted by the defendant, ASME, their misconduct cannot be con-
35. Hydrolevel Corp. v. American Soc'y of Mechanical Eng'rs, No. 75 Civ. 1360
(E.D.N.Y. 1978). ASME was held liable under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act, 15 U.S.C. § (1976).
Every contract, combination in the form of a trust or otherwise, or conspir-.
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby de-
clared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a
corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments in
the discretion of the court. Id.
See supra note 6, the Clayton Act § 4 allowing a private right of action for treble
damages.
In stark contrast to the large trial court judgment assessed against ASME, the
ITT owned instigators and beneficiaries of the scheme to destroy Hydrolevel, M & M
and Hartford Steam, settled out of court for $725,000 and $75,000 respectively. 102 S.
Ct. at 1945 n.1.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's imposition of liabil-
ity against ASME but ordered a new trial on damages. 635 F.2d 118, 131.
36. 635 F.2d at 124. For definitions of apparent authority see supra note 5.
37. 102 S. Ct. at 1941. See also id. at 1948 (Burger, J., concurring).
1646 Nova Law Journal 7:19831
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sidered that of the corporation with which they are associated."
Based on this instruction, the jury found ASME at fault and
therefore, liable for treble damages.
The Second Circuit and the Supreme Court Adopt a New The-
ory of Liability
To hold ASME liable, the appellate court and the Supreme Court
needed only to affirm the jury's finding of liability which was based on
traditional antitrust-agency concepts." Instead, both courts disre-
garded the jury finding of fault and imputed liability to ASME based
on a new no fault vicarious antitrust liability doctrine.4" ASME was
held to be a vicarious coconspirator to an unreasonable restraint of
trade solely because the misconduct of ITT's agents appeared to be
authorized by ASME.'1
Justice Powell argues in the dissent that:
[T]he very facts of this case belie the necessity of simply creating a
new theory of liability; the jury found ASME liable not upon a
theory of apparent authority but upon the traditional basis of ratifi-
cation or authorization. The apparent authority rationale was not
even argued to the Second Circuit on appeal. The Second Circuit,
and now this Court, reach out unnecessarily to embrace a dubious
new doctrine. That the Court chooses the case of a nonprofit, tax-
exempt organization to announce its new rule is particularly
inappropriate.42
The circuit court did not explain the benefit produced by the decision
to promulgate this new vicarious antitrust liability doctrine when the
defendant's liability was already decided on traditional antitrust
38. Id. at 1941.
39. See id. at 1951, 1955.
40. 635 F.2d at 124.
41. Id. at 127. "For ASME to be held liable, then, Hydrolevel had to demon-
strate only that ASME's agents acted within their apparent authority when participat-
ing in the conspiracy; it did not have to demonstrate that they also acted to benefit
ASME or that ASME later ratified their actions." Id. The court also characterized
ASME's involvement in the scheme as "unintentional participation." Id. at 131.
42. 102 S. Ct. at 1951.
6471
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grounds. For potential antitrust defendants, "as well as ASME, the ap-
proach adopted by the Second Circuit [and the Supreme Court] can be
viewed only as a tragic and confusing chapter in antitrust history."4
The Supreme Court Opinion
In affirming ASME's liability for the unauthorized actions of the
nonprofit organization's agents, the Supreme Court, for the first time,
holds that apparent authority can serve as an appropriate basis for im-
puting antitrust liability.44 Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, ad-
heres to much of the Second Circuit's logic and continually focuses
upon the possible anticompetitive effects from standard-setting organi-
zations such as ASME.4
5
While Hydrolevel involves many agency and antitrust principles,
the majority primarily emphasizes antitrust law's purpose of deterring
anticompetitive activities.46 Arguably, in doing so, the Court fails to
reconcile the new no fault doctrine with well-established rules of anti-
trust and agency law that disallow imputation of antitrust liability to a
principal who is not at fault and does not stand to benefit from the
agent's misconduct.47 Justice Blackmun partially concedes that his po-
43. Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 387.
[T]he Second Circuit proceeded to adopt a vicarious antitrust liability
principle and apparent authority agency standard by which it upheld the
antitrust liability of ASME for the misconduct of its two members. This
approach, however, was totally unrealistic because it completely begged
the question of how, .. ASME might have avoided a finding of conspira-
torial intent. Id.
44. 102 S. Ct. at 1944, 1949, 1950.
45. E.g., 102 S. Ct. at 1942 ("ASME wields great power in the nations economy.
Its codes and standards influence the policies of numerous states and cities ...
ASME permits its agents to affect the destinies of businesses and thus gives them the
power to frustrate competition in the marketplace.") Id. at 1944; ("A standard-setting
organization like ASME can be rife with opportunities for anticompetitive activity.")
Id. at 1945; ("The anticompetitive practices of ASME's agents are repugnant to the
antitrust laws. . . .") Id. at 1946; ("ASME's agents . . . are able to affect the lives of
large numbers of people and the competitive fortunes of businesses throughout the
country. . . . We thus make it less likely that competitive challenges like Hydrolevel
will be hindered by agents or organizations like ASME in the future.") Id. at 1948.
46. Id.
47. See infra notes 60-67 and accompanying text. The author does not assert
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sition as to the use of apparent authority in antitrust actions is not
supported by precedent. 48 However, he follows the lead of the circuit
court by analogizing the antitrust action to a common law suit for
fraud or misrepresentation where apparent authority is permitted as an
exception to the conventional tort doctrine that disallows its use.49
The Court quickly disposes of several other agency arguments by
asserting that its decision will "help ensure that standard-setting orga-
nizations will act with care when permitting their agents to speak for
them. '50 However, ASME's lack of due care is not an issue under the
apparent authority doctrine and arguably the Court attempts to
strengthen its argument by mixing the no fault apparent authority doc-
trine with a direct negligence or ratification theory requiring fault.
Since the Court states that apparent authority is the basis of the deci-
sion, any acts tending toward ASME's direct fault, ratification or ac-
tual authorization have no bearing on a finding of apparent authority
because the crux of the doctrine is the appearance of authority to third
parties.1
The expansiveness of the Court's decision on vicarious antitrust li-
ability is unclear as Justice Blackmun asserts, "We need not delineate
today the outer boundaries of standard-setting organizations for the ac-
tions of their agents committed with apparent authority. '52
In a forceful dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justices White and
that ASME was faultless but only that the adoption of a no-fault apparent authority
doctrine does not require consideration of the principal's own wrongdoing and is an
overly expansive addition to the antitrust laws. Under the apparent authority theory
even the assumption that ASME was blameless in its own right requires the same
finding of liability. Thus, there is no way for a principal to guard against a treble
damages judgment when his agent intentionally violates the antitrust laws.
48. 102 S. Ct. at 1944 n.7 ("Evidently, in recent years no Court of Appeals other
than the Second Circuit (in Hydrolevel) has directly decided whether a principal can
be held liable for antitrust damages based on an apparent authority theory.")
49. 102 S. Ct. at 1942. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257,
261, 262 (1957).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
51. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text. See also 102 S. Ct. at 1956
n.18 ("The Courts theory [of apparent authority] makes ratification by ASME
irrelevant.").
52. 102 S. Ct. at 1948.
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Rehnquist,53 sets forth the primary weaknesses of the majority opinion
upon which this comment expounds: (1) apparent authority previously
had no application in antitrust law, (2) even when applied outside of
the antitrust area, apparent authority did not permit imputation of pu-
nitive damages to the principal, (3) the majority disregards the fact
that the Sherman Act section 1 claim brought against ASME requires
the defendant to engage in a conspiracy and (4) nonprofit organizations
previously have not been subjected to antitrust law's treble damages.
Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability: An Incompatible
Combination
Apparent authority exists when an agent is not actually authorized
to act for the principal, but a third party reasonably believes the agent
acts with authority because the principal placed the agent in a position
creating this appearance. 54 After the principal initially creates the ap-
pearance of authority, apparent authority becomes a no fault concept
where the principal is liable even when the agent intentionally acts
against the principal's interests. 55 However, since the apparent author-
ity concept is based on the objective theory of contracts, 56 it is gener-
ally applicable only to contractual relationships and certain limited ar-
eas of tort, such as fraud and misrepresentation. 57 For conventional
torts, the apparent authority doctrine has no application. 58 Since anti-
trust involves statutory law with actions brought neither in tort nor
contract, a choice between the two theories of liability was required.
53. Id. at 1949.
54. This definition does not encompass the complete scope of apparent authority
but rather is fitted to the situation in Hydrolevel. For complete definitions see supra
note 5.
55. W. SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 57 (1964).
56. Cook, Agency by Estoppel, 5 COL. L REv. 36 (1905), "[T]he thesis of the
present article is that the liability in question is a true contractual liability, as well
where the authority of the agent is only apparent as where it is real." Id. at 38. Com-
pare H. REUSHLIN & W. GREGORY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PART-
NERSHIP § 23 (1979).
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 257, 261, 262 (1957).
58. The Second Circuit Court conceded that with conventional torts the principal
is liable only if he is at fault or the agent acts within his scope of employment with an
intent to benefit the principal. 635 F.2d at 125.
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The issue before the courts in Hydrolevel thus became whether an anti-
trust conspiracy to restrain trade should be analogized to either the
conventional torts (disallowing apparent authority liability) or the
fraud/misrepresentation type torts (permitting apparent authority lia-
bility) to justify adopting eithers' brand of vicarious liability, or
whether the antitrust action deserves an entirely distinct theory of
liability?59
Prior to Hydrolevel, the Supreme Court and the lower federal
courts considering the questions of vicarious antitrust liability, without
exception, opted for the conventional tort-scope of employment-brand
of liability where the agent's unauthorized acts are imputed to the prin-
cipal only when the acts are done with an intent to benefit the princi-
pal.60 These courts have rejected the possibility of expanding vicarious
antitrust liability on an apparent authority basis either expressly or by
implication."1 Had the Court remained on this established course,
ASME's liability would rest on its own fault and not on unpreventable
fraudulent conduct designed to benefit another.
59. The district court chose to apply the conventional tort theory and refused to
allow ASME's liability on an apparent authority basis: Id. The circuit court admitted
that a vicarious liability choice was required but Justice Blackmun in adopting the
apparent authority theory failed to acknowledge the existence of the conventional tort
brand of vicarious liability or the necessity of choosing between the theories. Since
Hardin and James, the ASME agents, acted fraudulently and outside their scope of
employment, the conventional tort theory would find ASME liable only if it was inde-
pendently at fault, but the apparent authority theory holds the principal liable regard-
less of his own fault. See supra note 5; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 257, 261, 262 (1957).
60. See 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1944 n.7, 1950 (dissent).
61. See United States v. Hilton Hotels, 467 F.2d 1000, 1006 n.4 (9th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied sub nom. Western Int'l Hotels Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973)
(citing Standard Oil Co. of Texas v. United States, 307 F.2d 120, 128-29 (5th Cir.
1962)), ("A purpose to benefit the corporation is necessary. . . ."); United States v.
American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174, 204 (3d Cir. 1970);
United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co., 568 F.2d 1078, 1090 (5th Cir. 1978).
But ef. Continental Baking Co. v. United States 281 F.2d 137, 150-51 (6th Cir. 1960);
United States V. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 468 n.5 (3d Cir. 1979) (not
mentioning apparent authority). Compare Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1951 n.5.
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Applying Apparent Authority to Antitrust Law: A Deviation
From Precedent
In United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal 2 and Coronado Coal
v. United Mine Workers 3 the Supreme Court reversed decisions hold-
ing an international union vicariously liable for a local union's conspir-
acy to restrain trade in violation of the Sherman Act. The president of
the international union, with apparent authority but no actual author-
ity, assured certain local union members of funds for their strike in-
volvement and otherwise appeared to authorize the strike.6 4 Chief Jus-
tice Taft, speaking for the Court, declared, "The president had no
authority to order or ratify a local strike. [His actions show] sympathy
with its purpose and a lack of respect for the law but [do] not imply or
prove on his part any initiation or indicate a desire to ratify the
transaction .... ,,65
The Court in Coronado Coal and United Mine Workers followed
the conventional tort basis of vicarious antitrust liability and rejected
the nofault apparent authority approach. It stated:
[A] trades-union . might be held liable . . . but certainly it
must be clearly shown in order to impose such a liability on an
association of 450,000 men that what was done was done by their
agents in accordance with their fundamental agreement of
association.
A corporation is responsible for the wrongs committed by its
agents in the course of its business . . . . But it must be shown
that it is in the business of the corporation. Surely no stricter rule
can be enforced against an unincorporated organization like this.6"
In Hydrolevel, Justice Blackmun's opinion summarily disposes of the
Coronado Coal and United Mine Workers precedent in a footnote by
asserting that, "Those cases, however, are not controlling here. The
Court [in Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers] expressly pointed
out: 'Here it is not a question . . . of holding out an appearance of
62. 259 U.S. 344 (1922).
63. 268 U.S. 295 (1925).
64. Id. at 300, 303.
65. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal, 259 U.S. at 394.
66. Coronado Coal v. United Mine Workers, 268 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added).
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authority on which some third person acts.' "
Justice Blackmun utilizes a single sentence from fifty pages of pre-
cedent to assert that the two cases are not a rejection of the apparent
authority theory for antitrust litigation. The same interpretation of the
two cases and of the single-sentence excerpt is not adopted by the dis-
sent nor by federal courts citing the cases as precedent.0 8 In rebutting
Justice Blackmun's claim, Justice Powell asserts, "The majority quotes
this language but misses its point. The United Mine Workers Court
well could have characterized the cases before it as involving an exer-
cise of apparent authority by the local union or the national President;
it refused to do so. 9
Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v. United States70 quotes extensively
from United Mine Workers and Coronado Coal, including the excerpt
challenged by the majority in Hydrolevel. Truck Drivers ruled that "to
bind the union in an antitrust situation such as this, 1 actual and au-
thorized agency was necessary; mere apparent authority would not be
sufficient to take the matter to the jury ....
In United States v. Ridglea State Bank," the Fifth Circuit elimi-
nate was faced with the same choice over vicarious liability as the Su-
preme Court in Hydrolevel; whether a principal's liability for statutory
punitive damages should extend to apparently authorized agents acting
with no intent to benefit the principal, or whether the conventional tort-
scope of employment-basis should serve as the standard. Ridglea State
Bank involved a bank vice-president who fraudulently processed feder-
ally insured housing loans and subsequently shared the proceeds with
the defaulting borrower."4 The federal government sued the bank for
67. Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1946 n.12.
68. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local No. 421 v. United States, 128 F.2d 227, 235
(8th Cir. 1942).
69. 102 S. Ct. 1950 n.5 and accompanying text.
70. 128 F.2d 227 (8th Cir. 1942).
71. Truck Drivers Local No. 421 involved a § I Sherman Act violation brought
against the Teamsters Union and others. The defendants were convicted of conspiring
to fix milk prices, but the decision was reversed by the Eighth Circuit holding that the
acts of the separate union divisions and of the individual union officials could not be
imputed to the entire organization unless actual authority or ratification were proved.
72. 128 F.2d at 235 (emphasis added).
73. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
74. Id. at 496-97.
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the agents' fraud under the False Claims Act which imposed double
damages upon violators.
The Ridglea court granted that a principal is generally liable for
fraud or misrepresentation of an agent even when acting only with ap-
parent authority.7 5 The court recognized the vicarious liability choice
before it and stated, "We find ourselves confronted with two rules on
the imputation of an agent's fraudulent intent to his employer and a
case which falls somewhere between the usual areas of the operation of
the two rules."76 By refusing to impute liability to the principal, the
court chose to view the application of apparent authority to common
law fraud as inapplicable to a statutory punitive damages action. It
stated, "All of these authorities concern civil actions to recover actual
loss caused by the misrepresentation of an employee; not, as here, ac-
tions to recover forfeitures and double damages far in excess of actual
loss."78 Ridglea's logic for refusing to impose excessive statutory
double damages becomes even more powerful when applied to an anti-
trust action for treble damages.
Punitive Damages: An Unsound Extension
Hydrolevel also marks the unprecedented imputation of punitive
damages to a principal liable under the apparent authority doctrine.79
In permitting a treble damages judgment against ASME, the Court
disregards rigidly defined punitive damages boundaries which require
direct fault of the principal when his agent acts outside the scope of
employment. 80 In Hydrolevel, the Court places the immense burden of
punitive damages upon a principal who admittedly is not deserving of
punishment.8 1 It is deep-rooted in the law that exemplary damages can
75. Id. at 499.
76. Id.
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 257(d) (1937).
78. Ridglea, 357 F.2d 499. Justice Blackmun cited to Ridglea but made no at-
tempt to distinguish the case.
79. 102 S. Ct. at 1950-51. "Nor does the Court cite a single decision in which
the apparent authority theory of liability has been applied in a case involving treble or
punitive damages and an agent who acts without any intention of benefiting the princi-
pal." Id. at 1950.
80. Id. at 1950-51.
81. The Second Circuit Court characterized ASME's involvement as "uninten-
1 654 Nova Law Journal 7:1983 1
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be awarded only against one who has participated in the offense or
wrong complained of, 2 and are "not given against those liable, if at
all, [merely] by reason of their relation to the wrongdoer. .... ,83
The Supreme Court, in the 1893 landmark decision of Lake Shore
and Michigan Southern Railway Co. v. Prentice," held that "[a] prin-
cipal ...cannot be held liable for exemplary or punitive damages
merely by reason of wanton, oppressive or malicious intent on the part
of the agent."' 5 In following Lake Shore and refusing to assess punitive
damages in an apparent agency situation, the court in Ridglea State
Banks' expounded upon "the rule . . that the knowledge or guilty
intent of an agent, not acting with a purpose to benefit his employer,
will not be imputed to the employer."' 7 The Hydrolevel Court dis-
carded this rule and found ASME liable even though ASME did not
encourage or adopt the malevolent actions of its agents. ASME, in fact,
was a victim of its agents' active deception and could not benefit from,
nor guard against, conduct motivated by a desire to serve another."
In Hydrolevel, "the Court practically concedes that an apparent
authority rule of liability has rarely, if ever, been used to impose puni-
tive damages upon the principal.""9 Justice Blackmun "[r]ather than
tional participation." 635 F.2d at 131.
82. Lake Shore & Michigan S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893); Aetna
Life Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 56 App. D.C. 283, 12 F.2d 818 (1926); Hogg v. Plant, 145 Va.
175, 133 S.E. 759 (1926).
83. Graham v. St. Charles St. R. Co., 47 La. Ann. 1656, 1657, 18 So. 707, 708
(La. 1895) (emphasis added). See generally 22 AM. JUR. 2d Damages §§ 255 (1965)
("Exemplary damages are not recoverable against a defendant who acts in good
faith. . . .") Id. at § 255; (requiring the agent act within the scope of his employment)
Id. at § 258.
84. 147 U.S. 101 (1893).
85. Id. at 107.
86. 357 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1966).
87. Id. at 500. See also Note, Corporate Criminal Liability For Acts in Viola-
tion of Company Policy, 50 GEO. L.J. 547, 560 n.64 (1962), "[P]unitive damages are
penal in character and should be imposed in addition to compensatory damages only
where the corporate management has acted with malice or recklessness." See also
Mercury Motor Express, Inc. v. Smith, 393 So. 2d 545, 549 (Fla. 1981) ("Before an
employer may be held vicariously liable for punitive damages under the doctrine of
respondent superior, there must be some fault on his part.").
88. See 102 S. Ct. at 1955.
89. Id. at 1951.
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contest this well-established rule of agency law . . . argues that treble
damages are not punitive or, even if they are, the purpose of the anti-
trust laws overrides the basic rule of the law of agency."90
Justice Blackmun's position as to the purpose and effect of anti-
trust treble damages is directly contra to earlier Supreme Court deci-
sions, lower federal court rulings and the stance taken by the recog-
nized commentators in the field.9" Justice Blackmun's assertion that,
"the antitrust private action was created primarily as a remedy for the
victims of antitrust violations," 92 is diametrically opposed to the Su-
preme Court's explication of the antitrust treble damages action in
1981. In Texas Industries v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., the Court ruled
that, "the very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish past,
and to deter future, unlawful conduct, not to ameliorate the liability of
wrongdoers." 93 Justice Blackmun's new interpretation of treble dam-
ages as non-punitive is flatly rejected by Professors Areeda and Turner
as they state, "[W]hether or not compensatory damages ever punish,
treble damages are indisputably punishment. ' 94 Clearly, treble dam-
ages were "intended to be punitive in nature and deterrent in effect."'9 5
The wisdom of imputing the punishment of treble damages under
an apparent authority theory is also questionable in view of Ridglea
State Bank's rejection of apparent authority as a basis for imputing
double damages; "What is important for the proper decision of this
case is that the present action is not primarily one for the recovery of a
loss caused by an employee, but is one which, if successful, must result
in a recovery wholly out of proportion to actual loss."-96
Furthermore, apparent authority and punitive treble damages be-
come overtly incompatible concepts when the basis for apparent agency
liability is reviewed. Apparent agency stems from the reasoning that
although the principal and plaintiff are both innocent parties to the
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
92. 102 S. Ct. at 1947 (emphasis added).
93. 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (emphasis added).
94. 2 AREEDA & TURNER § 311(b) (1978) ("In addition, treble damages consti-
tute punishment that is analogous in many ways to criminal sanctions."). See generally
K. ELZINGA, THE ANTITRUST PENALTIES, A STUDY IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (1977).
95. 1 H.A. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS § 20.5 (1949).
96. 357 F.2d at 500 (emphasis added).
212
Nova Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 3 [1983], Art. 9
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol7/iss3/9
Apparent Authority and Antitrust Liability
action, the plaintiff should not bear the loss since the principal's initial
relationship with the agent created the damaging situation.97 It is
anomalous, therefore, to subject the principal to three times the actual
damages suffered when the injured party, as in Hydrolevel, has alter-
native avenues for redress by way of a tort action in state court.98
Conspiracy in Restraint of Trade: Unidentified or Abandoned?
ASME's liability emanates from a conspiracy in restraint of trade
in violation of the Sherman Act.99 The Court analogizes this antitrust
action to a common law suit for fraud or misrepresentation0 " but fails
to recognize that the antitrust conspiracy requires a plurality of actors
whereas the common law actions may be occasioned by a single perpe-
trator.101 It is rudimentary that one cannot conspire with oneself,10 2 but
by finding ASME liable as a coconspirator with its own agents, the
Court ignores this basic tenet of antitrust and conspiracy law. While it
is clear that a business entity and its agents alone cannot constitute the
requisite plurality of actors in a conspiracy because the principal is one
97. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8, 159 (1957).
98. Hydrolevel could have utilized the apparent authority doctrine in a state
court tort action against ASME for fraud, misrepresentation, etc. to recover compensa-
tory damages for its actual loss rather than treble damages from an antitrust claim.
Hydrolevel, in fact, initiated its action in tort for trade libel and interference with busi-
ness relations, but eventually abandoned the claims. 635 F.2d 126, n.5. Since
Hydrolevel otherwise had the opportunity to seek redress, the Courts' autogenous the-
ory of vicarious antitrust liability through apparent authority served no purpose other
than that of increasing the damages amount.
99. 102 S. Ct. 1956.
100. Id. at 1942.
101. ATTORNEY GENERAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY
THE ANTITRUST LAWS 31 (1955).
102. 2 KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW § 9.7 (1980); Welling, Intra Corpo-
rate Plurality in Criminal Conspiracy Law 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1151, 1158 (1982);
Barndt, Two Trees Or One? - The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 MONT.
L. REV. 158, 180 (1962) (if there is only one active participant "[r]egardless of
whether the action is brought against the corporation, the officer. . . or both, the only
possible result upon grounds of both logic and precedent, is that a violation of the
conspiracy portions of the Sherman Act cannot exist"). See generally Note, Develop-
ments in the Law - Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959).
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with the agent, 03 it is unsettled whether this fundamental precept of
business enterprise is likewise applicable to a non-profit association. 104
However, if logically extended to associations, the rule makes ASME's
relationship to its agents incapable of satisfying the plurality require-
ment of the Sherman Act, i.e. by definition, no conspiracy exists, thus
making the restraint of trade not violative of Sherman Act section 1.105
There is some authority holding that if the agent is outside his
scope of employment, as in Hydrolevel, the rule is vitiated making the
entity capable of conspiring with the agent.1 But this theory, if ap-
plied, also shields ASME from liability because if "James and Hardin
had sufficiently independent motivation to conspire with ASME, they
could not simultaneously and by the same act cause ASME to conspire
with them; otherwise, a single person acting alone could create a multi-
party antitrust conspiracy." 107
The Hydrolevel Court failed to reconcile these rules of antitrust
and conspiracy law, and in fact, did not address the conspiracy issue.
As noted in the dissent, "The intersection of the law of agency and
vicarious liability with the law of conspiracy makes this a complex
case. Yet the Court does not recognize this complexity. Indeed, the
Court never identifies who conspired with whom."108
103. Welling supra note 102, at 1158-67; See, e.g., Goldlaw, Inc. v. Shubert, 276
F.2d 614, 745 (3d Cir. 1960). Morton Bldgs. of Nebraska, Inc. v. Morton Bldgs., Inc.,
531 F.2d 910 (8th Cir. 1976); Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389
(5th Cir. 1976); Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953)
It is basic in the law of conspiracy that you must have two persons or
entities to have a conspiracy. A corporation cannot conspire with itself any
more than a private individual can, and it is the general rule that the acts
of the agent are the acts of the corporation.
Id. at 914.
104. See 2 KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 9.16 (1980) (Kintner argues
that this principle is not applicable to trade associations).
105. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
106. H & B Equip. Co. v. International Harvester Co., 577 F.2d 239, 244 (5th
Cir. 1978); Greenville Publishing Co. v. Daily Reflector, Inc., 496 F.2d 391, 399-400
(4th Cir. 1974).
107. Reply Brief of Petitioner at 13, American Soc'y Mechanical Eng'rs v.
Hydrolevel Corp., 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982) (emphasis original).
108. Hydrolevel, 102 S. Ct. at 1956 n.18.
"[The Court] so expands the concept of vicarious liability as to leave little
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Furthermore, liability for ASME, while only an "unintentional
participant"109 in an antitrust conspiracy, gives rise to the incongruous
concept that ASME was a coconspirator without intent." 0 However,
this arguably illogical concept is not foreign to the laws of antitrust
because it is a general rule "that a civil (antitrust) violation can be
established by proof of either an unlawful purpose or an anticompeti-
tive effect" (no intent).11 Even so, this long established rule does not
entirely vitiate the importance of the defendant's intent in a civil anti-
trust action. 1 2 Even when civil liability is primarily based upon a mere
anticompetitive effect, intent remains an important determinant.113 Ar-
guably, then, if the antitrust defendant has no wrongful intent or
knowledge of a possible anticompetitive effect, as the Second Circuit
held in Hydrolevel,11 ' liability should be narrowly defined so as to ex-
clude apparent authority as a basis115 for liability. More importantly,
content, in this case, to the requirement in § 1 of the Sherman Act that
antitrust plaintiffs demonstrate a contract, combination or conspiracy. Did
James - acting for ASME - conspire with Hardin - acting for M & M
and Hartford Steam ... ? Or was it the other way around? Could it be
said under the Court's theory, that James conspired with himself - as a
double agent - thereby committing both of his "principals" to an anti-
trust conspiracy?"
Id.
109. Id. at 1956 (quoting the Second Circuit Court, 635 F.2d at 131).
110. See Wirtz, Purpose and Effect in Sherman Act Conspiracies, 57 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 45 (1981). See also Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 361-62, 388; W.
LAFAVE & A. Scor, CRIMINAL LAW 464-65 (1972) ("in a conspiracy, two different
types of intent are generally required, the basic intent to agree, which is necessary to
establish the existence of the conspiracy, and the more traditional intent to effectuate
the object of the conspiracy.") Compare Note, Developments in the Law - Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 1000-05 (1959).
111. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 436 n.13 (1978);
United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333, 337 (1969); United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106, 179 (1911); Standard Oil Co. v. United States 221
U.S. 1, 58 (1911).
112. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. at 436 n.13.
113. Id. ("[o]f course consideration of intent may play an important role in di-
vining the actual nature and effect of the alleged anti-competitive conduct"). See Chi-
cago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
114. See 635 F.2d at 131.
115. Howe & Badger, supra note 1, at 388 ("proof of apparent agency, simply
should not be admissable").
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intent is clearly a significant factor in choosing the sanction to be im-
posed upon the antitrust violator,118 and defendants without a wrongful
intent, such as ASME, should not be subject to punitive treble
damages. 117
In assessing the results of Justice Blackmun's refusal to deal with
these important but unsettled areas of conspiracy and antitrust law,
Justice Powell proclaims: "The Court simply opens new vistas in the
law of conspiracy and vicarious liability, as well as in the imposition of
the harsh penalty of punitive damages."11 8 "In view of this ...one
would not have expected the Court to take the occasion of this case to
promulgate an expansive rule of antitrust liability not heretofore ap-
plied by it to a commercial enterprise much less to a nonprofit
organization."119
Nonprofit Organizations: New Victims For Treble Damages
In holding ASME liable as a Sherman Act violator, the Supreme
Court "[substantially broadens] the treble damages concept' 20 by ap-
plying the strict sanction to a nonprofit organization for the first
time.1 21 In Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar1 22 the Court ruled that non-
116. Wirtz, supra note 110, at 44-47.
117. The question thus arises whether the mere act of entering, without a
wrongful purpose, into an agreemnet that proves to have anti-competitive
effects, renders a party liable to the full range of Sherman Act sanctions,
including treble damages and criminal punishment. It would be surprising
if the answer were yes.
Id. at 45. See also Areeda, Antitrust Immunity for State Action after Lafayette, 95
HARV. L. REV. 435, 455 (1981) ("[A]ntitrust liability does not necessarily call for a
damage remedy ... [T]he Supreme Court may come to agree that antitrust liability
may vary according to the remedies sought.").
118. 102 S. Ct. 1935, 1956. "[The Court] stretches the concept of vicarious lia-
bility beyond its rational limits to conceive of Hardin and James as conspiring on be-
half of ASME when they acted . . . against the interests of ASME." Id. at 1936.
119. Id. at 1950.
120. Young, Court Widens Treble Damage Liability for Nonprofit Societies, 68
A.B.A. J. 846 (1982).
121. Id. See also 102 S. Ct. at 1935, 1949 n.2.
122. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). The Goldfarb Court ruled that a state bar associa-
tion's practice of publishing a minimum fee schedule for attorneys constituted price-
fixing in violation of the Sherman Act, and was an enjoinable activity. Id.
7:1983
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profit associations were not entirely exempt from the antitrust laws.123
However, in so doing the Court urged that such associations be allowed
a different standard of liability than the typical commercial antitrust
defendant. The Goldfarb Court ruled that:
It would be unrealistic to view [these associations] as inter-
changeable with other business activities, and automatically to ap-
ply ...antitrust concepts which originated in other areas. The
public service aspects and other features of the professions, may
require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated
differently. 124
Goldfarb's holding that noncommercial organizations are deserv-
ing of a narrower view with respect to potential antitrust liability was
reiterated in National Society of Professional Engineers v. United
States125 where the Court upheld an injunction against a nonprofit soci-
ety. The Court ruled that an appropriate antitrust remedy could be
"fashioned" for the nonprofit defendant, 26 and stated that, "the stan-
dard. . . is whether the relief represents a reasonable method of elim-
inating the consequences of the illegal conduct."12 Arguably, ASME's
treble damages liability does not follow this standard and, at best, ac-
tual damages might have served as a more appropriate sanction.12 8
Interestingly, the National Society of Professional Engineer's
holding was supported by Justice Blackmun who stated in a concur-
Prior to Goldfarb it was generally assumed that professional associations like
ASME, were exempt from the operations of antitrust laws. See Goldfarb v. Virginia
State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-15 (4th Cir. 1974); Bauer, Professional Activities and the
Antitrust Laws, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW., 570, 571-92 (1975).
123. 421 U.S. at 787.
124. Id. at 788 n.17.
125. 435 U.S. 679 (1978) ("We adhere to the view expressed in Goldfarb that,
by nature, professional services may differ significantly from other business ser-
vices. . . ."). See generally Posner, Information and Antitrust: Reflections on the
Gypsum and Engineers Decisions, 67 GEo. L.J. 1187 (1979); Note, Rule of Reason,
Per Se Rule and Professional Groups: National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States, 20 B.C. L. REv. 716 (1979).
126. 435 U.S. at 697.
127. Id. (emphasis added).
128. See supra notes 114-17 and accompanying text.
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rence, "In my view, the decision in Goldfarb . . . properly left to the
Court some flexibility in considering how to apply traditional Sherman
Act concepts to professions long consigned to self-regulation."129 Ar-
guably, Hydrolevel sees this "flexibility" approach to nonprofit entities
ignored as the majority disregards ASME's nonprofit status1 30 and rig-
idly imposes treble damages. The Court states, "the fact that ASME is
a nonprofit organization does not weaken the force of the antitrust...
principles that indicate that ASME should be liable ....
Even though ASME was not a business competitor of anyone,1 3 2
the Court, in finding the nonprofit organization liable, claims to follow
the intent of Congress. 33 In fact, the Congressional author of the anti-
trust act, Senator Sherman addressed the issue of extending liability
under the act to noncommercial entities such as ASME. He stated,
"[The act] does not interfere in the slightest degree with voluntary as-
sociations . . . to advance the interests of a particular trade or occupa-
tion. They are not business combinations. They do not deal with con-
tracts, agreements, etc. They have no connection with them."14
Clearly, "this legislative history. . . counsel[s] against adopting a new
rule of agency law that extends the exposure of such [nonprofit] organi-
zations to potentially destructive treble damage liability. 13 5
Conclusion
The Supreme Court's decision in American Society of Mechanical
Engineers v. Hydrolevel 8 expands potential antitrust liability by re-
jecting four established principles of liability: (1) the apparent author-
ity theory of the law of agency previously had no application in anti-
129. 435 U.S. at 699 (emphasis added).
130. 102 S. Ct. 1947 ("in addition, ASME contends it should not bear the risk
of loss for antitrust violations committed by its agents acting with apparent authority
because it is a nonprofit organization, not a business seeking profit. But it is beyond
debate that nonprofit organizations can be held liable").
131. Id. at 1947-48 (emphasis added).
132. Id. at 1956.
133. Id. at 1943 n.6.
134. 21 CONG. REC. 2562 (1890).
135. 102 S. Ct. at 1952.
136. Id. at 1935.
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trust law,137 (2) when apparent authority was used outside the antitrust
area, it disallowed imputation of punitive damages to the principal, 38
(3) a Sherman Act conspiracy to restrain trade generally required a
plurality of actors'3 9 and (4) nonprofit organizations previously were
free from the treble damages sanction for liability in antitrust. 40
Hydrolevel unnecessarily "launches on an uncharted course"' 41 by
broadening antitrust liability, especially because ASME was already
found responsible by the district court on traditional antitrust grounds.
James R. Palmer
137. See supra notes 54-78 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 79 - 98 and accompanying text.
139. See supra notes 99 - 119 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 120 - 135 and accompanying text.
141. 102 S. Ct. at 1951. (Powell, J., Dissent).
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